Photo: david abdalla

Whatever feelings one might harbor towards international individual and group stances on Arab problems, it would be useful for everyone to carefully analyze these stances. Such stances are adapted to the nature of relations between international players, most prominently the five nuclear countries that are permanent members of the Security Council: the United States, China, Russia, Britain and France. Arab concerns during this period are focused on what is going through the mind of Israel and Iran, as well as Turkey to a lesser extent. Arab arenas that have remained on top of the list of concerns are Palestine and Lebanon, as well as Syria if a regional war were to break out. Iraq, in spite of being highly important, remains in the upper half of the list, but not on top. Arabs are concerned with what is happening in Egypt, albeit from a distance. Yemen comes to mind from time to time, although it might be the most dangerous Arab country. Somalia makes an appearance every time it deepens the hole it is digging for itself. Sudan, which ranks quite high in terms of international concern, nearly goes by unnoticed on the screen of Arab cares. There are numerous and noteworthy examples of the standing of Arab issues on the list of priorities. Nevertheless, what retains the highest rank in terms of protest, reproach, blame or hatred is the broad US policy that has accompanied all presidents and administrations with negligible measures of difference, characterized by the traditional bias and blind loyalty to Israel. And because the Iranian-Israeli equation reflects, and in fact sometimes erupts, in Arab arenas, it is imperative to closely examine the stances of China and Russia today towards each of Iran, Israel and the Arab arenas between the two that are likely to erupt, knowing that it has never happened in the history of bilateral relations between the two countries or the two peoples for a direct clash to take place, in small or large-scale battles. Such arenas are most prominently Palestine and Lebanon, as well as Iraq. International attention is turned first and foremost towards Iran, whereas Arab attention is focused on both Israel and Iran.

Highly noteworthy was the warning by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev this week for the first time that “Iran is moving closer to possessing the potential which in principle could be used for the creation of nuclear weapons”, in what seemed to echo the statement made by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Leon Panetta last month, which Medvedev had then considered “worrying”. Both the US and Russian warnings coincided with an Iranian stance being issued that asserted Iran’s possession of a large amount of 20 percent enriched uranium, in a clear and direct challenge to the two countries and the recent UN Security Council Resolution which imposed additional sanctions on Iran. Russia and China are not alone in excluding a military strike against Iran. US President Barack Obama also does not want military engagement, but rather political engagement through dialogue and negotiating with Iran. The Security Council Resolution has granted the authority to impose sanctions and made clear that such authority does not include that of undertaking any military action. Yet Russia and China will not be able to continue to protect Iran if the leadership in Tehran continues to challenge and defy in the nuclear issue. Even Russian and Chinese diplomats are at a loss regarding the behavior coming out of Tehran, from the nuclear issue, to the stoning of an Iranian woman accused of adultery, up to a social dictatorship that imposes “legal” hairdos under the threat of being punished by the government. Iran’s escalation may result from overwhelming anger at the extent to which the sanctions are harmful to the leadership and the regime, even if the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) claims to benefit from them. It is unlikely, though not entirely excluded, for the purpose of such escalation to be that of inviting an Israeli, American or Israeli-American military strike against Iran in order to turn the tables – in other words, for inviting a military strike against Iran to be tantamount to calling upon the Muslim street to line up behind Iran against Israel and the United States.

The fate of the Iranian leadership’s wager on the Muslim street may be the same as that of toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s wager on the Arab street. Indeed, the regime was ousted and the street did not move with the momentum to save it, neither before nor after the Iraq war. Furthermore, mobilizing the Muslim street seems to be a race between many, most prominently the Iranian regime and Al-Qaeda, knowing that they both compete against each other under the banner of fighting the US and Israel, in spite of the sectarian disagreement between them. What is important about this, from an international perspective, is that the US is not the only one to be afraid of and to oppose any Muslim mobilization whatever its reasons and regardless of who is behind it. Russia and China do not want any Muslim mobilization because each of them has its own battle with extremist Islamists. Thus Iran’s wager on China and Russia may be a losing one, especially if the escalation is based on two fundamental issues – the nuclear issue and that of Muslim mobilization – because China and Russia being forced to join the United States and Europe in sanctions may be unavoidable. Furthermore, such a wager on escalation and confrontation may lead to increasing the odds of military authority being given by a Security Council Resolution as a means of preempting and containing a reckless Israeli adventure against Iran. Today, this is highly unlikely. Tomorrow, it might be on the radar if the leadership in Iran fails to realize it. That is why such risk-taking is dangerous.

If on the other hand the leadership in Tehran have in mind to detonate the region through the gateways of Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon, then each gateway has its own considerations which should be carefully examined, especially from the perspective of the Arabs who applaud the roles played by Iran and forget about the restrictions that besiege and weaken such roles. Thus, detonating the region from the gateway of Iraq is dangerous for Iran because it is surrounded, besieged, isolated and weak. Indeed, any fragmentation or war erupting in Iraq near Iran would only threaten Iran’s stability, through its border and within its own territory, in view of the number of minorities who are not at ease in Iran, including the Arab minority.