Increasing omens of a civil war erupting in Syria are being accompanied by a combination of “escaping forward”, avoiding a “Plan B” and burying heads in the sand - with regard to what a civil war might result in if it were to occur. The timeframe which Security Council members have in mind revolves around the plan of the joint UN-AL Envoy Kofi Annan and the mandate of the UN delegation of monitors ratified by the Security Council, which expires on July 21st. Everyone is in trouble in one way or another. Security Council members are in trouble because they have been hiding behind Annan’s plan and their “consensus” that has now become a decisive drive, as division has prevailed and resulted in a dual veto by Russia and China, twice so far. They are in trouble because they are afraid to think of a “Plan B”, despite the fact that at least half the members of the Council are entirely convinced that the regime in Damascus will not fulfill its pledges, and will not engage in a political process that would lead to pluralism, to replace the Baath Party’s stranglehold over power. The Syrian regime in turn is in trouble because – regardless of how arrogantly it behaves, leaving the impression that it is convinced that it will remain in power without making concessions – it realizes that a Syrian civil war would ultimately remove it from power. The Syrian opposition is in trouble because it is in a state of fragmentation and division, especially when the issue of civil war is discussed, and does not seem to be ready with a “Plan B” in the case of the current situation remaining unchanged, or if Kofi Annan’s plan collapses. When opposition leaders meet under the sponsorship of the League of Arab States next week, they will not find cohesion in the stances of the Arab League, which in turn is in trouble because it does not want to bear responsibility in the case of a civil war erupting, and does not want to think of a “Plan B”, because that is one hot potato it prefers to throw to Kofi Annan and the international community. As for the major leaders of the international community, they will be ‘escaping forward’, or will try to anyway, at their important meetings over the next two weeks in the United States – the G8 and NATO summits – while being hounded by the current situation in Syria, which entails regional dimensions that burying heads in the sand will not help avoid.
The nearest discussion of “Plan B” scenarios revolves around Turkey thinking of putting forward Article 5 before the gathering of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) in Chicago on the 20th and 21st of this month in order to obtain some support for either “safe corridors” or military operations, on the basis of its own security being threatened at its border with Syria. Turkey might not obtain outright support from its NATO allies, but it will pave the way in Chicago for such a possibility. This does not mean that NATO countries will be waging war, by air or by land through Turkey, in Syria. Rather, it means that Turkey could receive the cover it seeks from the North Atlantic Alliance, after having reached the conclusion that there was absolutely no way to issue a Security Council resolution that would grand the authority to establish such corridors. To be sure, Russia and China have made it clear that their bilateral relationship was a strategic one all the way, and that they are in the same trench with regard to the situation in Syria, regardless of what change might occur here or whose anger might be aroused there. They have resolved to support the regime in Damascus and to consider Kofi Annan’s plan to be the roadmap for resolving the situation in Syria, on the basis of their own interpretation of this plan, including the fact that it does not at all mean changing the regime.
Ankara is well aware of the fact that the priority of consensus at the Security Council has done away with any possibility of issuing a resolution “with teeth” – whether in terms of imposing sanctions against the regime in Syria or in terms of establishing safe corridors, even for humanitarian ends. It is currently in a state of quasi-enmity at the state level with Damascus. What weakens its stance is the leadership of the ruling party – headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political parties. Indeed, Ankara had succeeded, temporarily, at convincing the West that it should not fear the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. And then came the experience of Egypt – and with it those of the other Arab countries which the Arab Spring has undergone – to pour cold water on the enthusiasm of the West and the world. This experience has radically contributed to helping the ruling regime in Syria, in addition to strengthening Russia’s fears from the rise of Islamists to power.
What is worth observing over the next two weeks will be the “charm” displayed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the face of similar “charm” displayed by Vladimir Putin, nicknamed “Putin the Tsar” in the wake of being crowned President of Russia - most probably for the next 12 years. Neither of them is famous for his charisma, but they are both violent in their persistence and their insistence on winning and emerging victorious. The battle between the two concerning Syria is noteworthy not just in terms of their personalities, but also in terms of the conflicting, contrasting and overlapping stances taken by Russia and Turkey vis-ŕ-vis Iran. Additionally, the stances of both men on Iran include the important aspect of their relations with the Arab Gulf states, and in particular with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has made it clear that it considers the situation in Syria to represent the linchpin within the framework of its relations with the Islamic Republic in Tehran.
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