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Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov’s
proposal to reopen the Shebaa Farms file in order to resolve the
issue of
“Hizbullah’s activities and the situation in the region” is
noteworthy, both in terms of its gist and timing. Indeed, this
minister, who formerly represented his country at the United
Nations for several years, clearly understands what led the UN to
draw the Blue Line in such a way as to include the Shebaa Farms
within Syrian-occupied territory, which falls under the
jurisdiction of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).
Lavrov’s proposal came one day after the in-depth
talks he conducted in Washington, and after his meeting with UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. These talks had focused on Moscow’s
leadership role in the Iranian dossier as well as Russia’s
perspective on the regional ramifications of this dossier on
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. And that is important.
Lavrov’s
visit to Washington and New York overlapped with Lebanese Druze
leader Walid Jumblatt’s
trip to the U.S. capital and the UN. Jumblatt, too, noted that the
Shebaa Farms issue is central to the implementation of UN
Resolution 1559 and the [success of the ] Lebanese national
dialogue.
During the
upcoming week, Lavrov will receive his Syrian counterpart, Walid
Al-Moallem, in Moscow, and, according to Lavrov, they will discuss “UN Security
Council resolutions,” and the importance of cooperating with the
UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC)
into the terrorist act that claimed the life of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, UNIIIC Chief
Judge Serge Brammertz, who replaced German investigator Detlev
Mehlis, will also present his first report to the UN Security
Council next week. It is said that the report will be “technical”
in nature, because Brammertz is responsible for preparing the case
for prosecution before a court of law. But the report will not
conclusively say whether Syria cooperated fully with the
investigation or not.
Syria might
consider that buying time would be in its favor, and it might be
right about this. But this is not necessarily true, since
Brammertz could use the time which Syria and its allies are trying
to gain to prepare a report that would tie every perpetrator to
the assassination crime of Hariri and those who died with him. For
this reason, it is being said that Brammertz will deliberately not
state things clearly in his report, even though he might allude to
the implication of a certain country in the region in the crime.
Brammertz’
reason for keeping things vague is because he is acting like a
general prosecutor instead of a chief investigator who gathers
evidence. His aim is not to cause a big bang with his interim
report, but to confidently present a final report that would allow
him to proceed to the prosecution phase.
During this
month, Kofi Annan is expected to present his report to the UN
Security Council on what the UN legal counsel and under-secretary
for legal affairs, Nicolas Michel, and a Lebanese judicial
delegation agreed on with respect to their negotiations over the
establishment of a tribunal of an international character.
All progress
towards the establishment of the tribunal is very important since
it [i.e., the tribunal] should be ready to roll as soon as the
investigation draws to a close. Indeed, its creation should not be
allowed to drag “for years,” as some
are saying. It is important to keep a close link between the
creation of a tribunal and the investigation, something which
Brammertz seems to be aware of, since he has been closely
coordinating with the UN’s legal department which has been
handling the tribunal dossier.
Also to watch
out for in the second half of March (on the Lebanese-Syrian front)
is the visit of Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN secretary-general’s
special envoy who is entrusted with monitoring the implementation
of UN Security Resolution 1559. Roed-Larsen has started making
contact with several important regional and international players,
including officials in Washington, a few days ago, and the Saudi
Ambassador to Washington, Prince Turki al-Faysal, last week.
At this
point, the focus of all international discussions will be to
conclusively specify the identity and ownership of the Shebaa
Farms, as this has a direct relationship with the concept of
resistance which Hizbullah holds onto. Indeed, resolving the
Shebaa issue and determining whether it belongs to Lebanon or
falls under Syrian jurisdiction would cover a major part of the
Lebanese national dialogue—that
which is related to Hizbullah and UN Resolution 1559 which calls
for the dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
For this
reason, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggests that “we go back
to the Shebaa Farms issue, as this could help defuse the situation
especially in terms of Hizbullah activities and the general
regional situation,” he is, in fact, taking a stand that is both
remarkable and important. But Minister Lavrov, who has great
diplomatic skills, should deal with matters with greater urgency
instead of postponing them to a later date. It is important to
confront this matter immediately, as failure to do so might warn
of great dangers.
Lavrov knows exactly that the
Shebaa issue has two regional dimensions: a Syrian one that is
direct, and an Iranian one which is the result of an fundamental
relationship between Hizbullah and Iran.
Russian
diplomats are requested to deal with Syria with clarity and
resoluteness when it comes to the Shebaa Farms; otherwise, they
would be encouraging Syria to prevent a Lebanese national
reconciliation and to use the Shebaa Farms for its own interests.
Walid Al-Moallem’s
visit to Moscow is the perfect opportunity to address the Shebaa
Farms issue. And the fastest, cleanest and best way to resolve the
issue is to have the Syrian government demarcate the borders with
Lebanon right now. If Damascus possesses documents that prove
Lebanese ownership of these farms, then let it present them to the
United Nations, although it did not previously present such
documents despite its constant reiteration that these farms are
Lebanese.
If the documents prove
Lebanese ownership over the Shebaa Farms, then the farms would
cease to be under UNDOF jurisdiction, becoming occupied Lebanese
territory instead. In that case, Israel would be faced with two
choices: either it would refuse to pull out of Shebaa, thus
strengthening Hizbullah ’s
position as a resistance, or it would agree to withdraw from
Shebaa, and thus, Syria would have contributed in liberating Arab
land from Israeli occupation, and it would be thanked for its good
intentions.
Lavrov, in answer to an Al-Hayat question
during a meeting with the international press two days ago [March
8] said that he had received from Washington
“confirmation about
some information we had also received that infiltration into Iraq
from Syria had subsided.” With these words, Lavrov was insinuating
that Moscow is playing an active role in influencing the countries
of the region in such a way as to help US priorities.
Moreover,
Russia’s
and, more specifically, Lavrov’s
leadership of the Iranian nuclear file would grant Russia some
important leverage that would help both its interests and those of
the United States. This leverage could be used on hot issues in
the region, including Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria, and Iraq, all of
which are issued with an Iranian dimension as well.
On the one
hand, it would be useful for Russia to factor the regional
dimension of the Iranian role into the negotiations it is
currently conducting, because Iran is effectively linking its
nuclear issue with its regional role, in its own strategy. On the
other hand, Russian diplomacy should avoid an excessive use of “trade-offs,”
especially if these should come at the expense of international
resolutions. It is thus required to be careful, to monitor and to
study every step.
The United States seems to be
behaving with more restraint with respect to the Iranian issue, as
compared to how it dealt with Iraq, unilaterally waging war
against it despite the refusal of members of the UN Security
Council to grant it authority to do so. Indeed, the US
administration has been moving slowly and cautiously with respect
to Iran, while consulting with other [Security Council members].
It has not been acting unilaterally, despite the escalated tone it
has been using with Iran, threatening with
“serious
ramifications,” in the words of Vice-President Dick Cheney. But
the United States’ restraint does not grant Iran the right to toy
with the nuclear issue, and it does not give it free rein with
respect to its regional leverage.
Strategic considerations
leave regional players with enough leeway to either agree or part
ways on some matters. But there are also taboos. For instance,
Tehran and Syria are forbidden from setting up an axis that would
pass through south Iraq to reach Lebanon via Hizbullah, even
though such an axis might be almost a fait accompli at this
point.
For the first time, the
United Nations finds itself the gatekeeper in such matters,
because of its resolutions and achievements. For instance, the
Shebaa Farms can serve as the key to resolving Hizbullah ’s
relationship with Lebanon, in addition to determining the type of
relation the party will maintain with Syria and Iran. Moreover,
the international investigation into Hariri’s
assassination will also serve as the key to determining the future
relationship between Lebanon and Syria, regardless of whether
Moscow will succeed in reconciling Washington with Damascus on the
Iraqi front, or whether the countries of the region would play a
“pacifying” role for the sake of “stability” in the region. For
this reason, Russia would do Syria the biggest favor if it tells
it clearly and firmly that any future role it wants to play in
Lebanon would not receive Russia’s blessings from now on. This is
what the international resolutions stipulate, and this is what
Russia should do if it were truly committed to implementing them.
Indeed, Moscow does not need to play a misleading role with Syria
and Iran like the one it played with the former Iraqi regime by
insinuating that it [Russia] could provide it [Iraq] with some
kind of protection against sanctions, under all conditions.
During the
past few days, Minister Lavrov stood before TV cameras, surrounded
by a huge crowd of international reporters because of the
international interest in Iran. According to him, the scene
reminded him of the massive crowd of reporters who were at the
United Nations right before the beginning of the war in Iraq when
then-diplomat Lavrov [who was the Russian ambassador to the UN]
supported Baghdad before TV and newspaper journalists, something
which led ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to believe that he
enjoyed Russian “protection.” But
then the war came, despite the opinions of those objecting to it.
In fact, the “other objector,” Germany, was actually providing the
United States with essential intelligence information, thus
allowing the US to topple the regime at the speed it did.
Perhaps
Lavrov committed a Freudian slip when he likened Iran’s
nuclear crisis situation now with the pre-Iraq war phase. Perhaps
Cheney’s warning to Iran from the stage of the pro-Israeli lobby
group, AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee], was
merely a coincidence and not a green light for Israel to launch a
military strike against the Iranian nuclear reactor. Perhaps all
military talk is for public consumption, but that is not
necessary.
So while the Shebaa Farms
might allow for a Lebanese national reconciliation if all parties
agree on its Lebanese identity, any US blessing of an Israeli
military strike in Iran would open Lebanon up to more revenge on
the part of Iran through Hizbullah, and this could destroy the
dream of a true Lebanese independence in Lebanon. |
