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MEANS OF SALVATION: But ‘people power’ can still be used as
a means of salvation for some Arab countries, as long as their leaders
understand that they have no choice but to enter into alliances with
their masses in order to save their countries—and their own necks.
Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt are examples of how leaders can make use of
people power to improve their countries rather than seeing the people
as enemies that have to be crushed.
The Arab states of the Gulf are different matter altogether. They
cannot hope to build healthy relationships with their peoples so long
as they insist on rationing democracy and reform.
As for those (many) Arab countries that saw oppression as the only
answer to their Islamists’ quest for power, they are frankly surprised
at Washington’s decision to do away with their services in fighting
terrorism—which makes it more difficult for them to confront internal
opposition.
Relations between Arab peoples and their rulers on the one hand, and
between the peoples and American policies on the other are still ruled
by suspicion. What is new is that some Arab governments have
diversified, abandoning their previous absolute reliance on the United
States.
Some Arab regimes feel betrayed because they believed that they
enjoyed enough good will in Washington to keep them in power come what
may. Some still hope that the U.S. will resume its old policy of
linking American interests to the stability of traditional Arab
regimes once George W. Bush’s term is over.
Those
hopes will be dashed, simply because there is a new element Arab
leaders have to contend with: A new public mood. Disagreements and
divisions over American intentions and policies might help to
undermine any feelings of optimism in the Arab world. It would be a
mistake for Arab rulers to misread this new mood, which is being
expressed as calls for ‘the truth’ in Lebanon, demonstrations
screaming ‘enough’ in Egypt, or simply silently denuding the rulers of
legitimacy.
The
messages are clear and unambiguous. Disagreements in the Arab street
only have to do with the role played by the United States in the
process of change taking place in the region. Nevertheless, Arab
leaders still have options.
Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, for example, still has other options
besides feeling angry and fearful at the international and regional
pressures being exerted upon him because of the mistakes he made in
Lebanon, Iraq, and in Syria itself. He can choose to abandon what has
traditionally been seen in Syria as the country’s regional
weight—through its alliances with Iran and certain Lebanese and
Palestinian parties.
Assad
has the option of admitting that Syria needs an alternative strategy,
one that abandons the concept of relying on non-Syrian parties to
project influence in the region. What the Syrians have to do is admit
that their country can play an effective role in the region on its
own, without depending on the help of others. This necessitates
abandoning the tendency to link Syrian influence to events outside
Syrian borders. The time for such policies is gone, and the sooner the
Syrian leadership understands this the better.
Should Assad decide to adopt such a strategy, he must be brave enough
to enter into new alliances; alliances with the Syrian masses, the
only party that can impart legitimacy on the Assad regime and protect
it from outside interference. Only the Syrian people can prevent the
balkanization of Syria—so long as the Syrian people trust their
government and vice versa. This trust is nonexistent at the time being
(although the Syrian regime says otherwise), which is extremely
dangerous—not to mention just plain wrong.
Youthful elements in the Syrian leadership can ask the old guard to
step aside. The old guard has not brought prosperity and international
stature to Syria; quite the contrary. So Assad has an excuse to act,
and should he choose to act now, Syria will have a chance. If the
Syrian leader procrastinates however that would only strengthen the
impression already prevalent in the international community that he is
actually a dinosaur in disguise.
Syria’s welfare is in the interests of all Arabs—not only Syrians.
Therefore Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon is useful not only to
Lebanon but to Syria as well. It is time Syria took care of its own
people. It is time for the Syrian leadership to turn to Syria the
country, rather than Syria the idea with regional pretensions. The
Syrians have a chance to do so now by abandoning their regional
strategy that is based on regional alliances.
A
U.S. congressman with knowledge of Syrian and Lebanese affairs
recently said: ‘Even the chaos that comes from Syria does not scare
us.’ His message to Damascus is that it must stop seeking returns for
every positive step it takes. Syria, the congressman said, must stop
its scare-mongering because this strategy will rebound on it and fast.
The policies of the past, he said, are no longer effective—except as
far as self-harm is concerned.
The
choice is Syria’s to make. In Lebanon, its withdrawal will only be
seen to be complete if it cuts off all ties to Lebanese security
agencies. Should the Syrians accomplish that, they would have taken an
important step towards its neighbors. But that would not be enough;
Syria also has to mend its ties with its own silent but seething
people.
As
for Lebanon, there are other worries besides the Syrian presence. The
Lebanese economy is in pretty bad shape, and the challenge to rebuild
will test the capabilities of the Lebanese people to the limit. Gulf
money—vital to the well-being of the Lebanese economy and the local
currency—could take flight because of worries about insecurity. The
result would be a slowing of the pace of change in Lebanon, especially
if American and European money does not rush in to replace it.
However, if the Lebanese (born businesspeople as they are) decide to
invest in their country’s future, Gulf investors might well decide to
stay, and even American and European investors would be encouraged to
pour money in the country. The first step however has to come from the
Lebanese themselves. If they succeed, the Lebanese experiment could
act as an example in democracy and change for other countries in the
region.
One
early spin-off of the Lebanese experience has been the growth of the
dissident Kifaya (Enough) movement in Egypt. Kifaya
seeks change, which can either come about in cooperation with the
regime (if the latter were smart enough to appreciate the need to
accommodate dissent) or by taking matters in its own hands.
Yet both the Lebanese and Egyptian experiments in dissent are under
threat—for different reasons. While they both have to contend with
official arrogance and oppression, they also suffer from domestic
suspicion that they receive support from outside. Which brings us back
to the American role.
Those
who preach that democracy in the Arab world would come at the hands of
George Bush believe that they have won in Iraq, and that that country
has become a beacon of democracy for the entire region. These people
are fools; worse, they are blind fools who are jealous of Bush’s
espousal of the ideas of [Israeli right-wing leader] Nathan Sharansky,
who believes that Arab democracy is a prerequisite for solving the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
This
is a flawed and wrongheaded analysis that ignores obvious facts. In
fact, it is this understanding that stands in the way of democratic
change in the Arab world. It is also the main reason why the United
States is viewed with so much distrust on the Arab street.
While solving the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be a prerequisite
for democracy in the Arab world, democracy should not be a
precondition for solving that problem. Those Arabs who wish to
neutralize the Palestinian question completely by championing George
W. Bush have evil intentions; they are apologists for American and
Israeli extremists and suffer from a Sharansky complex. Their backing
for George W. is their way of getting back at his father and his
policies.
George W. Bush’s policies are good for the region only in so far as
they avoid seeing Arab regimes as essential for stability. But there
is no indication that the current U.S. administration has a coherent
and workable alternative to support Arab opposition movements. In
fact, there are signs that Bush’s current policy is only designed to
sow chaos and anarchy in the region as a way to overthrow Arab
regimes.
Some Arabs welcome this anyway, since they believe that the existing
situation is intolerable. Others believe that Bush is fighting
terrorism on the Arabs’ behalf. While some Arabs want to overthrow
their government even if that involved war and anarchy, others are
suspicious of the Americans and their policies.
During a conference on Democracy and Free Trade held in the Gulf state
of Qatar last week, Qatari FM Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim said: ‘I fear
that optimism might turn to anger, and that the (Arab) thirst for
democracy might turn to anger.’ Hamad is right to be afraid,
especially if Arab regimes continue to be alienated from their
peoples.
In
the same conference, Arab League secretary-general Amr Musa said: ‘We
are scared, confused, and angry.’ With these words, Musa reflected the
mood of the Arab masses, which by the way are not entirely negative in
spite of the fear, confusion, and anger.
In fact, it is precisely these feelings that create a desire and
readiness for change; they are the tools Arab masses have neglected
for generations, but are now coming to the fore in many an Arab
capital with varying degrees of forcefulness.
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