Iran is at the very heart of the Arab’s worry that the United States might either strike the Grand Bargain that excludes them, or, venture into an accidental or predetermined military confrontation with Iran that might prove costly to them. 

The single most worrisome aspect of Arab nervousness is that they just do not know where American policy is at now or is going to in the future. Exacerbating this uncertainty is the clear intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pursue its nuclear aspirations and regional ambitions throughout the Gulf via Iraq, and throughout the Arab world via Palestine and Lebanon.

The declining confidence in the United States did not come with President George W. Bush alone. Doubting the sustainability of American vows- including Mr. Bush's promises- is nothing new. Rather, the reputation of the United States throughout various administrations and under various presidents has been one of unreliability. 

This reputation takes a life of its own during the period of no-war/no-stability. 

It might be a bit excessive to conclude that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report has emasculated President Bush and vice president Dick Cheney and that the Iranian regime is now exonerated from any accountability for whatever it does in the world. 

Such a conclusion might lead to dangerous repercussions that might spark an incident or ignite a war. 

This fear of such an accidental confrontation had some Arab leaders return to the drawing table devising strategies. They had just gone back to the table only weeks ago when they were struck with the unexpected NIE report. Its publication amounted to taking the American military option off the table when it concluded that Iran had stopped its nuclear military program in 2003. 

The report compounded Arab doubt and fear of Washington's apparent confusion when it comes to Iran. They now believe that their interest dictates the drafting of new policies other than those in which the US is a serious partner- be it on Iraq, Palestine or Lebanon- the country that may turn into an Iranian base if it collapses. Or be it in the ways of standing up to Iran and its ally, Syria- the Arab country that sings outside the Arab fold. 

Some Arab leaders ridicule the idea of splitting Iran from Syria believing their strategic relationship and their dual entanglement in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, are too deep and interdependent. Some concur with the Israeli view of the possibility of splitting Syria from Iran. Others feel that the only way to block any spread of Iranian influence into Lebanon and beyond is to target Syria.

Irrespective of whether these point of views are futile or promising, it is clear that Arabs are thinking about alternatives to complete reliance on their American partner as they face the regional ambitions of the mullahs' regime in Tehran. They are especially aware that the American war in Iraq gave the mullahs of Iran and their regime the gift of a tremendous influence in Iraq. 

American politicians and policymakers must assess the significance of enabling the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran- which came to power in 1979- to eventually succeed in exporting its model to the Arab states. Americans must contemplate what does the expansion of the Mullahs regime produce as it imposes its ideology, suppress fundamental freedoms and oppress women. 

Americans should think about the consequences of rewarding countries that stand accused of harboring and exporting terror, and to giving in to intransigence and blackmail. 

They must understand that the situation requires more than a mere expression of anger and bitterness about President Bush and his policies. 

Opposing both the military option and containment through sanctions isn't enough. Those who oppose should put forward their views for the post-dismantlement of the "containment" policy, post taking the military option off the table, post-rehabilitation of the mullahs' regime and post-installing Iran as an overlord state in the Middle East.

This, most certainly, is not a call to use American military force in a war against Iran; it's a call for using all of the available tools to decisively inform the Iranian regime that it will not be allowed to export its model, its revolution and its militias. The regime in Tehran must be decisively be told to stop its proxy wars, whether in Iraq, Lebanon or any neighboring Gulf state. 

In other words, if the United States is going to strike the "Grand Bargain" with the Iranian regime- as some Americans are calling for- it must first of all make abundantly clear to the mullahs and their revolutionaries that, in exchange for recognizing their regime within their boundaries, they must, first, completely abandon their regional aspirations for hegemony and exporting their model beyond their borders. 

Secondly, they must be served notice to keep their hands off Lebanon and stop using this country as a tool for their own regional aspirations. To this end, Tehran must inform Hizbullah that it won't realize the dream of those who want to turn Lebanon into an Iranian base. 
This will require a "face-saving" deal for Iran and for Hizbullah- one that will enable Hisbullah to turn over their weapons to the State of Lebanon and take their seat in the political process as a party and not as a state within a state.

This "Grand Bargain" should not lead to an American-Iranian shared hegemony over Iraq, as Iran demands. Such a division of Iraq would sow anger and bitterness and would be costly for the long-term Iraqi and American interests. 

Should such an understanding take place, the US will be subject to vengeance and attacks for having robbed Iraq of its strategic rightful place in the Arab world and in the Arab-Iranian-Israeli-Turkish balance of power in the region. Furthermore, there will be Arab Sunni vengeance against the United States if this country is perceived to have launched wars to carve out the oil-rich enclaves and establish a Shiite power in a so-called Petrolistan.

Iran needs the US in Iraq. Any American withdrawal, which would leave behind a fragmented and collapsed Iraq, would be costly for Iran's interests and regime, especially since it is facing a potential rebellion by large minorities within the country, such as the Baluchis, Turkmen, and Arabs. 

When Tehran caught a whiff of the successful strategy of the surge in Iraq, it sent messages and signals voicing its desire to engage in dialogue and cooperate. Iranians know very well how to speak the language of national interests and they have a history of perfecting the cleverness of politics in the service of interests. The mullahs and the revolutionaries take it several steps further. 

But in each and every scenario of accommodation, one thing is absolutely clear to them: the key pillar of any "Grand Bargain" is the absolute readiness of this- or any future American Administration- to accept the full rehabilitation of the mullahs' regime and to put an end to its policy of "containment". 

They want recognition of their regime as a precondition and a ready-to-go American “partnership” with Iran as the most significant regional power. In other words, they want to spread their ideology with American partnership and blessing. 
Those in the United States calling for an engagement with the Iranian regime without any preconditions must understand that they are in fact handing the Mullahs what they most want beforehand- thus giving away a most valuable card at the offset rather than as part of the Grand Bargain. 

By taking the military option off the table and hurrying to embrace the mullahs, with no preconditions or margins for controlling the bargaining process, the “Grand Bargain” is lost to the Mullahs. Their recognition by the United States is the most important card in Iranian calculations, followed directly by Iran's regional role, starting with its influence in Iraq.

A certain official familiar with what’s going on between American and Iranian delegations discussing Iraq says they are- now- talking about "the situation in Iraq" and "crisis management," not about the Grand Bargain. 

Nevertheless, he says, the "the biggest issue on the table is Iran's regional role." and "Arab anxiety about an unacceptable extension of Iranian influence." 

Then there is the continuing Israeli challenge of the conclusions of the National Intelligence Estimate that said Iran has halted its military nuclear program in 2003. This assessment shocked the IAEA only because the Agency had no clue that Iran had in fact had a military nuclear program developed in 2003. 

This fact has not halted the ongoing efforts by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed El-Baradei,to dismantle the resolution calling on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. He believes this precondition was a mistake and does not mind arranging a deal that would evaporate the suspension clause even at the expense of the integrity of UN Security Council consensus resolutions.

His latest visit to Tehran- and announcement that Iran had agreed to provide new information in a month’s time- helped put off this matter for subsequent considering and compounded further a draft resolution on imposing new sanctions on Tehran if it doesn't comply with the demand to suspend uranium enrichment. 

Iran benefited from this and succeeded in postponing action by the Security Council on the third sanctions resolution. It may yet succeed again in generating a further postponement- courtesy Al Baradii. However, all this maneuvering neither closes the nuclear dosseir nor declares Iran innocent of such ambitions.

In the wake of the NIE report, some Arab States have now the temptation to rethink their relationship with the Iranian nuclear issue, via the IAEA and its director El-Baradei. 

The report functioned like a wake-up call for Arab leaders about the predicament that the Bush administration has led them to when it installed the Islamic Republic of Iran as a superpower in the Gulf and the Middle East. 

The US did this thanks to the war in Iraq, which weakened the country and offered it as a "Shiite" entity to Iran. This came after the Bush Administration got rid of the Taliban regime- Iran's enemy- when launching the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

As the NIE report sounded the death knell of the Arab trust in the US, Arab leaders found out that the IAEA might be the only channel to help them shape international policy toward Iran.

Bush's visit to the Middle East came in the wake of the NIE report, which officiated him as a lame duck, and amid America's declining influence, as seen by the Arabs. 

This doesn't mean that in Arabs' view, Iran has won or its Syrian ally has escaped accountability for what it's done and what it's doing in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. 

On the contrary, it means that Arab leaders are thinking about alternatives. 

An architect of the Arab moderation policy says that a new moderation strategy has surfaced after waking up from the NIE nightmare. 

Arabs concluded- after digesting the report- that there will be no confrontation between the US and Iran -at least not soon; not while discussions between the US and Iran are taking place supposedly over Iraq, and while another set of talks is taking place between Israel and Syria via Turkey and Qatar. 

Another Arab architect of moderation says “our strategy rests on the "necessity of our presence" everywhere and on the following basis: “there can be no negotiations without us" when the US and Iran are discussing us or when their conversation covers regional and Gulf security. 

Arab moderates, according to this policymaker, are trying to "expand the menu" of topics under discussion and force the way for additional items on the menu. This is because "the option is clear for us; either we take part in negotiations or we leave it for others to negotiate the future of our region without our participation."

In other words, Arab moderates have decided not to allow the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad- or the true rulers of Iran, notably Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - to negotiate over Palestine and Jerusalem, either absenting the Arabs deliberately or while the Arabs absent themselves. 

They have decided that the terms have now changed; that there's a need for a new foreign policy toward the United States itself, and not just towards Iran. 

These moderates have understood that either in the event of a clash or conciliation between the United States and Iran, Arabs are the ones who will pay the price. 

These aren't signs of destructive frustration or a plunge into disappointment. To the contrary: The moderate front totally understands what is required to confront the new challenges posed by regional extremism- sometimes encouraged by certain American institutions for the sake of transitional objectives. 

Perhaps this moderate front has succeeded in blocking Israeli, Arab, and American extremist attempts to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state based on ending the Israeli occupation of the territories seized in 1967. 

President Bush's declaration- from the occupied territories- that Israel must "end its occupation" and that the US was committed to establishing a contiguous Palestinian State- to replace the occupation- amounts to a failure for those who opposed and resisted the same comments when Bush made them in his April 2002 Address. 

Therefore, the moderate axis is rightly proud to have gotten the US directly involved in the process of establishing a Palestinian state, within a time frame, and based on ending the occupation. This is truly an achievement, especially since it is based on the Arab Peace Initiative.

Neutralizing or reducing Iranian influence when it comes to the core issue for Arab public opinion, Palestine is a very important goal for Arab moderates, which include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Jordan and others. 

Lebanon also tops the list of priorities for those who understand the regional-international battle that is now taking place in Lebanon.

Syria strayed from the Arab fold and allied itself squarely with Iran. It wants to host the Arab Summit in March to dispel any notion of isolating the regime of Damascus. 

At the same time, it wants to retain "the Lebanon card," so that that this country remains a part of the Syrian-Iranian sphere of influence. It also wants to conclude secret understandings with Israel including a condominium of power over Lebanon. This would allow Damascus not only to maintain imposing its will over Lebanon but to also teach lessons to all those who dared challenge Syria’s hegemony over the country. 

Most of all, it wants two fundamental objectives: a bargain to abolish or abort the international Tribunal to try those involved in political assassinations in Lebanon … and the survival of its regime. 

Informed Arab sources who are fully aware of the Syrian regime's investment in al-Qaeda and other fighters recruited to defeat the US invasion and occupation of Iraq say that this has begun to backfire. 

They say that the Syrian regime- at the level of its president, Bashar al-Asad- has become quite worried about the growing presence of al-Qaeda and the like in Syria itself. 

The regime thought that sneaking these fighters into Lebanon would exempt Syria from being a target; however, it quickly realized that it had created a monster, similar to that created by Pakistan through the making of Taliban in Afghanistan- a monster that becomes capable of turning on its creator.

According to informed sources, the "monster" of the Jihadist network created by the Syrian regime in order to foil the US project in Iraq has now turned into a nightmare, competing with another nightmare- that of realizing that there is no way to abolish the International Tribunal. 

If there is one source of comfort for the Syrian regime it is that of Israel’s opposition to attempts of dislodging it. Israel sees in the Damascus regime the best-case scenario: A dormant Syria-Israeli front; a weak regime; and a better alternative to Islamic fundamentalist rule such as the Moslem Brotherhood.

Where Israel will fail in offering guarantees to Syria is exactly where Syria needs them most: The International Tribunal for the political assassinations in Lebanon. 

The Arab League's intervention in the Lebanon does not aim at saving Syria from its nightmare, but at preventing Lebanon from becoming an Iranian base. Now, all eyes are on Syria’s intent and determination to create- in partnership with Iran- a vaccum in all Lebanese institutions. They want to dislodge the Government while enhancing Hizbulla’s state within a state.

If serious, major Arab states must put their money where their mouths are, especially as Iran is injecting both funds and weapons and conducting military training while publicly denying all that, as its Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki did in Davos without even blinking. 

Likewise, Palestine can no longer tolerate the traditional strategy of appeasing the different factions and seeking reconciliation. The Palestinian Authority must be backed unambiguously whatever it takes.

On the Iraqi front, the domestic political developments in Iraq must be assessed in order to benefit from the willingness of the Kurds to reconsider what was assumed as a guarantee of balance in Iraq's political equation. 

Iraq is once again on the verge of collapse if the current lack of balance in political equations persists

In the past, Iraq's Kurds assumed that an alliance with the Shiites would breed a new rule in Iraq. 

Now, Kurdish leaders believe that their support for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki of Al Daawa Party has enabled him to monopolize power and authority- to the pleasure of the rulers of Iran.

From their viewpoint, the currently improving security conditions in Iraq will "disappear" within weeks not years, as they warn, if no real reforms are implemented. 

In their opinion, Arabs must be effectively and actively involved in Iraq, especially at this stage of the American relationship with Iraq and the American-Iranian relationship in Iraq. 

Neither Tehran nor al-Maliki's government wants an effective Arab role in Iraq. Instead, they prefer complicating this role in view of excluding it. They believe that the outcome of the struggle over the region will be determined by the future of Iraq.

When Tehran and Damascus decided to cooperate with the US in Iraq, each had its reasons. 

Syria cooperated because it feared and still seriously fears the growing strength of "Al-Qaeda" on its territories. Acting as a pathway for "Al-Qaeda" militants into Iraq to defeat American troops was partially turning its territories into a base for "Al-Qaeda," which sent shivers forcing the Syrian regime to cooperate.

Tehran, on the other hand, cooperated out of fear that its continued escalation against the US troops through the militias it supports in Iraq may lead to the collapse of its Shiite rule project in Iraq. 

Tehran preferred to cooperate hoping by so doing to protect Al-Maliki’s government and the pro-Iran Shiite rule in Iraq. 

Iraq is not only trapped between ceasefires and pretenses of coexistence and harmony in peace. It is also, as someone put it, the victim of the "conflict of revenues and wills." On the one hand, the American role in Iraq is linked to several ambitions that include military bases and oil revenues. On the other hand, Iran seeks more than just a pro-Iranian Shiite rule in Iraq as Tehran bears in mind strategic ambitions in the oil-driven policies of powers such as Russia and China.

Evidently, the struggle in Iraq is enormous; it is not only over the future of the American role, but also over the future of Iran's role in Iraq and the region at large. 

And just as both Iran and Syria have an interest in creating a vacuum in Lebanon to obstruct the presidential elections and impose a presidential void, they seek a similar vacuum in Iraq to serve tactical and strategic objectives at the same time.

At the World Economic Forum at Davos last month, the Iranian delegation ushered its first significant participation in terms of ranks and numbers. Its members were all over the place, moving between open sessions and dinners, arrogantly delivering the same message: We are right and we shall not compromise. 

The Iranians went to Davos to take advantage of the "podium" as one of them put it. Iran's rulers enjoyed that podium to the point that they invited the president of the Forum, Klaus Schwab, to hold a regional conference in Iran similar to the ones held in the Dead Sea in Jordan or in Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt, only according to the rules of the Islamic Republic, as Mottaki proposed. 

This implies the exclusion of Israelis and the careful selection of the appropriate guests from the point of view of the Islamic Republic. 

As one of the Iranian participants at Davos elaborated in one of the Forum's meetings, even if a brilliant scientist plans to present the most critical proposition for the future of the world, he cannot do so if he happens to be homosexual because from an Iranian point of view, such a "pervert" has no right to exist in the first place. 

Accordingly, such a scientist can only present his proposition once he has undergone the necessary surgery to correct his perversion.

In one of the public sessions attended by the adviser to the Iranian president, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki and the US ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad, the two Iranian officials diligently lectured with toughness, and rejected flexibility under any circumstances. 

Mottaki said, "Exercise restraint - this is what we advised them," in reference to the five permanent member states at the Security Council.

Of Lebanon Motakki spoke with flagrant superiority and sarcastic denial, saying that the reports about Iran's arming of Hezbollah were nothing but "allegations." 

He also denied that his country was training militias in Iraq. He added: The Americans have understood that they have to support the Maliki government. He further demanded "delegating more tangible authority" to the government, i.e. by "handing over the security dossier to the Maliki government," among others. 

The Iranian story at this point is one of training, funding and supporting militias in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (without admitting it) while sending a clear and official message that all this training and funding for the militias does not aim at a comprehensive all-out war. 

War, after all, is a strategic decision. Supporting "Hezbollah" against the Lebanese state, "Hamas" against the Palestinian Authority, and the Shiite militias against balanced governance in Iraq, are merely tactical battles whose cost will be paid by Arabs not Persians.

The Islamic Republic is clearly interested in excluding Arab control of such critical files in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. 

If there were to be an Arab resolve (which will undoubtedly have to exclude Syria and Qatar) it would have to be backed with a new and viable strategy. Such a strategy would require an important ingredient; that of American clarity.

Absent that, there will be high-profile visits and pretense of working things out between some Arab States and Iran. Everyone will be watching elections in the US and in Iran. They will be looking at tea-leave or coffee cups to read what the Iranians and the Americans are doing.

Ironically, absent a military confrontation, by design or by accident, President George W Bush will leave office with a peculiar and a curious legacy: He would have given what he called part of an axis of evil in Tehran the precious gift of ridding the Mullahs in the Islamic Republic of Iran of the enemies that flanked them (and were supported once by the United States of America) namely, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. It maybe said some day in history books that American Forces fought two wars that were won by the Mullahs of the Islamic Republic of Iran…and installed them as a powerful regional hegemony.