by Peter C. Valenti
If President George W. Bush intended to eliminate even the pretense
of the U.S. as an "honest broker" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, then
he has succeeded masterfully. Similarly, he fostered a unity of Arab
and Islamic--as well as European--opinion against American foreign
policy even greater than the reaction to the Iraq war. It was not
hyperbolic for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to state during an
April 19 interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, "Today there
is hatred of the Americans like never before in the region."
The catalyst for Mubarak's statement, and indeed Arab anger,
was the joint press conference held April 14 by Bush and Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in which the U.S. president made
historic concessions to Israel. In both Bush's speech and subsequent
letter, he invalidated the right of Palestinian refugees to return
to homes from which they were chased or fled during the
establishment of Israel in 1948. Furthermore, the U.S. president
gave his blessing for continued Israeli retention of some West Bank
lands. "In light of new realities on the ground," Bush stated,
"including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is
unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations
will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949."
Using this euphemism for Israeli settlements in Palestinian lands
occupied in 1967, Bush has abandoned the position of every U.S.
administration since Richard Nixon--and international law--with
breath-taking alacrity.
Ostensibly, Sharon came to Washington to present his
"Disengagement Plan"--which, prior to April 14, was understood as
his attempt at a unilateral withdrawal of Israeli settlements and
troops from Gaza, to be redeployed in the West Bank. As always,
however, the "Butcher of Beirut" was much more ambitious. Subsequent
statements he made upon returning to Israel, plus his maneuvering
inside his own Likud Party, demonstrate that by "sacrificing" Gaza
in return for solid U.S. support on other crucial issues, Sharon is
shoring up his domestic political and electoral strength and the
very real possibility of a territorially aggrandized Israel.
Arab Reaction
The avalanche of Arab outrage, as expressed by their leaders,
street demonstrations and media outlets, has been so overwhelming
that it is possible to say the entire Arab world is galvanized.
Three days after the Bush-Sharon embrace, Israel assassinated Hamas
leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi--less than a month after it had
assassinated Rantisi's predecessor, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Innumerable
commentators in the Arabic media have dubbed Bush's statements the
"New Balfour Declaration" or "Bush Declaration"--referring to the
infamous declaration issued by British Foreign Minister Alfred
Balfour issued in 1917 that recognized the Zionist movement's desire
for the "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
Jewish people" and subsequently used to justify the creation of
Israel.
Television coverage of the Bush-Sharon meeting by Arabic
media such as Al-Jazeera repeatedly used the word "dangerous" to
emphasize the threat the Bush Declaration represented to Palestinian
sovereignty. Obviously, the Palestinian press is replete with
condemnatory articles and letters, but this is equally true
throughout the Arab world. On April 19, for example, the entire
op-ed section of the United Arab Emirates' al-Bayan was dedicated to
articles on the Bush Declaration. Innumerable articles focused on
the inherent contradictions between the Bush Declaration and
international law, especially U.N. resolutions 242, 338 and 194,
which the U.S. either authored or supported. The greatest irony is
that Bush's position contradicts the stance of his father's
administration. From July 1991 to August 1992, then-President George
H.W. Bush withheld $10 billion in loan guarantees from Israel
pending a freeze on Israeli settlements, before eventually buckling
under the election-year onslaught of the pro-Israel lobby. In fact,
the current Bush administration may have learned a lesson from this
episode.
Subliminal Message
The lead editorial of the Palestinian al-Quds on April 20
succinctly distilled the subtext of Bush's statements, arguing that
Israelis themselves knew for years that settlements are both illegal
and an obstacle to peace. Even many settlers realized they would
have to abandon the settlement in the event of a peace treaty.
However, the paper noted, "along comes the American president's
declarations, which infused [the settlers] with a new spirit ...
spurs them on and elicits confidence and ambition to inaugurate
[more] settlements and increase their numbers."
According to the lead editorial in Egypt's al-Ahram of April
17, the fact that Israeli settlements had always been considered
illegal by the international community, but now were legitimized by
Bush, has set "a dangerous precedent that encourages others to
violate international legality."
Nor did it come as a surprise to Arabs that the new leader of
Hamas was assassinated just days after the White House meeting--or
that, during an April 23 television interview in Israel, an
invigorated Sharon announced he no longer feels bound by his
three-year-old commitment to Bush not to assassinate Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat.
As Na'im al-Ashhab explained in the April 18 al-Quds: Arabs
should "rid ourselves of any delusions about American plans and
initiatives, as Bush's latest position leaves no room for doubt that
his administration lost any qualification to be an intermediary in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
Regional Players
The Bush Declaration also greatly damaged U.S. ties with
moderate and pro-U.S. Arab leaders in the region. Jordan's King
Abdullah II was in the U.S. at the time of the declaration and was
slated to meet later with Bush. After meeting with corporate leaders
in California, however, Abdullah released a diplomatically worded
statement on April 19 calling off his visit to Washington, then went
home.
Despite Egyptian President Mubarak's strong statements to Le
Monde and other subsequent speeches, he is still trying to recover
from what is perceived as a grave humiliation. Mubarak had just met
with Bush to discuss the Israeli pullout from Gaza and was still in
the U.S. when Bush issued his declaration. Some writers speculate
that Bush was being duplicitous in the back-to-back timing of his
meetings with Mubarak and Sharon, since it seemed to give the
impression that Bush had conferred with Mubarak and gotten some
implicit agreement for his upcoming declaration with Sharon. As
Egyptian writer Muhammad Abd al-Hakim Diyab pointed out in the April
17 al-Quds al-Arabi, during their meeting Bush browbeat Mubarak on
Egyptian reform, the constitution and elections, while Mubarak
received no substantive promises in return, leaving empty-handed.
Then Sharon showed up, and Bush was magnanimous. Asked Diyab, "How
can Mubarak face himself, firstly, and then his people, secondly,
after being put into that position?"
Some writers did find Arab leaders' responses too limited or
slow. On April 17, castigated the lead al-Quds editorial, "Isn't it
a shame that Europe sped to issue a united position rejecting Bush
and Sharon's unilateral moves ... whereas Arab leaders are still
studying the possibility to convene a meeting of their foreign
ministers on May 3 to study the possibility of holding an Arab
summit?"
Added Sultan al-Hattab in Jordan's al-Ra'i the same day, "I
think that what is occurring is the beginning of the price that
Palestinians and Arabs have to pay for the absence of [failing to
convene] the [Arab] summit.... Instead of a summit to discuss the
issues of Palestine and Iraq, Arab governments ran and buried their
heads in the sand while Bush and Sharon alone discuss the Palestine
Question."
Silver Lining?
Writing in the pan-Arab al-Hayat on April 16, Raghida Dergham
suggested there may be a few positive elements in the Bush
Declaration. While disparaging most of it, she observed that Bush
still affirmed a two-state solution and that the wall Israel is
currently building is recognized only as a security boundary, not a
political one. Dergham reminded her readers that they would be
mistaken to believe that, were John Kerry to win the presidency, he
could nullify the Bush Declaration, explaining that Kerry would be
bound by previous administrations' commitments.
Focusing only on the Gaza pullout, Hasan al-Batal argued in
the Palestinian al-Ayyam April 17 that "the Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza gives Palestinians, for the first time ... some possibility to
build a Palestinian strategy.... Oslo, as much as it could be, was
the first move on the political chessboard. The road map is a
greater move ... Even though the Gaza withdrawal is a small move, it
is on the geographical chessboard."
He concluded, "If Palestinians succeed in this challenge, the
world and a segment of Israelis will say: It is true, the occupation
was the reason for Palestinian 'terrorism.' While if they don't
succeed, Sharon and the average Israeli citizen will say: truly, the
occupation isn't the reason for terrorism, rather the Palestinian
mentality and culture of terrorism."
The vast majority of Arab writers, however, do not share al-Batal's
sentiment, pointing out that even if Gaza could be seen as a
potential "national experiment," Sharon's plan dooms it to failure
through continued Israeli control over crossing points, air, water,
airports, harbors and security, and the claimed right to attack Gaza
with impunity.
In the April 20 al-Ayyam, Hani al-Masri outlined possible
scenarios of either a Palestinian acceptance or rejection of the
Sharon Plan. The only positive factor in accepting the plan would be
to benefit from the Gaza pullout, he argued--but there is no reason
to assume that the Palestinian Authority will gain any prestige or
power. In the meantime, Israel would keep other settlements, gain
the demographic benefits of ridding itself of 40 percent of its
Palestinian inhabitants, and spell the ruin of Palestinian
territorial and national unity. No doubt acceptance would also mean
massive civil strife. While seemingly advocating rejection, al-Masri
conceded that this will cost the Palestinians greatly: it will free
Sharon's hand politically, allow him to turn the newly disengaged
Gaza into a prison, and make the current transitional status of
Palestinian lands into a permanent status.
U.S. Elections
As Ahmad al-Ruba'i noted in the Saudi Asharq al-Awsat on
April 17, "American policy in the Middle East is not a part of
American foreign policy, rather it is at its core domestic policy,
and this is the problem." In a lengthy article in the same issue of
the newspaper, Zayn al-Abidan al-Rukkabi explored every logical
justification for the Bush Declaration--but always came up empty.
The only plausible explanation, he argued, is to view it through the
lens of an election year. It is well known in the Arab world that
the Republican Party is trying to attract a larger segment of the
Jewish electorate this November. Thus, concluded Ahmad Dhiban in the
April 17 al-Ra'i, Sharon knew he had picked the "golden moment" to
present his plan to Bush. Even if Bush opposed Sharon's plan--which
is probably unlikely anyway--he couldn't reject it due to the
impending U.S. elections, Dhiban wrote.
In the April 19 al-Bayan, Jalal Arif noted that the long-term
plan of America's right-wing Zionists and their evangelical
Christian allies finally came to fruition: using themes like "Clash
of Civilizations" and the "War on Terrorism," he argued, they
steered the Bush administration into conceptualizing "the two
nations of America and Israel [as] the two faces of one policy which
is hostile to Arabs and utilizes insane force to subdue them."
For those who think Arab theories about Bush's electoral
considerations are conspiratorial, perhaps a careful reading of
Sharon's April 14 White House statements would elucidate the reason
for Arab suspicions. In concluding his remarks, a giddy Sharon
effused, "I wish to end with a personal note. I myself have been
fighting terror for many years and understand the threats and costs
from terrorism. In all these years, I have never met a leader as
committed as you are, Mr. President, to the struggle for freedom and
the need to confront terrorism wherever it exists."
A better electoral endorsement would be difficult to find.
Peter C. Valenti works as a translator and contributing
editor for the World Press Review.