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SYRIA-ISRAEL SUMMIT: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
On January 4, 2000, Raghida Dergham, the Senior Diplomatic
Correspondent for Al-Hayat Newspaper, and Joel Singer,
a principal architect of the Oslo Accords and an Israeli
participant in the 1996 Wye Plantation Negotiations with Syria,
addressed the Washington Institute’s Policy Forum to discuss the
prospects of Syrian-Israeli peace talks in Shepherdstown.
The following is a reporter's summary of their remarks
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Raghida Dergham
Peace for Syria is not a tactical move. Pursuing a breakthrough is now
declared Syrian policy, and Damascus does not back down from its
declared policy. Today, Syria is giving the logic of negotiation
precedence over the logic of resistance in its quest to liberate the
Golan Heights. If Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak commits himself to
certain basic strategic outlines, Syria will show great flexibility. If
Israel commits to fully withdraw from the Golan and south Lebanon, then
Syria and Lebanon will fully normalize. But if the negotiations in
Shepherdstown fail, Syria will not be ready to negotiate peace for a
long time; if the logic of negotiation fails to produce the anticipated
results, then the logic of resistance will return.
Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad is trying to distinguish himself from the
way Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, Palestinian Authority Chairman
Yasser Arafat, and Jordanian King Hussein conducted negotiations with
Israel. It is unlikely that Asad will suddenly appear in Washington to
help Barak sell a peace referendum to the Israeli public. If a
breakthrough is reached in Sheperdstown, however, Asad may surprise us.
Notwithstanding, it is not Syria’s responsibility to offer Israel
confidence-building gestures.
Syria’s Position
For Syria, the treaty must include:
• Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967
border.
The Syrians will most likely not accept the 1923 international border.
Whether Syria accepts anything but the June 4 border depends on
intricate negotiations on water and security arrangements; a difference
of inches or centimeters from the June 4 border is possible.
Furthermore, Israeli forces must withdraw from south Lebanon.
• An Agreement with Lebanon. Lebanon represents the strategic
depth of Syria. The fact that Syria’s military presence in Lebanon will
act as a guarantor of calm on the Lebanese-Israeli border will force
Israel and the United States to acknowledge that Lebanon is Syria’s
virtual protectorate.
• A comprehensive Agreement.
Syria will not follow the piecemeal approach to negotiation
adopted by the Palestinians. It will only sign onto a transitional
accord if it is tightly woven into a final, comprehensive agreement. In
order to succeed, a comprehensive agreement must address withdrawal,
normalization, water rights, security arrangements, and the timetable
for implementation.
Regional Implications.
Syria can facilitate normalization in the region should it achieve peace
with Israel. In particular, a Syrian peace with Israel could moderate
Iran and Iraq’s position toward the peace process. It is clear that
Syria talked to Iran about Hizballah’s future and its transformation
from a resistance movement to a political party. Therefore, Syria not
only holds the key to pacifying the Israeli-Lebanese border, but also
the gateway to improved U.S.-Iranian relations.
A Syrian-Israeli peace has the potential to serve as a
psychological breakthrough for Arabs and Israelis. But this will not
occur if the Palestinian issue is not dealt with fairly. This is not to
say that should the Israelis, Syrians, and Lebanese arrive at a peace
agreement, they should await the conclusion of Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations to conclude their own deal. But if a deal with Syria is
struck at the expense of the Palestinians, it will be detrimental for
Israel. Further, if Israel attempts to play the Syrian and Palestinian
tracks against one another, it will undermine the accomplishments of the
Syrian-Lebanese track and leave the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict
unresolved.
Role of the United States.
The Clinton Administration should be prudent when it comes to
giving military assistance to Israel. It is understood that financial
and security compensation is necessary to encourage Israel to make
peace. But a deal with Syria should not be an opportunity to overload
Israel with sophisticated weapons, intelligence, and technology. No one
questions the continued strategic alliance between the United States and
Israel. Nonetheless, upgrading arms transfers to Israel sends a
counterproductive message to a region preparing for peace.
Joel Singer
The Peace Equation. Israel has no peace with Syria because the calculus
of incentives has so far been insufficient to make the peace equation
work. For Syria, the notion of peace with Israel was so problematic that
even the prospect of regaining the Golan Heights was insufficient.
Implicit in the land-for-peace formula is the notion that Israel pays by
giving away territory, while Syria pays by giving away peace. For Syria,
making peace was something to which it had to reluctantly agree in order
to regain the Golan.
Israel was not willing to make peace because Syria did not offer
Israel sufficient guarantees in the spheres of security and
normalization. For Israel to give up the strategic Golan Heights, it
must emerge from an agreement in a better overall security position.
Israel therefore asked Syria to substitute the Golan with security
arrangements such as demilitarization, separation of forces, and an
early warning station. Syria in the past objected that a demilitarized
zone would leave Damascus vulnerable to attack. Syria also rejected an
early warning station on the Golan as an infringement on its
sovereignty. In the absence of an agreement on security, Israel
suggested normalization in spheres such as commerce, transportation, and
tourism--similar to the agreements signed with Egypt. Syria objected
that it has no such agreements with its Arab neighbors and therefore
sees no reason to have them with Israel.
What changed the calculus was Barak’s threat to withdraw Israeli
forces from Lebanon. For years, Syria has demanded an Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon as well as from the Golan. But when Barak proposed such a
withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria became concerned that it was going to
lose a significant negotiating chip, namely, the ability to threaten
Israel with attacks from southern Lebanon.
Steps to Peace.
The complexity and volume of issues that must be addressed by an
Israeli-Syrian agreement cannot be dealt with in one fell swoop. Every
Middle East peace treaty has been the outgrowth of an initial agreement
that outlined basic principles. For example, with Egypt there was first
a Framework Agreement; with the Palestinians, a Declaration of
Principles; and with Jordan, a Common Agenda. Such a document may be
produced by Israel and Syria in the coming weeks, perhaps as a "U.S.
paper."
Some creative compromises will be necessary. For instance, Barak
will never agree to return to the June 4, 1967 border as distinct from
the international boundary, while Syria has stated that it will not
agree to anything but an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4 line. That
would seem to make negotiations an exercise in futility. If the two
parties are committed to reaching a peace treaty, however, they could
find a compromise border and then, taking advantage of the fact that no
one has a precise map of where the border was on June 4, 1967, they
could name this the "June 4" border.
As a democratic leader, Barak is caught between telling the Israeli
public that Israel must make concessions, and telling Asad that no
concessions will granted. While playing poker with Asad, Barak must keep
his cards close to his chest so as not reveal his red lines. At the same
time, as an elected leader, Barak needs to prepare his public for
upcoming concessions in order to gain their popular backing. Rabin and
Peres shocked the Israeli public too much when they made the Oslo
agreement; Barak wants to avoid a similar fate.
Asad is unlikely to make a gesture toward Israel because he has a
limited number of bargaining chips; making a gesture means giving away a
chip that he could otherwise trade for something substantive. Further,
the notion of making confidence-building gestures in order to sway an
electorate is a foreign concept to a non-democratic leader like Asad.
The Syrian president may simply not understand that one simple gesture
to the Israeli public can buy more from Israel than the most clever
negotiating tactic.
The U.S. Role
In every previous Israeli-Arab agreement, supplements have had to be
added to make the peace equation work. For instance, U.S. aid was needed
to facilitate Egyptian-Israeli peace. To make Syrian-Israeli peace work,
the United States will attempt to enlarge the pie of incentives by
encouraging other Arab countries to make peace with Israel in tandem
with Syria. In this way, peace with Syria will become the end of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, a long-sought Israeli goal.
This Policy Forum Report was prepared by David Honig.
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