A Syria-Israel Summit: Prospects for Peace Prepared Text of Remarks Delivered by Raghida Dergham at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy On January 4, 2000, Raghida Dergham, the senior diplomatic correspondent for al-Hayat newspaper, and Joel Singer, a principal architect  of the Oslo Accords and an Israeli participant in the 1996 Wye Plantation negotiations with Syria, addressed The Washington Institute’s Special Policy Forum. Following is a full transcript of Dergham's remarks, as prepared for delivery

Syria is serious in seeking to transform the principle of peace as a strategic option into a full fledged reality. This is not a tactical move.
It is sincere in intent and a well-calculated step. Prudent in its adaptability, once Syria commits, it means to deliver. Seeking an historic breakthrough is now a declared Syrian policy. Damascus is not one to back down easily from policies it declares. The leadership believes that this opportunity--the resumption of negotiations in Shepherdstown--is indeed the last chance, at least in as far as one sanctioned by President Hafez Al-Asad.

If this one fails, Syria will not be ready for another attempt for a long time to come. Damascus is eager, but not desperate, and is not at all frightened should the negotiations fail. When it decided to take back the initiative, the leadership in Damascus figured its path of return without the burden of blame on its shoulders. It will give the negotiations its best shot with flexibility, total clarity, responsibility, commitment, courage, and leadership. It has made its positions clear not only to Israel, the United States, Russia, and Europe, but also to Arab public opinion. And that is extremely important.

There are a number of constants with a few variables when it comes to understanding Syria. We, by now, have learned that the leadership in Damascus thinks strategically, however it is acutely fond of brilliant tactics and of the esteemed art of negotiations.
This is not a spontaneous leadership nor is it quick to react emotionally. It tediously endures, manipulates, calculates, and adheres to stated positions. Consistency is a proud and fundamental characteristic of Asad's Syria and it has won him much, beyond respect and admiration. This does not mean that Damascus does not enjoy deal-making. It does mean that Syria will not simply take any deal. When cornered or when it fears becoming marginalized, Damascus either becomes defensive, intransigent and takes to trouble making, or it substitutes the downfalls of its intransigence with bold, visionary, and prudent steps and makes its readiness for a deal abundantly clear.
But Syria is not ready for just any deal. It will not follow a piecemeal approach nor will it sign on to transitional papers unless packaged tightly into the ultimate deal. "Comprehensive" is a very dear concept to Syria. Damascus resents the negotiations style adopted by the Palestinians. It will not allow any ideas that would resemble the Palestinian track of negotiations. But it will sign a peace treaty with Israel, as Lebanon simultaneously signs a parallel peace treaty with Israel.

The inseparability of the two tracks is a solid commitment that falls in the context of non-negotiable. The linkage between the Syrian and Lebanese tracks has been a fundamental constant in the position of Damascus and Beirut, which forced an important American and Israeli acknowledgement that Lebanon represents strategic depth for Syria. The linkage is further consolidated by turning the Syrian military presence in Lebanon into a guarantor of calm on the Lebanese-Israel border which amounts to an acknowledgement that Lebanon is a virtual "protectorate." Mr. Barak clearly recognizes the immediate and long-term benefits of tackling Lebanon through the Syrian gate, rather than effecting a unilateral withdrawal which might not secure neutralized border with Lebanon.

The basic tenants of a Peace Treaty with Israel, as far as Damascus is concerned, have been stated clearly and have included:

1) Withdrawal from the Golan to the June 4, 1967 borders,

2) Withdrawal from South Lebanon, and,...

3) The inseparability of both tracks. Syria had, since the Madrid peace conference, insisted on the land-for-peace principle and on Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for negotiations. Syria would never have agreed to resume negotiations without a clear commitment to this basis.

Damascus is skilled in the art of compromise once the broad strategic outlines are clear. It is today willing to negotiate flexibly on a peace deal with Israel as long as Mr. Ehud Barak is sincerely committed to such strategic outlines. Today, Syria is giving the "logic of negotiations" within the peace process the upper hand in the quest to liberate occupied lands, against the "logic of resistance." Should the logic of negotiations fail to produce the anticipated results, the logic of resistance will return vindicated and justified, as Syria sees it.
It needs to be underscored in the most absolute terms that no deal will be made if it does not take off from the Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Golan and South Lebanon within a reasonably paralleled timeframe–this so that loose ends are tied to permit simultaneous Syria-Lebanese signatures on peace treaties with Israel.

If such a commitment is clear, the issue of normalization becomes the easiest of the now five legs of the negotiations as the issue of water became central in the resumed negotiations. Syria and Lebanon will normalize fully if Israel withdraws fully. The negotiations on security arrangements and water will be tough and dangerous to the prospects of success if either party loses sight of the larger, ultimate goal.
To isolate one aspect from the comprehensive would only serve as a deal breaker. This is a set of negotiations, not a step-by-step approach. It is a package that will become a deal only when the "five legs"--simultaneous negotiations on withdrawal, normalization, water, security arrangements, and timetable for implementation--are concluded. One leg is enough to cripple. This peace package between Syria and Israel necessarily needs all five legs. And the package is not exclusively bilateral.

There are many ingredients to a peace treaty between Syria, Lebanon, and Israel that have important regional dimensions and that Syria can deliver. Those range from the battle of the logic of negotiation versus resistance, to the scope and nature of normalization in the region, to future positions of countries like Iran and Iraq toward the peace process.

It is important to note Iran's friendly reaction to the resumption of negotiations on the Syrian-Israeli track and the tacit understandings between Tehran and Damascus regarding the future of "Hizbollah" in Lebanon. Whereas Iran's positions and reactions are most definitely more important than Iraq's at this juncture, it is worth noting that Baghdad's reaction to the resumption of negotiations was void of criticism despite the abundant ammunition should Baghdad decide to make it an issue. In fact, Iraq's foreign minister announced steps toward an early resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria, after the first meeting in Washington between the Israeli prime minister, Mr. Barak, and Syrian foreign minister, Mr. Farouk Sharaa. So Syria is not only the gate to a neutralized Lebanese-Israeli border, but also a gateway to influence traditional opponents of the peace process and to provide them the needed umbrella to reconsider. This will have far-reaching future implications on American-Iranian relations, particularly since Washington made clear that Tehran's position toward the peace process will certainly impact bilateral relations. It will also have future implications related to policy toward Iraq and to Baghdad's barometer of policies and behavior.

Once Syria arrives at a peace treaty with Israel, not only will there be a watershed in the normalization process between the Gulf Arab states and Israel, there will also be a fundamental breakthrough in the psychology of the Arabs and Israelis alike. This gigantic leap will not materialize, however, if the issue of Palestine is not dealt with fairly and seriously.
The dynamics of this historic page in Syrian-Israeli relations are simple and complex in a most intriguing way. The Syrians and the Israelis know exactly what is required from each party for a peace treaty to be signed. In that sense, it is the simplest set of negotiations, regardless of how intricate are the details on water access and control, or on equitable security arrangements. Complexity, on the other hand, is due to a combination of political calculations and certain mindsets. Confidence is not yet established between the two parties, though a good measure of it must have existed to allow the arrival at this stage. The Syrians clearly have a good amount of trust in Mr. Barak, but his leadership in the historic sense has yet to stand the test.

At this particular juncture, Syria's president Hatez Al Asad seizes the reins of the Initiative. His Is the multiple offer which can deliver peace with Syria, Lebanon and beyond. His Is the offer of comprehensive peace. He has taken the reins of the initiative and put Mr. Barak on an historic crossroad. So far, Mr. Barak's response Is very promising. He Is capable of going the distance If he decides that leadership too Is good politics. He needs to collect all the courage that might be scattered Inside him and brave to make the difference. The difference of a qualitatively new relationship with Israel's neighbors that frees Israelis from the mentality of siege that leaves them fundamentally insecure whatever security guarantees are in place.
This requires, above all, a clear understanding that if a Syrian deal is struck at the expense of the Palestinians, the results will come back to haunt the Israelis first of all. It is silly, dangerous, and short-sighted to think that playing off the Syrian-Palestinian tracks against each other would be beneficial to Israel. Quite the opposite, this might undermine accomplishments on the Syrian-Lebanese tracks, and it will leave the core of the problem suspended in the heart of Israel.

Mr. Barak is capable of bold leadership and could be most resolute on doing just that. If he assures Mr. Sharaa of his commitment to the well-known "Rabin deposit," stating agreement to withdraw from the Golan to the June 4 borders, Syria will show a good measure of flexibility on other matters within reason and logic. The negotiations on the Lebanese track will resume almost immediately. And it is not unlikely that the set of negotiations on security, water, timetables, and the shape of normal relations will conclude before July, the date Mr. Barak has set for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.

As far as the Clinton administration is concerned, it should be prudent enough to make sure that its enthusiasm for success does not blind it to side effects of excessive generosity. Whereas it is understood that financial and security compensation is essential to permit Mr. Barak to take the necessary bold steps, this deal should not be a vehicle to overload Israel with sophisticated weapons, intelligence, and technology. America should not play salesman of peace and security to Israel. Israel is a mature nation and should be capable of choosing peace, particularly at the time when it is quantitatively superior to all Arab military capabilities combined; thanks also to American generosity. No one is questioning the continued strong strategic alliance between the United States and Israel. But the upgrade of military transfers not only has disquieting military implications; it sends an absolutely counterproductive message to the region as it prepares itself to cross the threshold into the mindset of peace.

The Clinton Administration should be sure to remember that Syria has taken pride and pain in negotiating with dignity and refusing any appearance of signing onto a condescending peace. It would be a grave mistake if Washington misinterprets Syria's surprise peace offer. Mr. Clinton has played a very positive role which made the events of today possible. He too is a major player who needs to navigate this stage without losing sight of what is promised; and that is a just and comprehensive peace.