The challenge America faces in reaching out to Arabs and Muslims — to convince them, in George W. Bush’s words, that this is a war against terrorism, not Islam — is to forge a bond of trust with people who have long felt betrayed. This widespread sense of betrayal is essential to understanding the apparent reluctance among some Muslims and Arabs to accept Bush’s assertion. A distorted echo of the president’s declaration came last week from an al Qaeda spokesman who announced that the US-led campaign ‘‘against Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden is a war on Islam.’’ The president is speaking for a government that is regarded with enduring suspicion by many Muslims and Arabs. Bin Laden’s message, on the other hand, strikes a chord — only with a minority, but a noisy one.

Don’t imagine that a free lunch and some propaganda leaflets are going to convince the people of Afghanistan, much less those now protesting on the streets of Quetta and Jakarta, that the Western leaders are right. But engaging the vast majority of moderate Arabs and Muslims as committed partners in the war against terrorism is possible if America rethinks its attitude toward the Arab and Islamic worlds.
That means adopting rhetoric that does not appear condescending; establishing a new approach to moderates, including influential Muslim scholars and clerics; reforming relationships with governments in the region; and above all redirecting US foreign policy. That last point, ironically, will involve addressing issues that bin Laden himself has stated as his grievances — among them, America’s perceived unconditional support of Israel and of the UN’s punitive sanctions against Iraq.

Doing so should not be seen as capitulation to the terrorists’ demands, but as depriving them of one of their primary tactics. Bin Laden has tried to link the hatred his few thousand supporters have unleashed with the bitter taste these American policies have left in the mouths of millions. They are entirely different. Endorsing the formation of a Palestinian state, for example, as a conclusion to peace negotiations — as Bush has done — brings that distinction to the forefront.

There is a second war being waged right now within the Islamic world — between the loud voices and desperate actions of the extremist few on the one hand, and the concerns of the subdued and disenchanted majority of moderates on the other. It is within the power of the American government to win over those moderates. Rather than listening aghast to the vitriol spewed out against the United States, Americans would make more headway if they looked at the imperfections of their own foreign policy. Arabs and Muslims need to adjust, too: to get over the tendency to view themselves as perpetual victims; to recognize that with its silence, the moderate majority is seen as acquiescing to the intolerant views of the vocal extremists.

Since September 11, the Bush administration has done an admirable job of reaching out to the Muslim and Arab communities in this country. But over the past month, what has astonished me is the administration’s lack of strategy for communicating with the wider Arab and Islamic worlds. While I do not believe, for example, that Bush intended his use of the word ‘‘crusade’’ to conjure up a replay of the brutal 12th- and 13th-century Christian military expeditions to recover the holy lands from the Muslims, I am met with incredulity by many Arab and Muslim colleagues when I suggest otherwise. ‘‘How could he have meant anything else?’’ they ask.
The administration rushed to correct the impression. It was likewise quick to change the name of the military campaign from ‘‘Infinite Justice’’ — which many Muslims believe can only be meted out by God — to ‘‘Enduring Freedom.’’ But just last week, the administration made another fundamental mistake — this time in an official letter to the United Nations Security Council signed by UN ambassador John Negroponte.

‘‘We may find that our self-defense requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states,’’ Negroponte wrote. This one sentence may have caused irreparable harm to the fabric of the coalition. It evoked fears in the Arab and Muslim world that America has a ‘‘hidden agenda.’’ It fortified the impression that Afghanistan is the first stop, then Iraq, to be followed maybe by Sudan and afterward Syria. Negroponte’s letter reduced the oft-repeated mantra that this war is not against Arabs and Muslims to a mere sound bite, sent out largely through American television. The United States, meanwhile, has been slow to realize the power of Arab media. American officials have begun looking with new interest at al-Jazeera, which has the only foothold in Afghanistan’s Taliban land and the ears and eyes of Arabs of all convictions. But there must be a sustained and respectful engagement with the Arab press — not yet another quick fix.

Why have American officials offered so few interviews to the al-Jazeera network, or to the Al Hayat newspaper, for that matter? Why are so few Arab columnists approached by American officials, offering to explain the administration’s actions and attempting to influence us?
As a journalist in both worlds, I am also disturbed by the TV networks’ ‘‘patriotic’’ agreement last week to limit their coverage of the terrorist’s announcements in response to a request by the White House. It’s obvious that we need less censorship in the Arab media — not more of it in the American.
Some moderate Muslim scholars and clerics have been courageous in exposing bin Laden as an extremist who has warped Islam for his own agenda. They must be encouraged as part of a broader strategy — one that depends on the spread of democracy. Only by developing democratic institutions will the moderate majority among America’s Arab and Muslim allies be able to play its natural role.

Otherwise, extremism will claim the day.

By Raghida Dergham
The writer is senior diplomatic correspondent in New York for the London-based Arabic daily newspaper, Al Hayat