Whispered at times, denied at others, it is today a proposal explained by Leslie Gelb, the President emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, detailed in the New York Times in an article entitled "The three-state solution." According to Gelb, this suggestion is based on a strategy to divide Iraq, aimed at strengthening the Kurds and Shiites, and weakening the Sunnis. There was nothing new in the content of the article, as it discusses dividing Iraq and Saudi Arabia so as to impose a quasi-American tutelage over the oil regions, both Shiite and Kurdish, whilst containing the Sunnis in the non-oil producing regions, to make them become the poorer cousins, as Gelb described. Gelb is not known to be a radical neo-conservative; this why it was very surprising that he came forward with the suggestion to divide Iraq. The issue requires serious attention, as the idea is no longer the product of a radical group's imagination that come up with suggestions such as dividing this or that Arab country for instance, or carrying out the "transfer" as an alternative strategy replacing the two-state solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Officially, the U.S. administration opposes the division of Iraq and asserts the importance of its territorial unity, just like the other previous administrations. However, there is a clear contradiction between the official government stances and the decision-makers in the Bush administration and those individuals enjoying power and influence over this administration. In fact, those are the people who put forward the idea of invading and occupying Iraq as part of a wider strategy that includes finding radical solutions to the Palestinian problem, so as to solve Israel's demographic crisis and eliminate the two-state solution, which involves instability and chaos as a necessary alibi to guarantee the U.S. remaining the sole superpower within "the preemptive doctrine," which includes resorting to fear and fear-provoking as a way of gaining the support of the American public opinion for policies, and twinning terror and Sunnis, after having twinned terror and Wahhabism, whilst considering the Shiites as a logical ally.

Regarding Israel and Palestine, the contradiction is clear between Bush's official stances and the plans of Israel's apologetics, even at the expense of American interests. The U.S. President wants the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, and he confirms his commitment to the two-state solution, considering the Roadmap as based on his vision.

The poles of "creative change" among the members of his administration and opportunistic advisors are certain the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will never accept the two-state solution based on putting an end to the 1967 occupation. They also know that Israel, and the majority of Jews abroad, will not accept the one-state solution that would group Arabs and Jews within a democratic state where both communities would enjoy equal rights. Such a democratic state denies and crushes the notion of "the Jewish state," which is unique in the world, thereby destroying Zionism's dream. Hence, considering that the demographic statistics show that Jews will be a minority in "the Jewish state" in a decade, which would lead to the cancellation of the Jewish state in a few decades, the only practical solution would be the forced deportation of Palestinians from inside Israel and from the West Bank towards Jordan as the "alternative nation."

This plan requires an instable and chaotic environment, as well as a few wars in the region. The plan-makers are not directly challenging George Bush and "his vision," but rather are working in a cunning and intelligent way on postponing it and making it hostage of an impossible equation. The equation of the security rationale and the American-Israeli twinning in fighting terror. These people will not challenge those relying on Bush's election for a second term, or those who are against unnecessary wars or radical developments at this turning point. They are patient and aware that their dreams could vanish if Bush loses the elections, and are thereby preparing themselves for a second mandate. They nod their heads, pretending to approve the president's "vision," while they do exactly the contrary with secret documents in drawers and as far as the lack of stability and facts on the ground.

Lack of stability and fear are two major tools in the supremacy strategy, based on the preemptive doctrine. Instability in the Middle East and fear in the U.S.

In the past, stability was the core of U.S. policy in the Middle East, regardless of the repression it entailed and the resulting alliances. As long as stability benefited oil and strategic interests, it did not matter whether the peoples suffered or if they needed democracy, or if from time to time instability was necessary for changing a situation or obstructing development. But on the whole, stability was a chief foundation.

Today, things are different and it seems that creating instability has become a strategic objective, at least for the authors of the new American policy. This explains why a campaign is being waged against regimes, rulers and governments under the banner of "reform" and "democracy." Here again appears the contradiction between the claims of the American President, or maybe his beliefs, and the actions of those who have interests in dividing the region instead of reforming it, and not for the sake of democracy, but because chaos and instability are necessary for division, separation and total control over the oil wealth and placing them under American tutelage.

To those radicals active in the U.S. administration, the fear of the Arab people has no weight in their considerations, nor does the lack of trust in the U.S. Part of the U.S. administration seeks to gain the trust and the 'hearts and minds' of the Arab region. So does the American President. He wants to be accepted by the Arab and Muslim peoples. But not the radicals among the fundamentalists and neo-conservatives. For they are still full of hatred and racism, and the fear they want to spread is that of the American popular base.

Hence in their plans, it is necessary to repeatedly remind the American people that terror is a permanent enemy, and that the President is always ready to defend the U.S. and defeat terrorists… So, keeping the Americans in a state of fear leads them to hold on even more to their president and be more tolerant over the dangerous violations of civil rights and more willing to become hostages of the American greatness.

Because George Bush is entering an electoral battle, and the U.S. is locked in a war that hasn't ended yet, it is necessary for the electoral campaign to divert the attention away from the losses and the death of American soldiers towards the change of strategy so as to make the war seem "remote." This modification might require decreasing the number of American troops in Iraq, but not to the point of undermining the main strategy. There is nothing to assure that the U.S. will totally withdraw from Iraq, and the occupation will bear a different name, and the military presence will be based on an "invitation" from a transitional Iraqi government, and Iraq will not be handed over to the UN to replace the coalition authority. And any country contributing with its forces is just a small ally of the U.S. The U.S. administration did not invade and occupy Iraq just to leave it quickly. It represents an important basis in the strategic calculations and plans.

At this stage, what is required is either a new "direction" of old policies or starting early on to implement the idea of dividing and splitting Iraq.

Once again, the contradiction reaches its peak between Bush's official sayings and wishes and between what has been drafted in the minds of those who drew the map for Iraq and the region a while ago. 

The article Leslie Gelb wrote last Tuesday indicates one of two things: either the idea is a basis and is not limited to the radicals such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle at the Pentagon, or the radical idea has made its way to the so-called mainstream, and so being whispered to become a declared idea that can be defended and marketed to the administration and to the public. In fact, Gelb considers a united Iraq as a historical flaw and considers the American commitment to the unity of Iraq an essential error, because a united Iraq would be a fabricated secretion in trying to unite three different entities, at the ethnical and confessional level.

Amid the mounting rumors about the U.S. set for withdrawing from Iraq and the probability of not sending any additional forces, Gelb maintains that the only viable strategy, then, may be to correct the historical defect and move in stages toward a three-state solution: Kurds in the North, Sunnis in the Center and Shiites in the South.

This would enable the U.S. to invest its money and troops where they would yield fast and good profits (with the Kurds and Shiites); this means withdrawing the majority of forces from the Sunni triangle North and West of Baghdad, thus being released of a costly war they might not win. Hence, American officials could wait and see if those "troublesome and domineering Sunnis, without oil or oil revenues," will "moderate their ambitions" and if not, they will suffer the consequences.

According to Gelb, Sunnis are inclined to Arab nationalism, and they have a significantly greater stake in a united Iraq, much more than the Kurds or Shiites. And because the center of Iraq, where Sunnis reside, is without oil or oil revenues, the Sunnis will soon become the 'poor cousins' of the Shiites, who might want a united Iraq if they manage to control it, of the Kurds who have no interest in any strong central authority, according to Gelb.

Hence, the strategy of dividing Iraq and moving toward a three-state solution would be built on such reality, and the general idea is to strengthen the Kurds and Shiites, and weaken the Sunnis, then wait to see whether it would be better to obstruct self-rule or encourage the creation of small states. 

Gelb also suggests granting the UN a role in the Sunni triangle, while the U.S. settles more with the Kurds and Shiites. Then, and depending to the Sunnis' good behavior, they could be turned into a Taiwan with respect to China as far as autonomy, while both the Shiite and Kurdish states would enjoy the oil wealth and the alliance with the U.S.

This dangerous talk is serious on the American intellectual scene, just like the dangerous plans existing in drawers to divide Iraq are. It is dangerous because it sows the seeds of turmoil and sectarian wars; it is dangerous because it dares promote it without hesitation and in a terrible kind of confidence that none of Iraq's neighbors will dare challenge or block it… or else, its fate would be worse.

As a disavowal, it might be said that the U.S. administration does not support this talk, and hence, that there is no need to exaggerate it. But this argument merely represents an escape forward from the deadlines and from thinking about the choices available regarding Iraq and the region. It is probably time for the Arabs to think ahead of time, in order to avoid repeating the past experiences of surprise before another fact on the ground, which it was said was a fictive scenario.

Policies in the U.S. are not only made in closed rooms but also by collecting ideas on pages. The Arab scene needs to think, in a courageous way and through an effective participation between people and government, in such a way as to replace the existing relation between ruler and citizen that is built on the (wali) ruler/ruled relationship.