Americans are right to be baffled by what seems like a contradictory reaction on the part of the Arab world to the end of the Iraq war - pleased that Saddam Hussein is gone but sullen that it was the U.S. that removed him.
 

Arabs are sick and tired of the status quo of living under regimes that have resisted reform, and of the rot these societies have fallen into. Even before the American military action, many Arab youths saw an invasion of Iraq as a means of shaking the status quo. The great majority of Arabs do not mourn the fall of a regime that was tyrannical and despotic. And yet, they remained distrustful of the Bush administration's motives for the war on Iraq and its plans for their region. It would be easy to dismiss this conflicted view or to see it as an ungrateful reaction to the American "liberation" of Iraq. Yes, Iraq has been liberated from a despicable regime. But Iraq remains, technically, at least, under American occupation. This is a legitimate ground for such a reaction. Americans would do well to understand that this mind-set can mean opportunity for the U.S. or disaster. There is a space now, as a consequence of the war that the Americans should cultivate: a means to build more complementary relationships with the Arab world. President George Bush must carefully avoid the kinds of mis-steps that would squander this chance to build qualitatively different, solid relationships not with Arab rulers but with the next generation of ordinary people in the region, relationships that would serve American national objectives. This is the new burden of the Bush administration in the region: trying to nurture trust with a people eager for change but suspicious of American motives. If the opportunity is lost, if the impression among Arabs in the coming weeks and months is that America pocketed Iraq for American companies and for Israel's sake, then the U.S. military victory in Iraq could well become a nightmare.

The problem is wide and deep. Arabs have indulged in the culture of complaint yet remained submissive to fate. It is as if they suffer an acute case of depression. They feel almost irrelevant. Individually, they are creative, intelligent, innovative and daring. But collectively, except for the Islamists, the Arab elite have refrained from offering options for change, whether internally, regionally or towards the U.S. Always there is imported blame, someone else controlling their destiny, while they themselves are at a loss to do anything about it.
Political institutions are banned in most Arab countries and the only quasi-political institutions are the mosques. In such a vacuum, religion has become the only institution, other than the powerful military and intelligence organizations, to hold sway in much of the region.

The Iraqi Shiite pilgrimage last week to Karbala is a powerful example of the kind of ambivalence many Arabs feel about the U.S. But it is also a poignant reminder of how religion can take over as a primary driver in that region. The pilgrimage had been banned for the past 25 years and became possible only because the U.S. has rid Iraq of Saddam. Nevertheless, on the first day, some of the pilgrims angrily called for the occupiers to leave. Baffling as it may be to Americans, the predominant message is: you, too, are to blame for supporting Saddam in his war with Iran and the consequent oppression of the Shiites; you remain the godfather of Israel; your motives are to "get" Iraq; and we want an Islamic republic. But this is merely a partial picture of what the war has left behind.

The American strength during the war only highlighted Arab weakness. Having to be "liberated" and "freed" by someone else is shaming; that America is the "liberator" as well as considered the "imposer" of Israel's superiority over Arabs has further exacerbated the sense of shame. Still, there are signs that the Arab region may be about to awaken from a deep sleep during which it has shunned reality.

This awakening could simply be a yawn before returning to business as usual and the vicious circle of equivocation, corruption, weakness, complaint and frustration. But if this awaking is real, it provides a true opportunity for both Arabs and Americans to defeat extremism and forge a fundamentally new relationship. Otherwise, there is a risk of a reckless confrontation, fuelled in both camps by extremism, arrogance and vengeance.

Arabs have an opportunity to take hold of their destiny and to demand that their governments better understand the necessity of reform. It's also an opportunity for Arab moderates to engage actively and defeat extremists. But for that to happen, moderates must be empowered.

They feel undermined by American policies toward the Palestinians and Israelis and by the loud voices of hawks and extremists in and around the Bush administration who have come to be seen as the voice of American foreign policy. Arab moderates will not be able to win the battle against Arab extremists unless the Bush administration contains its own extremists.

What is needed at this point is for the administration to make the kinds of policy changes that will provide moderates the arguments with which to diffuse extremist rhetoric about the U.S. This would help erase the impression that the U.S. is frightened by real democracy for Arabs.

How should the U.S. go about trying to create these healthier, more trusting relationships? The challenge is huge and, not surprisingly, it has as much to do with reality as with perception. The Bush administration does not appear convinced that Arab public opinion truly matters. It acts as if the "Arab street" is containable in the larger scheme. This needs to change. The administration also seems to believe that the president's use of the term "Palestine" is a huge development for which Arabs are not sufficiently grateful, whereas most Arabs view the Bush pronouncement as lip service.

Herein lies a major disconnect. As much as the region is ready to change, it will always remain bogged down and antagonistic towards the U.S. as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved and America is viewed as a partner of Israel's occupation and arrogance. Now, after the war, matters are worse. America is viewed as a "twin" to Israel as an occupier of Arab land, upholder of the "pre-emptive" doctrine, and condescending towards Arabs. Many Arabs view the Iraq war as the first step in the U.S. "pre-emptive" doctrine, to be followed by Syria and Iran. The notion that Iraq should be occupied until it becomes "stable" is interpreted as a cover for pocketing the country and its resources. Should such perceptions persist, the U.S. will slip into a quagmire and the military victory in Iraq would fade away. Iraq should be allowed to move as quickly as possible towards internationally supervised elections rather than the Pentagon imposing a leadership prefabricated in Washington.

The U.S. must not enhance the impression that it wants American companies to become the neo-colonialists of Iraq. With this in mind, it should withdraw from Iraq quickly.

If Arab perception is that the U.S. is now an occupier of Iraq, then there will be no confidence in American motives in the region. There is an understanding that Israel will remain a special strategic ally of the U.S. The concern among Arabs is that that relationship has expanded at the expense of Arab rights. The Bush administration should keep these things in mind as it works to strengthen ties in the region. The American bases that are now widely assumed to be in the works for Iraq will not become a problem if the occupation ends. Many Arab countries host such bases, after all.

The real divide is over issues: there is the anger about U.S. policies towards Israel. But finally, there is anger that comes from perceptions of American arrogance and condescension towards anything Arab.

If such perceptions prevail, the resurgence of strong religious groups in Iraq would be only a prelude to the worst for the whole region - and for the United States.

Raghida Dergham is Senior Diplomatic Correspondent for the London-based Al Hayat