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The arrest marks the end of a yearlong manhunt for a suspect believed to be one of the few living conspirators in the Sept. 11 plot. It signifies an important victory in the difficult campaign to apprehend key operatives in Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network. Even as Americans commemorated the anniversary of the attacks, Binalshibh was arrested by Pakistani police on Wednesday with as many as 10 other suspects, after a three-hour gun-and-grenade battle in which two gunmen. were killed. He is being transferred to a U.S. airbase in Afghanistan, sources said. Details of the arrest were unclear last night, but one intelligence source said that CIA paramilitary units "were nearby" when the raid was carried out. Charged in Germany with more than 3,000 counts of murder for his complicity in the attacks, Binalshibh had hoped to be the 20th hijacker in the plot but was repeatedly rebuffed in attempts to secure a U.S. visa, officials have said. His name has also surfaced in investigations of several other terrorist attacks, including the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen and a bombing earlier this year of a synagogue in Tunisia. The Yemeni national roomed with hijacking ringleader Mohamed Atta in Hamburg, and provided crucial financial and logistical support to Atta and other members of the cell who carried out the operation, according to intelligence officials. The U.S. indictment against another alleged Sept. 11 conspirator, Zacarias Moussaoui, names Binalshibh as an "unindicted co-conspirator," and accused him of wiring money to Moussaoui and at least one of the hijackers, Marwan Al-Shehhi. In a previously audiotaped interview with the Qatar-based al-Jazeera television station broadcast Thursday, Binalshibh boasted of his role in helping to organize the Sept. 11 plot and called the attacks "real acts of heroism" that succeeded in part because "the enemy is stupid." Al-Jazeera said it conducted the interview with Binalshibh and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, believed to be a top coordinator of the Sept. 11 attack, in a secret location in Karachi. "He is a very big fish to catch," said Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism official. "He certainly was the coordinator with Khalid of the 9/11 operation itself, and he might know some of the people who may still be in the United States if we can get him to talk." U.S. sources said Mohammed, one of the FBI's "Most Wanted Terrorists," was not captured as part of the Karachi raid. Only one other suspected terrorist known to be in U.S. custody, al Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaida, surpasses Binalshibh in importance, several officials and observers said. In a separate development, a federal official last night that authorities have issued arrest warrants in Buffalo, N.Y., for five men who are believed to have gone through al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. At least some of the men were in custody, the official said. The men were described as naturalized American citizens, and some or all are of Yemeni descent. They have been living in Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo. In Wednesday's raid on a low-rise apartment building in Karachi, which began about 9 a.m. local time, two suspects were killed and one police officer was seriously wounded. Suspects hurled grenades and fired assault rifles at police for three hours. Police seized a satellite phone, a laptop computer, firearms, grenades and other items from the building, according to local press reports. As President Pervez Musharraf has heightened efforts to crack down on militants, Pakistani security forces have engaged in more frequent gun battles with suspected terrorist operatives. Harvey Kushner, a terrorism expert at Long Island University, said the case "shows that there is significant cooperation with intelligence agencies around the world." But he said he would not expect the arrest to affect the second-generation al Qaeda network, which has dispersed to a number of countries. Officials now fear that lower-level and largely independent operatives are planning attacks on their own.
The terror operatives are "much
more spread out now," Kushner said.
Binalshibh grew up in the eastern Yemeni province of Hadramaut, considered
a hotbed of Islamic radicalism. He first entered Hamburg in 1995 with a
phony plea for asylum.
By Peter Finn His capture in Pakistan and subsequent handover to U.S. officials takes investigators to the core of the conspiracy by the al Qaeda terrorist network and offers the possibility of solving many of the outstanding mysteries about how Sept. 11 was planned and executed. It remains unclear if the capture of the 30-year-old Binalshibh was related to his decision to grant an interview to the Arabic-language al-Jazeera TV network, apparently from a hiding place in Pakistan. In the program, broadcast this week, Binalshibh described himself as the "coordinator" of the attacks. "Regarding your question about the issue of coordination," he told the al-Jazeera interviewer, "in brief, it's the issue of connecting the cells to each other, forming a link between these cells and the general command in Afghanistan and determining the priorities and following up on the work of these cells until the conclusion of its work." His statements to the network, including the claim that he has written a 112-page justification for Sept. 11, may provide additional evidence for U.S. authorities to indict him, a U.S. official said. Binalshibh has been named by U.S. prosecutors as an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, the French Moroccan who investigators say took Binalshibh's place among the hijackers after Binalshibh was turned down for a visa to travel to the United States. An international arrest warrant under which he was being sought was issued, last year, by German authorities, based on his activities in Germany, where he stands with more 3,000 counts of murder for his role in the attacks. U.S. authorities, however, are unlikely to hand him over to the Germans. Once in German custody, the United States would have great difficulty in extraditing him to face trial, if there was a threat of capital punishment, as is likely in cases relating to Sept. 11. The Germans have refused to hand over evidence for the trial of Moussaoui unless they receive guarantees that it will not be used secure a capital conviction. So a U.S. indictment of Binalshibh, or a military trial, is now likely. Binalshibh was born in Yemen, in the province of Hadramaut, home to many Islamic radicals. In 1995, he stepped off a ship in Hamburg and asked for political asylum, claiming to be a refugee from Sudan who had been jailed following a student demonstration in the capital, Khartoum. His story wasn't believed, but by the time he was formally turned down by asylum officials and ordered deported, in December 1997, he had obtained residency and a student visa, allowing him to stay. He entered a German language program to prepare for college studies, but dropped out, leaving many teachers and students with the impression that he was neither smart nor dedicated. But in Hamburg he met Atta, who was both. In 1998, Binalshibh moved into an apartment with Atta and another student, Said Bahaji, who also is being sought on a German arrest warrant. Binalshibh had wanted to take part in the attacks, investigators believe, but he failed four times to get a U.S. visa. "It was only by luck, really, he wasn't given a visa," said one U.S. official. "Otherwise, he'd have been on one of those planes that went down." Investigators say they have concluded that planning for the Sept. 11 attacks was punctuated by two critical meetings, one in Malaysia in January 2000 and one in Spain in July 2001. Binalshibh is the only person known to be alive who attended both meetings, making him a key potential source of answers to the enduring questions about the plot. These include who initiated it, how the hijackers and flights were selected, and who coordinated the hijackers with Afghanistan and in the United States, Western intelligence officials said. Binalshibh also was a conduit for money sent to the Sept. 11 pilots in the United States as well as Moussaoui, whose exact role remains the subject of debate.
In the now familiar absence of Bush administration engagement, halting progress has been made by the parties on the ground. There have been no major Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis in six weeks, despite several attempts; both the Israeli army and the Palestinian administration claim credit, and both probably had something to do with it. Attempts by Palestinian political and military leaders to change the direction of their self-destructive uprising against Israel, and to force Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to yield most of his power, continue in spite of Mr. Arafat's strong resistance; this week the legislative body of the Palestinian Authority delivered an unprecedented rebuff, forcing the resignation of Mr. Arafat's cabinet. The more moderate Labor Party ministers in Mr. Sharon's cabinet have been trying to negotiate incremental security agreements with the Palestinians, and there are signs of revival in the long-moribund Israeli peace camp.
But Israeli troops occupy six
major West Bank towns and significant parts of the Gaza Strip, imposing
curfews and other restrictions on movement that aid agencies say are
breeding a mounting humanitarian crisis. Israeli forces killed more than a
dozen innocent Palestinian civilians in the past two weeks, including
several children; a hasty official investigation cleared the soldiers of
any wrongdoing. Israeli settlement-building in the territories continues;
Mr. Sharon refuses to rein it in, just as he rejects any discussion of
Palestinian statehood or any negotiations -- even with a post-Arafat
leadership -- about a permanent peace. For his part, Mr. Bush clearly
remains unwilling to do or say anything that would cross Mr. Sharon. That
reluctance largely explains his administration's failure to act on his
broad promises of last June; in the coming months, it could also prove a
serious impediment to building a coalition against Iraq.
By Peter Baker With its veto power, Russia emerged as perhaps the key country on the U.N. Security Council as the Bush administration sought to persuade the international body to issue a new ultimatum to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. But Russia's threat to launch a strike against Chechen rebel camps across the border in Georgia presented an unexpected challenge for the Bush team. Both sides disavowed any linkage between the two issues. But Russian President Vladimir Putin effectively injected the issue of Georgia by warning of unilateral action against the former Soviet republic this week at the same time Bush was soliciting allies against Iraq. Russian politicians and analysts were discussing a possible Georgia-for-Iraq deal -- Russia would not block Bush's plan to topple Hussein if the Americans step aside in Georgia. "If the U.S. thinks it is possible to conduct military actions against a state because there is suspicion that it is making weapons of mass destruction, likewise Russia as a member of the anti-terrorist coalition can bomb Georgia because there are terrorists on Georgian territory," said Irina Khakamada, a deputy speaker of the State Duma, the lower house of parliament. A visiting U.S. diplomat rejected the notion of a direct tradeoff. "I don't see that there really are any quid pro quos to be had, whether with Russia or others," said Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton, who was here consulting with Russian leaders about Iraq and other issues. "I think our case is extremely strong and stands on its own merits." Yet a senior U.S. official, who asked not to be identified, said Washington was open to hearing Russia's arguments for action against Georgia and suggested that the two countries might find "common interest" on the need for preemptive strikes against terrorists. As one of five permanent Security Council members, Russia could single-handedly block any resolution threatening force. Britain supports the United States, France has moved closer to Bush's position and U.S. diplomats say they believe they can persuade China to at least abstain if Russia sides with the United States. Russia has long complained that Georgia harbors Chechen guerrillas in the Pankisi Gorge. Seizing on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks this week, Putin employed Bush's own logic in announcing that he would authorize military action against Georgia if the tiny, mountainous country does not rid its territory of people he has characterized as terrorists. "He's assuming very cleverly the same framework that Bush is," said Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution scholar who studies the region. "It's a typical and very clever step for Putin to step into the international spotlight to remind everyone of Russia's own interest. It's basically turning the Bush administration's words back on itself." Many Russian newspapers speculated today on a potential trade-off. "The 'deal' between Bush and Putin -- who traded Saddam Hussein for [Georgian President] Eduard Shevardnadze -- is the talk of the day in the Russian political establishment," said the Vremya Novostei newspaper. The paper quoted ultranationalist parliamentary leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Hussein supporter, as saying: "Russia will condemn the operation against Iraq but will not take any preventive measures. In return, America will wink at Russia's operation in Georgia." The State Department took "strong exception" on Thursday to any threats by Russia against Georgia and said the United States would "oppose any unilateral military action" there. Tedo Japaridze, the Georgian national security adviser, said he has spoken with Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and was confident that Georgia is "the red line that President Putin and his people cannot trespass. Washington will stand strong next to Georgia." In a telephone interview from Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, Japaridze said he had detected no buildup of Russian forces near the border.
Georgian troops engaged in a
firefight in the gorge Thursday night and arrested three men, he said, one
of whom was wounded in the exchange. Georgia has now captured a total of
15 men in Pankisi, mostly local residents described as criminals. Only one
was an Arab suspected of links to international terrorist organizations.
By William Raspberry The Bush administration has been at great pains to make the case that Saddam Hussein is such a threat to the security of the United States as to warrant a unilateral U.S. assault with the implied intention of killing him. But the evidence presented this week consisted almost entirely of the Iraqi dictator's offenses against his own citizens, his neighbors and the United Nations. In addition to the oft-repeated (and, so far as I know, uncontested) allegations that Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran and against Iraq's Kurds, Bush made a detailed case that Hussein repeatedly defied, ignored, violated and otherwise disrespected U.N. resolutions and directives -- a "decade of deception and defiance," he called it. But surely the United Nations knew that already -- and knows that it has the power to invoke military means to enforce its directives. It may be a shame that it has not done so, and the Bush speech may be useful in that regard. What the speech did not offer, though, is any evidence that Hussein is amassing weapons of mass destruction for use against the United States. That, as far as I can understand it, is the charge on which the American-executed death penalty would be based. Without that evidence, the rationale seems to go something like this: Saddam Hussein has "dissed" the United Nations and menaced his neighbors, and if the United Nations is too chicken to do anything about it, then America will. But surely the administration's warmongering hasn't been on behalf of the United Nations (although Bush did take the occasion of his speech to announce America's return to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which it left in 1984). No, we have been led to believe that Hussein is such an imminent threat to us that we dare not wait much longer to take him out. And always the explanation is made in the context of terrorism -- suggesting, though not quite saying, that Iraq is behind the savagery we now know as 9/11. If it were true -- and neither Bush nor anyone else has offered the slimmest reed of evidence that it is -- then I wouldn't be cautioning against an all-out attack on Hussein. Nations, after all, have a duty to protect themselves. But the best Bush could do the other day was to note that an unchecked Saddam Hussein could destabilize the region, which would be bad for us; that Iraq could be stockpiling weapons of mass destruction -- perhaps even getting nearer to producing atomic weapons; and that Iraqis were suspected in a 1993 attempt to "assassinate the emir of Kuwait and a former American president" -- the current president's father. The Clinton administration responded to that attempt, which took place during a visit by the senior Bush to Kuwait, by firing 23 Tomahawk missiles at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence. What else is there? According to our president, this: "Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September 11. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan are known to be in Iraq." By my lights, the prosecutor's failure to make a convincing case is complete. The case fails diplomatically, because unilateral action of the sort envisioned would weaken the relevant international institutions and complicate our role in the world. It fails militarily -- not because we couldn't stomp Hussein's pitiful army but because we don't seem to have thought through the consequences of "victory," including the likelihood that it wouldn't stop terrorism and that we would be stuck with running Iraq for years to come.
And it fails morally. War is
sometimes necessary. But it needs a firmer basis than that the slimeball
was happy about 9/11 and I'm still sore about Poppy.
What Time Is It? There just isn't time for all the things it's time for You may be thinking that it would have been nice to be alerted back when opinion-makers thought it was okay to wallow in sentiment, so that you could enjoy this opportunity before the time came to put sentiment aside. But there was no such opportunity. Sentiment belongs in a special category, along with partisan differences, of things that exist primarily to be put aside. When sentiment and partisan differences are put aside, there is room for goodwill, reason, common sense and maybe even a small refrigerator where cooler heads can prevail. A check of articles in just four major newspapers during the three weeks or so since Kristoff's declaration indicates that it is time for literally hundreds of different things, in the view of those who write for or are quoted in the news media. A few of these matters do seem time-sensitive. This may actually be an especially good moment to consider leaving a corporate board of directors or to discuss with a child what he or she is willing to eat for lunch at school. But most of the things it is said to be time for are more like democracy in Pakistan or reviving urban rivers: It is time for them only in the sense that it is never not time for them. The dean of Stanford Law School, for example, says "it is time" for America "to hold true to its principles." Was there a time, in her view, when America should not have held true to its principles? By contrast not everyone will agree with the letter writer to the Wall Street Journal who says, "It is time to bring the hierarchy in Rome to its knees to beg forgiveness from the rest of the world for its crimes against humanity." But our view on this subject is unlikely to turn on what time it is. It may be logically pointless to insist that it's time for something you never think it's not time for, but the "time for" conceit serves various rhetorical purposes. It suggests that you are open-minded and deliberative. You are not saying that your opinion is always and obviously correct. You are saying that you have considered the various options and only now have reached your conclusion, which itself is only tentative and applicable at this point in time. "It is time to concede that politicians will never understand" the world's major conflicts, writes a Times culture critic, who evidently thinks he does understand them. This might seem arrogant, but "it is time" suggests that he decided only lately and reluctantly that his view of geopolitics is superior to that of the politicians. That word "concede" is an especially elegant touch, though one may wonder who forced him to concede the superiority of his own opinion. "It is time" gives you the credibility of a convert. You are not one of those folks who have always believed unquestioningly that Jews and Christians should "bury old suspicions and fears." Until now, you did not think that Americans should "practice what we preach" -- or at least you did not feel strongly about it. But now, "it is time." Your opinion on this subject is fresh and strong. Third, it creates a sense of urgency. Not merely do you hold a particular opinion but this is the very moment when your view of things ought to prevail. Yesterday would have been too soon and tomorrow may be too late. A strong sense of urgency can even help to disguise a certain flabbiness in the opinion itself. According to a Washington Post op-ed piece, "now is the time to create a Commission on Privacy, Personal Liberty and Homeland Security." A commission to study the matter is just about the lamest thing you can call for on any subject. But at least "it is time" gives an illusion of vitality. But where will we find the time for all the things it is time for? Fear not. In recent weeks' newspapers, the list of things it is not or no longer time for is almost as long. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder says the time for "checkbook diplomacy" is over. Dear Abby says this is no time for feuding -- though she also says it is time to face reality, which for most of us will eat up more time than we save by eschewing feuds. A Los Angeles Times economic correspondent says it is time for Americans to "drop their infatuation with unfettered markets," while a half-dozen others add that it is not the time to raise taxes on business. As if, in their view, it ever could be that time.
With any luck, the time you
spend doing the things it is time to start doing and the time you save by
not doing things it is time to stop doing ought to be roughly equal. So
please continue to do everything the media tell you to do.
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In a recent interview with the Arabic satellite news network Al-Jazeera, Binalshibh bragged that he had participated in the planning of the Sept. 11 attacks.
Binalshibh's roommate, Mohammed
Atta, was one of the hijackers on American Airlines Flight 11, which
crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. U.S. officials say
Binalshibh was also a member of a Hamburg-based cell led by Atta. Before
Sept. 11, Binalshibh was frustrated in his attempts to receive a visa to
enter the United States in 2000. Instead, U.S. officials allege, he
provided financial support to the other 19 hijackers. Separately,
officials said five men of Yemeni descent, most believed to American
citizens, were arrested in Lackawanna, outside Buffalo, on suspicions they
were operating as a terrorist cell on U.S. soil.
The officials said the men were
on U.S. soil for years and lived just a few blocks from each other, but
were discovered through recent investigation and intelligence suggesting
they were part of a terrorist cell. The evidence included a recent spike
in communications with suspected terrorist locations overseas, and some
evidence of attendance at a terror training camp linked to Usama bin
Laden, the officials said.
The officials said, however, there was no evidence the men were in
any stages of launching a terrorist attack. Officials declined to describe
many of the details of the case, saying it was sealed. The arrests will be
announced by the Justice Department at a news conference Saturday, a
senior government official said, on condition of anonymity. The source
said the Justice Department plans to charge the men in the Buffalo area
capture with providing material support and resources to terrorists.
U.S. officials said the discovery of the cell was connected to information
that also prompted the Bush administration to raise America's terror alert
to "code orange" -- the second highest -- on the eve of the Sept. 11
anniversary. One senior government official said one of the men arrested
in Buffalo is linked to Omar al-Farouq, a senior Al Qaeda figure captured
in Asia this summer, who has provided his interrogators specific
information suggesting that terror cells in the region were planning
attacks on U.S. facilities, the sources said.
The official did not say how the
two were associated. The official said the information provided by Farouq
that led to the higher alert does not stop with the five men arrested in
Buffalo. "There are other reasons we're at orange," the official said,
without elaborating. Binalshibh's capture is a major accomplishment for
the United States. Binalshibh, who has alluded authorities for months, was
not injured during his arrest.
To catch him, police commandos fought a pitched battle with Al
Qaeda suspects holed up in an apartment Wednesday, with combat spilling
out onto adjoining rooftops, officials said. They said that two suspects
were killed and five captured in the fighting, as Pakistan stepped up
pressure on the remnants of the terrorist movement a year after it made
its mark on the world.
Six officers were wounded when police stormed the top-floor apartment and the rooftop where the gunmen held out against hundreds of troops in the street and on the roofs of nearby apartment blocks, they said. Two of the wounded were reported in critical condition.
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf told a news program in an interview Friday that one Egyptian, one Saudi and eight Yemenis were captured in the raid.
U.S. personnel were not hurt in
the raid, officials said.
Binalshibh, 30, was born in Yemen. He is being sought by the German
government for his role in the Sept. 11 attacks. The Arab satellite
network Al-Jazeera ran a taped interview with Binalshibh Thursday, in
which he said he helped coordinate the attacks. Also interviewed was
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, whom U.S. counterterrorism officials say
masterminded the strikes. He also appeared in a videotape recovered by
U.S. forces in Afghanistan at the home of Al Qaeda's slain military chief,
Mohammed Atef.
According to the U.S. grand jury indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui,
an alleged conspirator in the Sept. 11 attacks, Binalshibh applied four
times for a visa to enter the United States from May to October 2000, but
was rebuffed each time. After being denied a visa for the third time,
Binalshibh allegedly began funneling money to associates inside the United
States. He wired money to Moussaoui, to at least two hijackers and to a
Florida flight school at which one of the hijackers was training, the
indictment said. Authorities believe Binalshibh fled Germany for Pakistan
before Sept. 11. German authorities had issued an international arrest
warrant for Binalshibh, whose whereabouts until now were unknown.
A correspondent for the pan-Arab satellite station Al-Jazeera
claimed to have interviewed Binalshibh and another Sept. 11 fugitive,
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, at a secret location in Pakistan. The men admitted
being central figures in the Sept. 11 plot, and claimed the U.S. Congress
had been another target that day. In Thursday's broadcast, Al-Jazeera
aired audio excerpts of the interview, in which two male voices attributed
to Mohammed and Binalshibh revealed details about the buildup to the Sept.
11 attacks. The voice purported to be Binalshibh's said the hijackers were
instructed to take over the planes 15 minutes after takeoff. "That was the
best time, and they were very brave," he said. Two other members of the
Hamburg cell, Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah, died in the suicide
hijackings. Two other members of the Hamburg cell did not take part in the
hijackings and are still at large.
Fox News' Carl Cameron and The Associated Press contributed to this
report.
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Official: Terrorists Met in Amsterdam
By Toby Sterling
AMSTERDAM -- A group of al-Qaida terrorists, including two of the
pilots who flew into the World Trade Center, met in Amsterdam in 1999, a
German security official said Friday. The official, who spoke on condition
of anonymity, said al-Qaida members met twice in the Netherlands while
attending "Islamic seminars."
The meeting in mid-June 1999 was attended by pilots Mohamed Atta
and Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ramsi Binalshibh -- the man who this week
claimed on Arabic satellite network al-Jazeera to have coordinated the
Sept. 11 attacks. Mounir El Motassadeq, the only person under arrest in
Germany for direct involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks, was also present.
The Dutch Internal Security Service declined to comment, and Dutch
prosecutors investigating other al-Qaida operations in the Netherlands
said they were unaware of the meeting. German prosecutors, however, had
confirmed that at least one member of the Hamburg al-Qaida cell visited
the country. At a news conference Aug. 29, German prosecutor Kay Nehm said
El Motassadeq embraced Islamic fundamentalism after visiting the
Netherlands. Nehm said the first seminar was held in Eindhoven in early
1999, the second in Amsterdam in mid-1999 -- apparently the same seminar
where, according to the source, they met with Binalshibh.
Dutch daily newspaper De Telegraaf reported Friday that the group
used a conference on "Muslim Puritanism" held at an unidentified Amsterdam
mosque as a cover for their meeting.
A second Dutch paper, the Eindhoven Dagblad, reported Thursday that
El Motassadeq also visited Eindhoven in the fall of 1999 and again in
2001. Both papers cited unidentified members of the Internal Security
Service. The German source couldn't confirm either paper's report.
Fourteen alleged terrorists have been arrested in the Netherlands
since Sept. 11, 2001, and are awaiting trial.
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Why wars don't stop terrorism
By Dahlia Lithwick
I have received mail this week from readers objecting to my recent contention that the United States is not at war. There are two main strands to this debate: Are we at war, and should we be? The first is a matter of law: Can we be at war without a congressional declaration? Is war a subjective status (as in, "hmmm, sure feels like a war out there today") or is it a formal, objective legal state? This question has already launched a thousand constitutional, scholarly, and rhetorical ships, and I'll get back to you with an answer if Eugene Volokh and I get it sorted out this weekend over e-mail.
The second—and to my mind, more urgent—question is how did we come to be talking in terms of a "war" at all? Why does the war model—soldiers, uniforms, nation-states, civilians, weapons, and battlefields—apply to our fight against terrorism? The administration calls this a "war on terror" to avail itself of the limitless executive powers—mainly domestic detention and surveilance—triggered in wartime. This "war on terror"—wherein we track down rogue al-Qaida members, then hold and/or torture them—is not a conventional military operation that meets any technical or international definition of "war." And the oddest part of it all is that despite all this insistence that we are fighting a war, almost no one can come forward with a coherent theory of why.
Yes, America was attacked on Sept. 11. But there have been terror attacks on U.S. targets before—al-Qaida attacks that weren't met with a unilateral declaration of war or a rolling out of any Patriot Acts and their creepy DOJ surveillance progeny. There were criminal prosecutions and convictions in the destruction of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; the earlier WTC attack in 1993; the 1998 bombings of two U.S. Embassies in East Africa; the (foiled) "Day of Terror" plot (to bomb New York City tunnels, the U.N. building, and the FBI building in New York); and the (foiled) millennium bombing of LAX in 1999. The only difference between these plots and Sept. 11 was that their combined death tolls were in the hundreds, as opposed to the thousands. While that difference in scale is not morally insignificant—not by any means—it is not necessarily legally significant. The difference between a "crime" and a "war" doesn't necessarily come down to integers.
Before we decide that the only way to fight terror is through war, it's worth recalling that the criminal prosecutions for each of the above acts of terror were not only successful; they were also constitutional, frequently transparent, and overwhelmingly legal and fair. What happened on Sept. 11 to discredit the criminal law system? What failures in this system drove the administration to call immediately for secret roundups of "material witnesses," military tribunals, and secret deportation hearings? Did something go so badly in the first WTC prosecution that led to the decision to detain "enemy combatants" without trial forever? How did we lose faith in a system that worked so well?
Criminal trials are not going to solve every problem facing the nation right now: They cannot stop Iraq from launching weapons of mass destruction, and they would not have removed the Taliban from power. But it doesn't follow that the criminal law cannot bring terrorists to justice, nor does it follow that we need to gut the existing system—replacing openness with secrecy, and due process with parodies of process—to do so.
First WTC Bombing: On Feb. 26, 1993, a car bomb exploded in the basement of the World Trade Center, leaving six dead and over a thousand wounded. A cell of fundamentalist Muslim terrorists planned and executed the attacks, and zealous domestic investigation, along with diplomacy and extraditions, led to the trial and conviction of all but one of the terrorists. In 1995, after a nine-month trial, 12 defendants were convicted in federal district court of conspiracy to bomb the World Trade Center, as well as of plotting in 1993 to bomb the United Nations, the FBI building in New York, and the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, and to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. (Evidently we all missed the trial because we were too busy watching O.J.)
African Embassy Bombings: More than 220 African and American citizens were killed in two almost simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998. Twenty-three defendants were charged with various offenses, four of whom were convicted in federal court on May 29, 2001. All were sentenced to life in prison. Others are being held; still others remain at large.
Millennium Bombing: A plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport in the midst of the millennium festivities of 1999 was foiled when Ahmed Ressam was arrested crossing the border from Canada in a car with a trunk full of explosives. Last year, after a three-week trial in Los Angeles, a jury found Ressam guilty of nine criminal counts—including conspiracy to commit an act of international terrorism. Despite a mini-squabble with the Canadian government—which didn't want to share intelligence secrets in court—the testimony of Canadian intelligence officials was provided at the eleventh hour, without incident. Facing 57 to 130 years in prison, Ressam agreed to a deal with the DOJ and has since provided the government with detailed information about training with the Taliban and the structure of al-Qaida. He will testify against Zacarias Moussaoui and Abu Zubaydah (reportedly a top lieutenant in al-Qaida), who was captured last March. Ressam also provided crucial testimony against his co-conspirator in the millennium plot, Mokhtar Haouari, who was also convicted in 2001.
No one would tell you these
trials were disasters. No one would argue we are less safe today as a
result of these criminal prosecutions. Certainly there were security
issues: information to be sealed; witnesses, judges and jurors to be
protected; and fears throughout of further incidents. But the procedures
instituted for handling those issues worked. The investigations leading up
to the trials also uncovered future plots. And the convictions have
produced government informants and witnesses for future prosecutions.
Terrorists have been incapacitated for life, and cells have been
disrupted. Still, the national presumption remains that prosecuting
terrorists via standard criminal means has failed us somehow; perhaps
because no one trial can pre-empt all future attacks.
No one war will pre-empt all future attacks either.
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Guardian:
Iraq rejects new
US-UK pressure
Nicholas Watt,
David Teather and Ian Traynor
Britain and the United States were
moving closer to a confrontation with Iraq last
night after Baghdad rejected President George Bush's demand for the
unconditional return of UN weapons inspectors.
As the foreign secretary Jack Straw prepared to warn Saddam Hussein that he will face a military assault within months if he refuses to readmit the inspectors, the Iraqi deputy prime minister declared that Baghdad would not bow to US "aggression".
Dismissing Mr Bush's speech to the UN on Thursday as "lies and falsifications", Tariq Aziz said: "The return of inspectors without conditions will not solve the problem because we have had a bad experience with them. Is it clever to repeat an experience that failed and did not prevent aggression?"
His remarks were immediately rejected by the White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, who declared: "Obviously they have something to hide." Mr Bush set the tone of the US view of Iraq earlier when he said he was "highly doubtful" Baghdad would comply with calls to readmit weapons inspectors.
The war of words between Washington and Baghdad will stiffen the determination of Mr Bush to draw up a strongly worded UN security council resolution over the readmission of inspectors. Britain and the US, who yesterday embarked on a frantic round of diplomacy at the UN in New York, want the resolution to make clear that Baghdad will face a military assault if it fails to give the inspectors unlimited access. Mr Bush also wants to set a strict deadline "of days and weeks" for Iraq to comply with calls for the inspectors to be readmitted.
Mr Straw will outline this tough approach today when he tells UN general assembly: "We have to be clear to Iraq and to ourselves about the consequences which will flow from a failure by Iraq to meet its obligations."
A British source spelt out its position in blunter terms. "Everyone understands that the key target is to get weapons inspectors back in and that we have to make clear that force is the alternative," the source said.
Britain is being careful not to talk publicly of including the threat of military force in the resolution, because ministers hope to win round sceptical members of the security council and place the Iraqis under greater pressure to readmit weapons inspectors.
Iraq's rejection of America's demands appeared to complicate the negotiations at the UN last night. But Baghdad's response was carefully phrased to keep the door open - however slightly - on readmitting weapons inspectors.
But British officials made it clear that Mr Straw, who had lunch yesterday with his counterparts from the security council's five permanent members, had an "open mind" about what should be in the resolution.
His approach was echoed by Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, who diplomatically referred to the drawing up of "resolution or resolutions" as he prepared to meet the 14 other members of the security council. This was a nod to France, one of the "big five" with the power to veto a resolution, which proposed two resolutions. Under the French plan, the first resolution would give Iraq three weeks to readmit the weapons inspectors. This would be followed by a second approving the use of military force if Iraq refuses.
Britain and America hope that their conciliatory approach will ease the atmosphere at the UN as diplomats prepare to draw up the new resolution. The "framework" of the resolution will be set by foreign ministers over the weekend. Senior diplomats will then start drawing up a resolution which Britain hopes to finalise next week or the week after.
Behind their conciliatory public language, however, Britain and the US are adamant that the threat of military action must be included in the resolution.
The British government also has an eye
on a growing backbench revolt. Tony Blair will tomorrow be given a warning
of the threat he faces when the former frontbenchers, Chris Smith and
Gerald Kaufman, warn of the dangers of military action without an
international consensus.
Big moment for drama's small players
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UN
Temporary members of security council hold key to vote
Matthew Engel
If, in a few years time, you should find yourself in Conakry, capital of
the west African republic of Guinea, and notice that the airport terminal
seems unusually luxurious or the road system unexpectedly well-maintained,
it might be worth thinking back to the Iraq crisis of 2002 - and
wondering.
Guinea is one of 10 countries who find themselves, by fluke, in the crucial position of deciding the fate of any United Nations resolution on Iraq. These are the rotating members of the security council. When the UN does move to the centre of world attention, the focus is on the permanent five: the US, Britain, Russia, China and France, their positions as global powers based on a world view (like much at the UN) established in 1945.
If one of the five uses its veto, then any resolution is killed. But the veto is the bluntest instrument in UN diplomacy. There will be frantic activity over the coming days and weeks between Washington and the sceptics in Moscow, Paris and Beijing to find a resolution that will produce agreement or, at the worst, abstentions.
But that will not be enough. To pass, assuming there are no vetoes, a resolution would have to get nine votes out of the 15 available - the five permanent members plus the 10 temporary members which currently include Guinea as well as Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Singapore and Syria.
By good fortune, with a small slice of skill, that line-up of the temporary members is about as favourable to the US as any selection from the general assembly could possibly be. The countries represent regional blocs, mostly chosen on Buggins' turn. The skill came because one of Africa's representatives should now be Sudan, no friend to American ambitions.
However, the Clinton administration, with a display of diplomatic finesse that might not be so evident these days, successfully maneuvered to have Sudan sidelined as soft on terrorism and replaced by Mauritius.
Even in normal times, the two-year term on the security council is a big moment for a small country, many of which treat their moment in the sun as an important duty and honour. Suddenly, their diplomats find themselves greeted in the corridor in a less perfunctory function by the big players. Because the security council meets almost every day in private session, their names get remembered.
But the duty matters too. "You can't just make polite noises as you normally might," explained one small-country diplomat. "You can't make pious generalizations. You can't hide. You are in the ring."
It was not easy to discover yesterday what, for instance, Guinea's position on Iraq might be, because the phone in its embassy in Washington appeared to have been disconnected. However, its per capita income is approximately one-thirtieth that of the United States, and Saddam Hussein's intentions are not thought to be top of the list of national priorities.
UN sources say that Guinea and - even more so - the other west African country on the council, Cameroon, have proved generally sympathetic to the US in recent meetings. Bulgaria (which is this month in the chair of the security council and is keen to enter Nato), Colombia (which has its own tangled relationship with the US), Singapore and Norway are also thought likely to support the kind of resolution President Bush would want. In contrast, Syria's vote can probably be written off.
But given the possibility of abstentions from three of the five permanent members, even those mathematics could still leave the balance in the hands of the remaining three members: Ireland (which will give weight to EU opinion), Mauritius (which has proved rather more independent-minded than the US might have anticipated), and Mexico.
Mexican opinion has turned sharply against the Americans in recent months. In an interview published in yesterday's New York Times, Mexico's president, Vicente Fox, forcefully reminded the Bush administration to remember its earlier commitments on immigration reform that would legitimise the position of three million Mexicans working illegally in the US. He insisted that the US focus on terrorism should not be allowed to obscure Mexico's concerns. "I ask myself, is it necessary to choose between the two issues?" he said.
In any case, the exact wording of any resolution is always vital at the UN. Since the drafting process generally takes place in English, that might be thought to give the Anglophone countries an advantage, but it can cause its own problems.
There is still dispute whether Resolution 242, passed 35 years ago, calls on Israel to withdraw from "the territories it conquered" or just "territories it conquered", a profound distinction. It depends on whether you read the English text or the French version, which is equally official.
Who's on the council
Permanent members: China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States
Temporary members (elected by the
general assembly for two-year terms): Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia,
Guinea, Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Syrian Arab
Republic
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The United Nations of
America
By John O'Farrell
American officials are currently lobbying hard at the UN. It's the
name they don't like: "United Nations" - there's something not quite right
about it.
"We're prepared to compromise..." they say. "You can keep the first word."
"United?"
"Yeah, but that second bit sounds wrong - what other words are there?"
"United Countries?"
"No..."
"United Places?
"No, no, there must be another word for nation or country..."
"State?"
"Hmmm... United States, yes that has a ring to it. So we'll call it the 'United States' with its HQ in the United States... Now this UN flag; we're prepared to compromise - you can keep some of the blue, but it needs a bit of red and white in there as well."
George Bush is trying to hijack the UN. Delegates thought it was just a routine peacetime trip. They were settling back in their seats for a snooze when suddenly a scary-looking American president broke through the flimsy doors into the UN's cockpit, grabbed the controls and tried to steer it into a catastrophe. Will anyone have the courage to overpower him or will they nervously sit it out, hoping that they might somehow survive?
Of course he tried to appear conciliatory and courteous. But Bush's speech to the UN this week was like a head teacher pretending to respect the newly formed school council. It's not that he was patronising to the UN, but at one point he stopped his monologue and shouted: "Canada! Are you chewing? Get up here and spit it out!"
His message was that the only way to ensure UN policy was implemented was to change it to American policy. Some of the more subversive translators were having great fun. Bush said: "Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?" And into the headphones of one European minister came the translation: "Listen, suckers, I'm going to bomb who the bloody hell I like, so sod the lot of you!"
"The world now faces a test and the UN a defining moment..." continued Dubya as African leaders heard him apparently saying, "I've never heard of half your countries! Why are you wearing those funny costumes? I might bomb you next! I've got B52s and sidewinders and everything. Neeeeeoooow, boom! Bang! Ker-pow!"
Despite his efforts, Bush does not have the backing of the international community and so makes the most of his support from the British foreign secretary. Diplomatically he is a drowning man clutching at Jack Straws.
The UN, admittedly, is not the speediest means of deciding policy. At the beginning of the Afghan conflict a UN committee sat down to hammer out a resolution and this week they nearly agreed on whether it was "Taliban" with an "i" or "Taleban" with an "e". But changing the world takes time. It is a laborious and painstaking process.
In north London an extended campaign by local residents recently managed to prevent a branch of Starbucks opening in their area. In my road another Starbucks has just opened and someone keeps smashing the windows. (It's amazing what you can get the cubs to do in Bob-A-Job week.) Bombing Baghdad is the diplomatic equivalent of protesters who smash windows. It makes them feel tough and hard; it's quick and easy but it doesn't actually make anything better for the people who really need help. It's instant espresso politics to go.
Meaningful change is brought about by long-term strategies, patience, painstaking persuasion and taking people with you. In this crisis we have to ensure that the UN is the ultimate authority; it has to agree a meaningful line and then eventually we might find a way to rid the world of the new Starbucks in my road.
Saddam might seem a little harder to shift, but quick wars don't bring long-term peace. American foreign policy is like their television. It has to keep jumping from one thing to another because the president has the remote control in his hand and his attention span is very limited. That thrilling adventure Take Out the Taliban! held his interest for a short while, but now the explosive open ing action sequence is over and it's got bogged down in the complex story of rebuilding a war-torn country. Bush's finger is hovering over that button itching to see if there's any more exciting stuff somewhere else.
"Don't you want to stick with this and see how Afghanistan turns out?" asks Colin Powell.
"Nah, it's got boring now."
"But we don't even know if they catch Bin Laden..."
"Ooh wow, look what's on CNN! 'Bombers Over Baghdad!' Let's see if this baddie Saddam gets it instead..."
A war on Iraq will not make the world a safer place. Perhaps the only way to make US policy successful is radically to change the aims. Then as the troops are brought home and the flags are waved the White House could declare that it had definitely achieved all the objectives in Operation Kill All the Wrong People and Make the Problem Much Worse.
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Kurdish extremist leader arrested at airport
Michael Howard
The head of an extreme armed Kurdish Islamist group with suspected
links to al-Qaida was arrested yesterday at Amsterdam airport after being
deported from Iran - alleged to be one of the group's backers.
According to a report on Norwegian television, Mullah Krekar, leader of the Ansar Al Islam (supporters of Islam) group, which controls a string of remote villages in the Kurdish self-rule area of northern Iraq, was arrested after arriving on a KLM flight from Tehran. It is thought Mullah Krekar, who has a home in Oslo, was attempting to enter Iran - and from Tehran travel north to rejoin his group in the mountains of northern Iraq.
Police in Oslo said yesterday that Krekar would be taken into custody if the Dutch authorities sent him to Norway.
Authorities in Amsterdam refused to confirm or deny the arrest last night.
Krekar's refugee status in Norway was revoked at the end of August after publicity surrounding his activities with Ansar. Krekar, a disciple of Abdullah Azzam, the founder of al-Qaida, had received a charity grant from Norway for his religious activities.
Three weeks ago it emerged that the US
had considered bombing Ansar's hideouts following reports they had
chemical and biological weapons.
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Extradition of terror suspects ruled out EU will not expose prisoners to
US death penalty
By Ian Black
European Union countries will without exception refuse to extradite
terrorist suspects to the US if they are liable to face capital
punishment, Washington was told yesterday.
The threat was made as EU interior and
justice ministers meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, prepared for talks today
with the US attorney general, John Ashcroft. "The European human rights
convention is not negotiable," the Danish justice minister, Lene Espersen,
declared. "That means that no EU country will extradite suspects to
the United States [if the death penalty might apply]." US officials
have said that Washington could tackle this issue with the EU on a
case-by-case basis, as it has done with individual member states. "The EU
side needs to get some form of binding assurance that the death penalty
would not be imposed," one Brussels diplomat said last night. "The US
government can make clear that it would not seek the death penalty but it
cannot bind judges. Everyone has to feel confident with the mechanism."
Today's unprecedented meeting marks
intensifying EU-US cooperation since the terrorist attacks of September 11
last year, though there are significant differences on legal and human
rights issues and anxiety on the part of European civil liberties
activists. "I am concerned that the pendulum may have swung too far to the
detriment of our fundamental freedoms and rights," said Graham Watson,
leader of the Liberal Democrats in the European parliament.
The European independent civil liberties watchdog Statewatch has
warned that the EU is failing to respect fundamental rights, but Denmark
says that such are unfounded. Nevertheless, MEPs are concerned that the
parliament is not being consulted, as it would have to be on internal EU
anti-terrorism measures.
Concern focuses on Washington's demand
for information exchanges which could infringe EU privacy laws, its wishes
on money laundering, border controls and security cooperation. But it is
the death penalty that provokes the sharpest disagreement, some EU members
refusing to release information about suspects in cases that could involve
capital punishment. Germany, already angering the US by its strong
opposition to a war on Iraq, refused to provide information last month on
the so-called 20th hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, without a guarantee that
it would not be used to secure a death sentence.
Both sides will use today's meeting to
establish political guidelines for their negotiators seeking an agreement
on transatlantic mutual legal assistance and extradition.
Dealing with Russia
Moscow has concerns of its own but must
still back Bush
By Matthew Parris
President Bush’s impressive performance at the United Nations has
unleashed a flurry of diplomacy, as American officials begin to put
together a coalition to confront Iraq. To one country, especially,
Washington must now pay particular attention — Russia. Moscow has yet to
be swayed by Mr Bush’s rhetoric. It has maintained its strong opposition
to any military strike on Iraq. And it is voicing the disillusion within
the Kremlin with the meagre results of President Putin’s decision to throw
his weight behind Mr Bush’s war on terrorism. Russia is clearly now
bargaining for greater national advantage.
Yesterday John Bolton, the Under-Secretary of State for Disarmament, was
in Moscow to urge Russia to support Washington’s ultimatum to Baghdad. He
did not find the going easy. In talks with officials he insisted that
Washington was aware of Russia’s interests — its qualms about unilateral
US action, its trade deals with Iraq and its concern to recover what it
can of Iraq’s long-standing debt, amounting to some £7 billion. He
reminded the Russians that they had supported the US-led alliance in 1991,
approved all the UN resolutions that Saddam Hussein is flouting and joined
the war on terror because this was in Russia’s own interest. But he ran up
against Moscow’s perceived resentment that it is being taken for granted.
It is a feeling clearly stoked by the old guard, the military and
nationalists suspicious of Mr Putin’s turn to the West.
The immediate quarrel centres on the Administration’s criticism of
Russia’s threats to Georgia. The Russians are infuriated that Georgia has
so far done little to curb the activities of Chechen rebels who have fled
across into the Pankisi Gorge and are using this valley as a haven in
which to rearm and regroup. Moscow has repeatedly demanded that President
Shevardnadze expel the fighters, or at least seal the border with
Chechnya. His response is lamentable. At first, he denied that the
Chechens were there; he then promised some action against them; but
instead Georgia has invited in American military advisers, insisted that
it has little control over the wild northern frontier and sheltered behind
US diplomatic support while thumbing its nose at Moscow.
President Putin insists that Russia has the right to defend itself against
the attacks launched from Georgia, and has warned other world leaders in a
letter that Moscow will strike at Chechen strongpoints. He has cited
India’s threat to strike at Kashmiri militants’ camps in Pakistan and
Israel’s bombing of the Hamas headquarters in Gaza as justification. More
tellingly, he is now quoting Mr Bush’s words at the UN about “preventative
measures” against countries from which threats come. America, however, has
instead voiced stinging criticism, saying that it took “strong exception”
to Mr Putin’s threats and would oppose unilateral action.
Moscow feels aggrieved. But it has floated the notion that it could
be persuaded to support a US strike — at a price. That would be US
tolerance of Russian intervention in the Pankisi Gorge. Mr Bolton
yesterday denied any such deal was offered. He had no choice. Russia
cannot expect to be “rewarded” for joining in the fight against terrorism,
something that it should support in any case as a member of the Security
Council. Its own record in Chechnya would rouse opposition from human
rights activists to a bargain. It would be sensible, however, for
Washington to consider Mr Putin’s options through Russian eyes. Bringing
Moscow on board a year ago was one of the triumphs of US diplomacy. The
relationship still remains largely firm. But America has every right to
expect support in tackling the evil in Baghdad, just as Moscow can ask for
understanding in fighting Chechen terrorism.
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Middle East:
The road map to democratic
governance in post-Saddam Iraq
Ghassan al-Atiyyah
LONDON: With a US attack calculated to overthrow the regime of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq imminent, it might be useful to reiterate the following
practical steps that can ensure that Saddam would be replaced by a
democratic government.
The actual process of unseating Saddam might be the easy part of the
enterprise compared with the task of establishing democracy in Iraq.
Democracy in Iraq has been in decline since the monarchy was overthrown in
1958, hitting rock bottom under Saddam.
Iraqi opposition parties, forced by Saddam’s regime to operate either
underground or in exile, have been deprived of opportunities to
consolidate democratic principles through practice.
Opposition parties in exile fell under the influence of host countries
(Iraq’s neighbors especially), which dealt with them as political pawns
depriving them of freedom of action and thus opportunities to establish
democratic traditions.
The adage that says “there is no democracy without democrats” was proven
right by the events that took place in liberated Iraqi Kurdistan back in
1996, as well as by the failure of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) that
regressed from being an umbrella for all opposition movements to being a
party in conflict with other movements.
The independence of the Iraqi opposition was undermined by the way
successive US administrations dealt with it as a propaganda tool. The fact
that different American officials “adopted” certain opposition factions
did not enhance the opposition’s independence, and neither did the
reliance of the opposition itself on financial help from America and/or
regional states. Opposition factions thus lost the ability to deal
democratically with each other. Instead of opposition leaderships being
accountable to their grassroots, the latter became financially dependent
on the former. Forming a new opposition party became the method of choice
for some dissidents to gain financial backing.
In the absence of solid democratic traditions in political life,
inconsequential differences of opinion became reason enough for parties to
break up. The lack of democracy also led to the rise of personality cults,
so much so that some opposition parties have no grassroots to mention: All
they have are leaders with personal computers on which statements are
written. This style of politics is as detrimental to democracy as
dictatorship is, and consequently there appears to be no way democracy can
be established in Iraq without outside help.
However, regional states, lacking democracy themselves, cannot give what
they do not have. In fact, the United States is the only outside power
that is willing and able to extend this sort of help. Unfortunately, by
adopting a policy of containment, the Americans abrogated this role.
However, the recent American espousal of regime change as a new policy for
Iraq has returned the problems of the Iraqi opposition to the political
limelight, not only because Washington needs Iraqi dissidents to aid its
military operation, but also to help set up an alternative to the Saddam
regime that ensures stability, thus providing the Americans with a
suitable exit strategy.
Had the US been able to effect change in Iraq through a military coup, it
would have done so years ago. But the reality of the situation has
convinced the Americans that the only way to achieve political change in
the country is through military intervention.
However, American military intervention does not mean that a new
dictatorship will not be the only way to ensure that Iraq does not slide
into chaos and civil war. If the Americans go down that route and install
a new dictator in Saddam’s place, however, they would be admitting
failure. Moreover, they would be introducing a new element of instability
in a region that is already seething with anger at the United States.
The Americans can of course undertake to carry out change on their own.
But in that case, they would have to keep their forces in Iraq for many
years to come an option unlikely to be accepted by American, not to
mention Arab, public opinion.
That is why Washington decided to involve the UN and the Iraqi opposition
in its plans for the future of Iraq. US Vice-President Dick Cheney
expressed American thinking on the shape of the regime to replace Saddam’s
on Aug. 26, when he declared: “The US is determined to establish a unified
Iraq under a pluralist democracy in which the human rights of all ethnic
groups will be respected.” Cheney had earlier said: “We are not about to
overthrow one dictator just to replace him with another.”
The State Department invited 32 Iraqi dissidents to a two-day meeting in
London on Sept. 4-5 to discuss democratic change in Iraq after the
overthrow of the current regime. Besides the INC, the Kurdistan Democratic
Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Supreme Assembly of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the Iraqi National Accord, representatives
from most Iraqi opposition factions took part in the conference, including
Islamists and independents. Kurds, Turcomans, Assyrians, and Arabs were
all represented. However, some parties, such as the communists, the
Islamist Daawa, and Arab nationalists, were not invited.
Participants did not project themselves as future rulers of Iraq, or as
trustees for the opposition. The meeting was nothing more than a forum for
inter-Iraqi and Iraqi-American debates.
The London gathering marked a qualitative leap in American thinking that
could become the basis for a new Iraqi-American partnership built on
cooperation towards the establishment of a model democracy in Iraq that
could provide stability and ward off fundamentalism.
Iraq, a country rich in natural and human resources, can certainly provide
the necessary foundation for such a democracy, while America is more than
capable of defending it both from itself and from its neighbors. Moreover,
it will not be in the interests of a post-Saddam Iraq, busy rebuilding
itself, to threaten Western interests. A new Iraq, allied to Washington,
would be well placed to help solve many problems in the Middle East, such
as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the issue of regional economic
development.
In the London meeting, discussions revolved around the democratic and
federal formulae appropriate for post-Saddam Iraq; the period of
transition; and the requirements for setting up a civil society under the
rule of law.
Participants adopted the principles decided on at the 1992 Salaheddin
opposition conference as a basis for their deliberations. After thorough
discussions, several committees were set up and were entrusted with
contacting various opposition factions (whether they were represented at
the meeting or not) in order to gauge their positions with a view towards
arriving at compromises.
It was agreed that the participants would meet again next month in order
to come up with recommendations, which they would then refer to a general
meeting of the Iraqi opposition to be held at a later date.
The success of this endeavor will pave the way for success in that
meeting, which will present an opportunity for the opposition to come up
with a charter that will lay down rules for settling any disputes or at
least will spell out mechanisms for solving such intractable issues as
federalism, the future status of Kirkuk and the nature of the transitional
period.
For the upcoming general meeting of the Iraqi opposition to succeed, it
must accurately diagnose the Iraqi crisis and specify the best ways for
solving it. To do so requires a readiness by all parties to make
concessions and understand each others’ points of view. The recent
announcement by the two Kurdish parties that they have succeeded in
patching up their differences was a good beginning.
Creative thinking and a readiness to compromise is essential for the
opposition to succeed. The United States can play a constructive role, not
by imposing solutions, but by acting as a catalyst and guarantor.
If the upcoming opposition meeting is to succeed, it must become neither a
talking shop nor an arena for various parties to compete for positions in
an illusory government. It must be an opportunity to lay down the
foundations for the Iraq of the future, which necessitates the
participation of all parties. Participants must gauge their success by
what they contribute to the meeting rather than by what they hope to get
out of it.
The upcoming meeting might be the opposition’s last chance to win the
respect and trust of Iraqis especially those inside Iraq. This can only
be realized if opposition factions are seen to be serving their
constituents rather than themselves.
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Holding the UN hostage to Washington’s war plans
Arab Press Review
(Daily Star)
US President George W. Bush’s speech to the United Nations General
Assembly gets banner headline treatment in the Arab press, which for the
most part views it as a declaration of impending war against Iraq,
regardless what happens over the issue of arms inspections.
In Beirut, the daily An-Nahar calls it a declaration of “suspended war,”
pending the outcome of Washington’s efforts to get the UN Security Council
to issue an ultimatum to Baghdad, while As-Safir sums up the US
president’s message to the international community as: “Wage war on Iraq
or we’ll wage war alone.”
Other Arab newspapers highlight the list of demands Bush spelled
out for Baghdad to comply with. But while some, like London-based pan-Arab
Asharq al-Awsat, portray the demands as “preconditions for avoiding war,”
others such as Al-Quds al-Arabi see them as pretexts for justifying it.
“Bush declares war inevitable,” the pan-Arab daily headlines.
Egypt’s semi-official daily Al-Ahram reserves its front-page lead
for the news that President Hosni Mubarak is to hold a series of meetings
with Arab leaders “after the increase in the possibility of Iraq being
attacked.”
In its main editorial, Asharq al-Awsat expresses relief that the
Bush administration has finally restrained its unilateral and isolationist
impulses and opted to “take the issue of Iraq to the UN,” and implies that
the onus is now on Baghdad to avoid war.
“The US president has thus provided a new opportunity for resolving the
current crisis over Iraq. The ball is now in the Iraqi government’s court
and the UN should exploit this opportunity and prevent it from being
squandered,” it says.
The paper applauds the Bush administration for assuming a new
multilateral approach to world affairs, commenting that whenever America
has “placed its enormous capabilities in the service of the international
community and international law and justice” the outcome has been
beneficial for all; and when it has done otherwise, both it and the world
have suffered. America must play a “leading role” in the world, “but if it
is ready to assume the responsibilities of leadership it must listen to
others and discuss with them their policies, views and fears with a strong
sense of responsibility,” Asharq al-Awsat counsels. “Bush’s speech to the
UN General Assembly was a step in the right direction,” it declares.
Al-Quds al-Arabi couldn’t agree less, remarking that Bush did not
take the Iraq issue to the UN but served notice that he wasn’t going to
let either the world body or international law stand in the way of his
drive to reorder the Middle East by force.
“He pre-empted any Security Council resolution and gave changing the
regime in Iraq precedence over any other consideration, including the
issue of arms inspectors and weapons of mass destruction,” it says. Bush
effectively arrogated to Washington the role that the UN Security Council
is supposed to play, Al-Quds al-Arabi writes. To the council’s demand for
the resumption of arms inspections in Iraq, he added a list of his own,
such as the novel demand that Iraq account for missing Gulf War personnel
from various countries, or that it cease oppressing its people or
supporting terrorism.
“What can be concluded from these debilitating preconditions is
that the American president has decided to erase the Iraqi president just
as he erased Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, and that the readmission
of arms inspectors will neither change that equation nor lead to that
decision being reversed,” it writes. “So his talk of coordinating future
moves against Iraq with the UN is just talk for media and political
consumption. The decision to attack has been made and all that remains is
how to implement it and market it to some countries in the region and the
world,” according to Al-Quds al-Arabi. Bush didn’t offer a single piece of
evidence about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, and
everything he said about the country was just rhetoric, “especially his
feigned concern for the Iraqi people.
“Were he genuinely concerned, he and his predecessors wouldn’t have left
the Iraqis subjected to the cruel embargo that has killed half a million
of their lot.
“War is looming come what may, and it is painful to see no evidence
of any Arab action to confront it. On the contrary, all we see is evidence
of direct involvement in it by some Arab states,” Al-Quds al-Arabi says.
The UAE daily Al-Khaleej says the list of new demands Bush presented Iraq
was obviously “drawn up to be rejected, so that the rejection can be used
to justify aggression.”
Whether the Iraqis cooperate over disarmament or not, a war “seems
unavoidable, even if they were to give up the shaving blades in their
homes,” the Gulf daily writes. The US certainly has the military muscle to
inflict immense devastation on Iraq, or any other country in the world,
but it will have to face up to a number of unavoidable questions: “What
next? Until when? What harvest will it reap? Will the whole world remain a
spectator, even though most of it stands to lose?
“Following the destruction of Afghanistan, Iraq is next in line.
The threats have extended to Iran, and also Syria and Lebanon,” and it is
no coincidence that these are exactly the targets of the threats Israel
constantly mouths too, the paper says.
“Is America going to destroy the entire region to appease its arrogance,
satiate the appetites of those they call its ‘hawks,’ and pamper its
Israel?” Al-Khaleej wonders. Jordan’s Al-Rai says while Bush went through
the motions of asking the UN to handle the Iraq crisis, he presented it
with “categorical judgements that turned the question into one of when
military action will begin, rather than whether he has decided on it.” The
“hope” was that the US president would use his UN address to “turn to
quiet diplomacy, dialogue and respect for international legality” in his
approach to Iraq, the paper says. But following his speech, “it can be
said, regrettably, that war is imminent,” and that international efforts
have failed to “prevent things from reaching the point of no return. That
was reflected in the tone and terminology used in Bush’s speech, which
gave the impression that Iraq is the source of all evil in the universe,”
the Amman daily writes.
“Most of the world and all the Arabs” think the crisis can and should be
resolved according to international law with Baghdad allowing the arms
inspectors back as a prelude to the lifting of sanctions against Iraq and
the “normalization” of its ties with the region and the world.
But instead, the coming phase is likely to be characterized by “various
kinds of pressure, intimidation, inducement and threats of sanctions”
against other countries, “to give the impression that the US has put
together an ‘international coalition’ against Iraq like the one Bush pere
led a decade ago.”
By announcing that the US would rejoin UNESCO, Bush may have tried
to signal a willingness to work hand in hand with the international
community. “But giving precedence to the option of forcing ‘regime
changes,’ as Bush did in his speech, reduces the positive impact of that
gesture, especially when Israel possesses a huge arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction,” Al-Rai says.
Abdelwahhab Badrakhan, in the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat,
says that while Bush made an effort to convey the impression that he
respects the international community, his speech “defied the logic on
which international relations are based and the spirit in which the UN
operates.”
He contrasts what Bush said with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s earlier
remarks to the General Assembly stressing that while every country has the
right to defend itself when attacked, the use of force outside the context
of self-defense needs international sanction which only the unique
legitimacy of the UN can provide. In other words, Annan signaled that war
on Iraq would not be an act of self-defense, and that “American
legitimacy” was no substitute to the UN’s. Annan also remarked that any
government which respects the law within its borders is obliged to respect
it outside them, adding that the gauge for Security Council action over
any issue “Iraq, for example” is the extent to which it constitutes a
threat to world peace. Annan was constrained by his position from being
more specific, says Badrakhan, but he knows that the US is in effect
imposing a “parallel” international world order to supplant that
represented by the UN, at the expense of the latter’s credibility and
“legitimacy” and in contempt of international law.
“The American President came to the UN to throw down the gauntlet
in everyone’s face: You must choose between international legitimacy and
American legitimacy, and you have only one option to place international
legitimacy at the service of the United States,” Badrakhan writes.
“He’s going to war come what may. He made the decision last
November (according to USA Today). He won’t announce it until the military
say they’re ready to implement it. But he won’t cancel it or defer it
pending the achievement of an international consensus, which he doesn’t
need.”
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Raghida Dergham,
Al-Hayat’s New York bureau chief, writes in her weekly opinion piece that
Bush’s demand that Iraq disarm completely to avoid an attack is one with
which it is “impossible” to comply.
Baghdad can readmit inspectors and give them free rein to search anywhere,
“even the Iraqi president’s bedrooms.” But it can never “prove” it doesn’t
have any weapons of mass destruction, she points out.
Baghdad’s position is that it has already destroyed all the prohibited
weapons that were not destroyed by UNSCOM or American aerial bombardment,
and because they no longer exist it cannot prove that it destroyed them.
Yet UNSCOM, like its successor UNMOVIC, insists that the burden of proof
is on Baghdad. In other words, it is deemed guilty until proven innocent,
yet the one thing UNMOVIC will not, by definition, be able to find is
proof that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.
Some would argue that this is an “unfair trap” that has been sprung for
Iraq, Dergham writes. But others will say that it is Baghdad’s own fault
that it was placed in such a position, due to its previous efforts to
conceal weapons programs, which it later had to own up to after their
existence was revealed by Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, when he
defected.
Baghdad will have to think of “creative” ways of getting out of this bind,
and only the unconditional readmission of UNMOVIC can “buy it time” to do
that, Dergham suggests. But even that would not be sufficient.
Meanwhile, it is futile for Baghdad to demand that in return for admitting
UNMOVIC it be offered a timetable for the lifting sanctions, or guarantees
that the arms inspectors won’t include spies even though the UN
resolutions entitle it to that. “This is not the time for talking about
quid pro quos. It is the time for talking about an alternative,” Dergham
says.
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Sharon rides high as Bush cocks his gun
Israeli Press Review (Daily Star)
US President George W. Bush’s
stern warning to Iraq in his address to the UN General Assembly dominates
the news pages and the opinion columns of Israel newspapers.
The mass circulation daily Yediot Ahronot sees the speech as a
“declaration of war,” and says Israeli officials were pleased with the
president’s tough tone. The second Tel Aviv tabloid, Maariv, has a
front-page photograph of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln with the
words “Ready Now” spread across its deck, and quotes Bush as saying
military action against Iraq is unavoidable unless Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein dismantles his weapons.
Maariv also reports that Bush thanked Israel for standing by the US as a
“loyal soldier,” but it says Washington has been sending messages to
Jerusalem, urging Israel to keep a low profile. Yediot Ahronot for its
part speaks of rising tension in Israel and of a growing demand for gas
masks. It says that after Bush’s speech, queues for gas masks got
appreciably longer.
In a front-page commentary, Yediot Ahronot military analyst Alex Fishman
contends Bush has clearly already made up his mind to go to war with Iraq.
“The president,” he says, “drew his gun, cocked it and told world leaders:
‘I am already on the way to Baghdad and you are welcome to join me. If you
want to come fine; if not I’ll manage on my own.’ He didn’t ask for
anything, he didn’t apologize, he didn’t even present a proper ultimatum
which could leave the Iraqi leader a way out. It was a speech announcing
the impending war.”
Fishman says that going by the steps the Americans have already taken,
they are halfway to launching hostilities. “Transferring the US Central
Command from Tampa, Florida, to Al-Udaid Air Base near Doha, Qatar, is a
turning point that will accelerate American war preparations. If so far we
have seen only rescue teams, now we will start seeing personnel and
equipment streaming towards the Gulf. According to Israeli estimates, in
about two months, the Central Command chief will be able to tell the
president: ‘We are ready, you can open fire.’”
According to Fishman, the significance of this timeline for Israel is that
by the end of November, it “must again be ready for the possible use of
nonconventional weapons in the Middle East. In addition, shooting in
Baghdad could be a catalyst for the eruption of suppressed conflicts
like the one on the northern border.”
In a piece tinged with skepticism under the headline “George’s horror
show,” Maariv political analyst Chemi Shalev asserts that “anyone who
heard the president’s speech, and believes what he said, cannot but feel
the fear of God.”
Recalling that new Israeli Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon
had declared that he never lost any sleep over the Iraqi threat, Shalev
says that “either Yaalon is the type that can sleep through just about
anything, or else, perish the thought, perhaps Bush exaggerated a little”
in depicting Saddam as a clear and present danger to the world in general
and Israel in particular.
While Bush may have won the hearts of America, the United Nations, Shalev
writes, “is an entirely more complicated matter.” By changing tack and
trying to get UN Security Council legitimization for attacking Iraq,
Shalev contends, “the Americans may have made some gains in persuading
some European governments to change their tone and their approach, but in
the Third World, especially in the Arab world, it really hasn’t worked …
and despite all the feverish diplomatic efforts, most of the Arabs and
Muslims will continue believing that it is all a Zionist-Imperialist
plot.”
Bush made clear, Shalev continues, that “the die is cast and the attack
will go ahead with or without a UN stamp of approval. The regional
repercussions of the move will depend absolutely on the outcome on the
ground. A rapid, forceful and elegant American campaign will convey a
deterrent message to the leaders of the ‘axis of evil’ and their
fellow-travelers; but a botched operation and an ensuing entanglement
could set a perilous maelstrom in motion, into which we too will be
sucked. In that case, the day after the confrontation will turn out to be
a lot scarier than the day before.”
In a Maariv Sabbath supplement article entitled, “The treason of the
West,” Ben-Dror Yemini scathingly attacks European intellectuals for
failing to support the US in its “war on terror.” He says a year after the
Sept. 11 attacks, America is losing the ideological war and anti-American
fundamentalism is winning.
“The ‘progressive forces’ in the West have made a pact with the forces of
evil in the name of democracy and human rights, of course. A year has
gone by and the victory is Osama bin Laden’s, whether he is alive or dead.
The Iranian worldview, of the Great Satan (the United States) and the
Small Satan (Israel), which is a bin Laden-like vision, is making inroads.
This ideological pollution is spreading. And although we are already used
to the Iranian ideas, the problem is with the growing support they are
getting in the West.”
Yemini writes that “the West has long crossed the line between
self-criticism and self-destruction.” He says this European
self-deception, appeasement and sycophancy happened before with “an evil
dictator” in the 1930s, and that something similar seems to be happening
again, “except that in the previous round, Europe was attacked and the US
sprang to its defense. This time the US is under attack and Europe
justifies and encourages the attackers.”
“A year has gone by,” Yemini complains, “and more people have an
anti-American bias: some because of evil incitement and Islamic education
financed by the Saudis; some because of their hypocrisy, their stupidity
and their evil. Bin Laden couldn’t have dreamt of a better outcome. The
work of evil is being furthered by hypocrites in the West.”
Analyzing the findings of Maariv’s bi-weekly public opinion survey, Chemi
Shalev writes that it was conducted “before the humiliating slap in the
face dealt to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat by the Palestinian
Legislative Council this week, but judging by the findings, what happened
in Ramallah must have caused Israelis a good deal of pleasure.
“It may be that the ‘rebellion’ will turn out to be short-lived, a passing
moment, a fleeting separation of powers in a reality of dictatorship. But
if the Palestinians do manage to neutralize Arafat with their own hands,
for whatever motives, their stock will soar sky-high amongst Israelis. The
survey shows that while Israelis have not decided finally whether the
Palestinians want peace or not, they have decided by an overwhelming
majority that they’ve had it with Arafat.”
Eighty percent of those polled say Arafat is irrelevant and 79 percent
that Oslo is no longer valid; 81 percent say Arafat does not want peace.
On the political scene, the poll shows that Sharon is holding his own,
with 56 percent saying they are satisfied with his general performance,
the same as in the previous poll.
Sharon would also win an election, both within the Likud (39
percent to Sharon, 29 percent to Benjamin Netanyahu) and in a vote for
prime minister, (Sharon 58 percent, Labor Party leader Binyamin Ben-Eliezer
18 percent).
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