November, 2002 Opinion Editorials
The Daily Star - 11/16/02

There are further warnings aplenty in the Arab press that Iraq’s decision to agree to the stringent new arms inspection regime approved by the UN Security Council is not likely to spare it an American military blitz.

The pan-Arab daily Al-Quds al-Arabi says that while there is much for Baghdad to rightfully dispute in UN Security Council Resolution 1441, if the Iraqi leadership had rejected the resolution ­ as “recommended” by the Iraqi Parliament ­ it would have played into the hands of the Bush administration.
“The resolution is unjust, indeed steeped in injustice, and it violates Iraq’s sovereignty, consists of unparalleled provocations, and is impossible for any government that respects its sovereignty to accept. But it was also drafted by the United States and Britain in order for Iraq to reject it, so that the death sentence they have passed on the country can be carried out immediately with international cover. Accepting it, therefore, means disrupting one aspect, though not all, of the American scheme,” the paper says.

By accepting the resolution, Baghdad has signaled that it intends to cooperate with the arms inspectors, and to tackle any problems that arise with them ­ “and they most definitely will arise” ­ peacefully through dialogue.
But Baghdad’s move has not delayed the onset of the mugging, which the Americans plan to launch early next year, the paper suggests. “The US administration is not deploying its forces in the region on such a massive scale in order to dispose of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, but to seize Iraq’s oil wealth and install an allied or client regime in Baghdad to serve as a lynchpin for its plans to draft a new political, geographical and human map for the region.”

Al-Quds al-Arabi goes on to fault Arab governments for unanimously welcoming Resolution 1441, despite its provocations and violations of Iraqi sovereignty. Their collective endorsement “will encourage the US to press ahead with its plans for aggression, and give a green light to individual Arab states to participate in them, either with troops, or by opening up their bases and air space to attacking aircraft,” it says.
As the Iraqis brace to repel the aggression with whatever means they have at their disposal, they should get used to the idea of “total Arab collusion” in it, Al-Quds al-Arabi advises. “What does it mean when Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa declares that his country will never join any coalition to fight Iraq outside the UN framework?” it asks. “Does this mean it will join if there is a UN resolution?”

Jordanian analyst Fahed Fanek, writing for the Amman daily Al-Rai, says the declared determination of the US administration of President George W. Bush to enforce the Security Council resolution by military means ­ ostensibly to uphold the authority of the UN ­ would be more convincing if America didn’t have such a long record of overlooking violations of Security Council resolutions by its own allies.
For years, he says, America ignored resolutions ordering Indonesia out of East Timor, Turkey out of Cyprus, Morocco out of the Western Sahara. It not only failed to punish the countries that violated resolutions, but provided them with economic and military aid that helped sustain their defiance of the UN’s authority, he says. And, of course, no country has received more US aid than the one that has defied the most Security Council resolutions ­ Israel.
“If America can ignore the UN Charter and invade Iraq on the pretext of enforcing UN resolutions, what is to prevent Greece from declaring war on Turkey, Egypt from attacking Israel, or France from savaging Morocco?” Fanek wonders.

Raghida Dergham, New York bureau chief of the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, says none of the main players in the Iraq drama are seriously considering the needs or views of the Iraqi people. The last thing they needed was for Al-Qaeda chieftain Osama bin Laden to emerge and pose as their champion against American aggression, as he did in his recently broadcast audiotape, she writes in her weekly column.
The Iraqis have enough on their hands with the Bush administration “preparing to invade,” she says. Meanwhile, the Iraqi leadership, which has for years also “waged war on the Iraqi people in their name and for their sake,” shows no sign of willingness to put the country’s interests above those of the regime. In its quest to extricate itself from this crisis, the regime has tried to win Arab and international backing, without trying to win over the Iraqi people and turn them into allies.

Comparable contempt for the Iraqi people has been demonstrated by some sections of the offshore Iraqi opposition. They welcome the prospect of a US assault and invasion that would claim the lives of thousands of their countrymen, “and in turn want to liberate Iraqis by waging war on them, in their name and for their sake.” Now bin Laden has come along to appropriate the Iraqi people’s cause for use in his vendetta against the Americans, just as Al-Qaeda earlier adopted the Palestinian cause, doing it untold damage in the process, she observes.

“Its exploitation of the Iraqi dossier has negative consequences for Iraqis, as it associates Iraq with terrorism and plays into the hands of those in the US who have been desperate to link Iraq to terror via Al-Qaeda. Thus, once again, those ostensibly enraged by America are providing it a service ­ an astonishing spectacle bound to arouse suspicions about them, their objectives and their methods,” she says.
America has long been a major protagonist in “the war on the Iraqi people for their sake,” ignoring or exploiting them when it suits it, especially when it was their leader’s “partner” during the 1980-88 war with Iran, and generally treating them as pawns. As a result, “everything the Americans say about the Iraqi people now provokes disgust, for no one is less entitled to pose as their defender than the US,” she writes.

Dergham says Iraqis “might view an American invasion as salvation from the status quo, and greet the soldiers with roses and cheers. They might also do the opposite, and deem invasion and occupation the worst of all worlds for them. Or they might combine both attitudes and rise against both their leadership and the US administration, and stage an amazing revolution to seize control of their fate. No one knows what the people’s choice will be.”
Whatever the case, as Baghdad begins waging the “battle of compliance” with Resolution 1441, public opinion at home and abroad is set to be a major determinant of the outcome. “The Iraqi leadership wants to use ‘compliance’ to win over Arab, Muslim and world public opinion and persuade it to oppose and resist war. There’s nothing wrong with that. Indeed, it is essential. But what is also indispensable is qualitative change vis-à-vis the Iraqi people, if the Iraqi leadership is serious about pursuing a ‘compliance strategy.’ There’s a world of difference between complying due to fear and compulsion, and appreciating the errors of the past,” Dergham writes.

Abdelbari Atwan, publisher/editor Al-Quds al-Arabi, says the US buildup for war helps explain what he sees as the latest moves aimed at quashing the Palestinian intifada ­ Egypt’s hosting of talks between Fatah and Hamas on an agreement reportedly aimed at putting an end to all Palestinian resistance to the occupation as a prelude to resuming negotiations with Israel.
Atwan contrasts Cairo’s “sudden eagerness” for intervention in Palestine with its sluggishness over the past few months, during which the Palestinians have been coming under Israeli aggression. He suggests that the aim of the latest endeavors to “calm” the situation is twofold: to facilitate Washington’s premeditated war on Iraq, and to help Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ­ whose poor economic and security records are directly attributable to the intifada ­ to win re-election.

Atwan says that by trying, clearly at the behest of the Bush administration, to get the intifada halted, the Egyptian government is attempting to “achieve what Israeli tanks and repression failed to accomplish.” The Egyptian government is also in effect acting “to rescue Sharon’s government from its economic and security crises at the expense of the Palestinians and their uprising,” he charges.

“We are entitled to ask,” he says, “what the reason is for these sudden moves aimed at putting pressure on the Palestinians” to abandon their uprising against Israeli occupation. “Is it to rescue the Palestinian Authority (PA), or what remains of it? Is it to save the Palestinian homeland? Or is it to push through the road map which the United States is trying to impose on the Palestinian people to keep them busy while it occupies Iraq, seizes the region’s resources and crowns Israel as the region’s unchallenged leader?” Atwan asks.
“In the past, the choice was between Ehud Barak and Sharon, and now it’s between Benjamin Netanyahu and Sharon. And it is one of fate’s absurdities that Arab governments ­ including Egypt’s ­ should, with the cooperation of the PA and its leader, want to create a climate conducive to a Sharon victory because in their view he is more moderate and less extreme than Netanyahu,” he says.

In three months time there will be national elections in Israel, shortly followed by an American occupation of Iraq, Atwan predicts.
“Within a year from now, the US would have brought to a conclusion its designs on the region and occupied Iraq, and perhaps other countries in the region, too. It will then turn to the Egyptian go-between and its Palestinian ally, say: ‘Thank you for your efforts,’ and inaugurate Sharon as the region’s unchallenged boss.”
Any American promises that Egypt and the PA are given now about future progress in Palestine will go the same way as those that were made by Bush senior during the 1991 Gulf War, “and the same way that the ‘Rabin deposit’ concerning the Golan Heights went,” Atwan says.
 

Israel’s Elections won’t help Palestinians
By Muna Shuqair

Israeli politics underwent significant variations recently. Despite the fact that there were no great disagreements between Israelis ­ as well as between most Western political observers ­ on how to interpret these changes, the same could not be said of Arabs and Palestinians in particular.

On Oct. 30, the Labor Party finally decided to leave Ariel Sharon’s national unity government (which forced Israel’s prime minister to dissolve the Knesset and call national elections within 90 days, ending in early February 2003).
Labor’s decision to leave the Cabinet, ostensibly over the 2003 budget and its demands that funds earmarked for Jewish settlements be reallocated to more needy Israelis, was really due to the party’s realization of how much it has lost by being part of Sharon’s national unity coalition. Labor leader Binyamin Ben-Eliezer’s popularity suffered tremendously as a result. In addition, Ben-Eliezer is facing a formidable challenge for the Labor leadership from MP Haim Ramon as well as Haifa Mayor Amram Mitzna. Elections for party leader are due to be held on Nov. 19.

No disagreement either on the fact that Sharon tried to neutralize his rival for Likud leadership, Binyamin  Netanyahu, by offering him the post of foreign minister. Netanyahu demonstrated considerable political acumen by accepting the post on condition that Sharon goes to the polls early. Sharon refused at first, but then acquiesced after realizing that continuing in power at the head of a coalition of far-right parties would leave him open to political blackmail. He thus chose the better of two evils, which was to agree to early elections now scheduled for Jan. 28.
No disagreements there either. In fact, the only major disagreement revolves around the allegation that the fall of the national unity government was to the advantage of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leader, Yasser Arafat, and that the Palestinian intifada led to the downfall of the Israeli government, and that Israeli politics is dangerously fractured compared to the cohesive Palestinian political scene.

There is no doubt that the intifada caused great damage to Israel economically as well as in human terms. The economic crisis triggered largely by the continuing Palestinian uprising undoubtedly contributed to the arguments over the budget that ultimately led to the downfall of the national unity government. However, it cannot be said that the intifada caused cracks to appear in the Israeli body politic.
Most Arab politicians and analysts still believe that any change in the structure of Israeli politics is evidence of weakness and chaos ­ and not the result of a dynamic political life made possible by democracy.

For Sharon to face a situation in which he is forced to call early elections (having rejected this option earlier) after realizing that a far-right coalition would not enjoy a majority in the 120-seat Knesset demonstrated a political dynamic that the PA lacks. Moreover, Palestinian politics is short of the deep political debate characteristic of Israeli politics, despite the fact that the issues facing the Palestinians are far more profound.
An early Israeli election cannot be seen as being an achievement for the PA unless it leads to the formation of a government whose political makeup permits it to sign a peace treaty with the Palestinians ­ something very farfetched under current circumstances.

According to the latest opinion polls, Amram Mitzna will become the next leader of the Labor Party. Compared to his two rivals, Mitzna lacks the strength and experience necessary to make a success of the job. At any rate, Labor ­ under any of the three contenders ­ cannot hope to beat Likud in the next general election after having lost its character.
Where the Likud is concerned, Sharon and Netanyahu will try to blackmail each other by calling for even more hard-line and extreme measures against the Palestinians. Netanyahu, who rejects the idea of an independent Palestinian state, has for example been calling for Arafat’s expulsion.
Yet the office of prime minister will force whichever one of the two rivals to temper their more extreme rhetoric. Sharon’s criminality was tempered when he became prime minister to the degree that he appeared to the outside world as a statesman who could be dealt with rather than the war criminal he really is. Netanyahu, more skilled in the political game than Sharon, will also be forced by international and American pressure to abandon some of his more extreme demands if he becomes prime minister.

Both Sharon and Netanyahu realize that election campaign slogans are not always achievable. In any case, their policies will be broadly similar. Both will continue to kill and destroy the Palestinian people. They will both continue to place obstacles in the way of a Palestinian state until the PA and the Palestinian people submit to Israeli conditions, at which point a non-sovereign and unviable entity might be created. The only way either of the two would moderate their positions is through American pressure ­ applied so that the US can ensure tranquility on the Israeli-Palestinian front while it pursues its war on Iraq.

Labor’s chances of winning the next election appear to be very slim indeed. In order to compete with Likud, Labor will have to adopt more hard-line positions to win support from an increasingly hawkish Israeli electorate. And herein lies its dilemma. By trying to emulate Likud, Labor will only succeed in becoming a pale imitation of the real thing. Why would ordinary Israelis vote for an ersatz Likud when they can have the genuine article? As a matter of fact, Labor’s political program lost its uniqueness once it succumbed to political opportunism and agreed to become part of Sharon’s coalition.
Labor’s current attempts to regain its traditional position as a socialist-orientated, left-wing party that caters to the poorer sections of society are merely meant to win the votes of the underprivileged in the next election. It definitely doesn’t mean that Labor is about to regain its political identity as the party that can rally the Israeli left and create a credible peace camp.
If either Ramon or Mitzna wins the Labor leadership contest, that will have almost no bearing on the next Knesset. The results of this month’s Labor leadership contest will only transpire much later, when the new leader has had a chance to rebuild and reorganize the party, and recreate its political program.

The new leader must demonstrate to the electorate that Labor is different from Likud, a difference that disappeared when the party agreed to partner Sharon. This process will take years to accomplish.
For all these reasons, it cannot be said that early Israeli elections will benefit the PA. According to all indications, either Sharon or Netanyahu will lead the next Israeli government. It will be a more hard-line government too, ensuring that the broad outlines of policy as laid down by Sharon will be pursued for a long time yet.
 

Arabs should Campaign for Amram Mitzna
The Daily Star, 11/16/02

Amram Mitzna is something of a freak in Israeli politics: In a land where someone like Shimon Peres is regularly referred to as a “dove,” the mayor of Haifa is that rare individual who backs up reasonable rhetoric about peace with concrete proposals designed to achieve it. Whereas many Arabs say they “prefer” the likes of Ariel Sharon to Peres because the former is at least honest about being a warmonger, Mitzna walks and talks the real thing. He is well-situated to win the Labor Party’s nomination for the premiership on Nov. 19 but has dimmer prospects in the general election. What would help is a clear message from the Arab world that Israeli voters have much to gain by backing him.

When Margaret Thatcher first met Mikhail Gorbachev, she averred that he was someone with whom she could “do business.” The “Iron Lady” was hardly in the habit of heaping praise on communists, so her stamp of approval spoke volumes about just how different Gorbachev was from his predecessors. Mitzna represents almost as radical a shift, but if Arab leaders wait for him to be elected before reaching out, they may never get the chance. Helping Israeli voters make the right choice does not require Moammar Gadhafi to embrace Mitzna under an olive tree. Instead, clear signals can be sent in a number of ways, both direct and indirect. For example, the peace proposal adopted at March’s Arab League summit in Beirut is a fine document that has much in common with Mitzna’s plans. Arab governments could do themselves and their peoples a monumental favor by renewing that appeal.

In addition, governments such as Lebanon’s and Syria’s could help Mitzna’s campaign ­ and so the cause of peace ­ immeasurably by revolutionizing the way they communicate their positions on regional issues. Beirut is about to take a long step toward better stability after the “Paris II” meet; it should use its newly amplified voice to stress Lebanon’s willingness to deal with someone like Mitzna. Damascus, meanwhile, has just earned a great deal of credit in Washington by backing the UN Security Council resolution on Iraq. It should capitalize on that situation by stressing its desire to see Israelis elect a genuine man of peace.

Perhaps the most important actors will be the Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority must have a preference; it should express it. Groups like Hamas might not want to go so far, but they could also help by at least suspending suicide bombings.

Clips of truth on the editing floor: US media and Saudi Arabia
By Tariq A. Al-Maeena - Arab News, 11/16/02

Selling America to the Muslims
Abdelwahab El-Affendi - The Daily Star, 11/16/02

At the end of a few days of intensive engagements that included lecturing and discussions with academic colleagues, I was desperately in need of some light relief. The New York Times provided just the thing, with a report on Oct. 30, titled “Muslim-as-apple-pie videos are greeted with skepticism,” about an experiment in selling America to the Muslim masses. Apparently, the US pundits have been scratching their heads in search of answers for why Muslims dislike America. Not satisfied with providing answers, diplomats have already begun prescribing remedies. The dose comes in the shape of an advertising campaign featuring short films and other materials for distribution to Muslims.

Up to $13 million was set aside for the purchase of TV and radio time and advertising space in newsprint media. The campaign had a disappointing start. Egypt, a key US ally, refused to broadcast the material, arguing that it was against established policy to carry paid advertisements by other states. But US diplomats remain hopeful. Jordan and several other friendly states in the Gulf (but not Saudi Arabia) are also being approached to support the campaign.

The first country to reap the benefits of this wooing was Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, where it was immediately noticed that the films exclusively portrayed the experiences of Arab-Americans. State Department pundits have apparently overlooked the fact that the Arabs represent less than a fifth of the world’s 1.25 billion Muslims. Critics also argued that the films, which showed American Muslims enjoying the benefits of life in America, were patronizing and an unnecessary oversell, painting a picture too rosy that neglected difficulties Muslims are facing.
All these criticisms miss the central point, however. What makes this exercise so amusing is that it is based on the wrong assumptions to start with. Leading American officials have publicized the allegations that many Muslims hate America mainly because of its democratic values. That is why it was felt there was a need for a campaign to promote America and its values to Muslims who are assumed to be oblivious to these virtues.

The Bush Administration appears to have fallen victim to its own propaganda, unmindful of the fact that the real problem is that too many Muslims love America and are distressed because it does not seem to love them back. The millions of Muslims who would love to visit America, are now put off by reports of the unwelcoming reception that awaits them at US airports. As one Saudi journalist wrote recently, these fears may have been exaggerated, but horror stories abound, scaring away potential lovers of America. The most bizarre of these is the story of a Canadian citizen of Syrian origin who was deported to Syria last month even though he was just passing through New York on his way to Canada. The Canadian government was incensed by this act of sending one of its citizens to a country listed by the US as a supporter of “terrorism.” No one has yet come up with any explanation as to why this action was taken, or on what legal grounds.
These stories abound even more in the cases of those Muslims who love America enough to make it their home. No wonder most Muslims in America live in terror as, from their own perspective, America has become a land of lawlessness. Those thinking of paying a visit to a country they like very much are forced to think before trying to obtain a visa for fear of humiliating investigations.

What is surprising is that many Muslims still persist in their quest to visit America. With this tenacity, there is apparently no need to preach the virtues of America to the Muslims, since they are already sold. There is of course the side question of American policies, which most Muslims don’t like that much. But then, a lot of Americans are not besotted with their politicians and policies either. Many of those who try to defend those policies do so with embarrassment. Muslims, however, happen to be on the receiving end of these policies, whether in Palestine, Iraq or under the many dictatorships hated by their Muslim victims and loved by American leaders.

There is a thinly disguised attempt at blackmail in arguing that those who detest President George W. Bush’s policies, or the entire American political class for that matter, hate America. One can argue that opponents of Bush’s policies are much closer to the American spirit than Bush and his aides. Not that there is anything holy or divine about the “American spirit” which merits unquestioning veneration and prohibits questioning.
In any case, if there is anything that needs to be sold to the Muslims, it is US foreign policy. That would indeed be a hard sell. If most Europeans and a large section of Americans find these policies unpalatable, selling them to the victims could be a bit of a problem.
But it is clear that Secretary of State Colin Powell and his team are selling what does not need selling, and neglecting to market their policies, which are in real need of marketing. This may be sensible, as this is a near impossible task.

How can you convince a Palestinian refugee who was driven away from his home twice, has had most members of his family killed, imprisoned or exiled, that George W. Bush’s love for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his policies, and the generous subsidies for his killing machine is the epitome of virtue?

You can try, but it’s going to be very hard.

Srebrenica’s Shadow
Arab News, 11/16/02

The public inquiry that has just begun in the Dutch Parliament into the 1995 Srebrenica massacre is unlikely to come to any conclusions different from the Dutch government inquiry published last April. It accepted that 110-strong Dutch UN contingent had failed to protect the 8,000 Muslim men and boys murdered by Serb forces after the town was overrun, although it also said that Dutch peacekeepers had been sent on an impossible mission and that blame had to be shared with the UN and even with the Bosnian Army, which, it claimed, had provoked some of the attacks. This judgment is unlikely to be challenged. What this present inquiry seeks is to investigate individual failings — of officers, government officials, even politicians — and to substantiate or lay to rest allegations that there was an attempted cover-up after the massacre.

If individuals are found to have failed to prevent the massacre there will be grounds for legal claims by Srebrenica survivors against the Netherlands. But this process cannot be about money — though, sadly, governments too easily think that they can wipe the slate clean by paying blood money after some avoidable tragedy. Equally too, more and more victims’ families these days are all too willing to join in the treasure trail, eagerly seeing lives in cash terms. However much compensation ends up being paid out, it will not bring back the dead; it will not wipe away the stain on the Netherlands’ reputation; and it will not achieve the justice that Srebrenica cries for. That can only happen when all those responsible have been brought to account; so far only one man, Radislav Krstic, who led the Serb forces, has been sentenced for his involvement — to 46 years in prison. Just four other senior Serb soldiers accused of involvement have been arrested; their trials are still to come; in the meantime one of them is free on bail. Justice is taking a long time to happen. Cash aside, whatever the findings, the inquiry will be far more important for the Netherlands than for Bosnia — because Srebrenica has stripped the Dutch of an innocence they cherished.

For years they have fondly imagined that their government and society were somehow more moral, more ethically conscious and honest than almost elsewhere else. It is a dangerous illusion to hold, although there is no denying that ethical issues regularly top the Dutch political agenda, no matter how incomprehensible some may seem, notably euthanasia and legalized brothels and drug taking. Yet they were the first in the West to start taking the Palestinian cause seriously despite being staunch supporters of Israel’s right to exist.

The expectation that government and morality go together was the reason why, when the April Srebrenica report came out, the then government of Wim Kok resigned: a brave and honorable decision. It is difficult, indeed impossible, to imagine the French or British, or indeed any other European government, doing the same in similar circumstances; the current belief in most of the West seems to be that resigning is for wimps. Nonetheless, the Dutch have had their fond illusions shattered, which may explain why so many of them subsequently opted to vote for the unethical far right.

This second inquiry could be cathartic if it shows that individuals were to blame rather than something being fundamentally wrong with Dutch institutions — although that must be more hope than reality. The fact remains that Srebrenica has cast a long shadow over the Dutch view of themselves. It will not be easily lifted.