Commentators in the Arab press generally agree with the US that its overwhelming military might guarantees its forces “victory” in Iraq, after initiating what most people in the region see as naked aggression against a country that is in no position to defend itself.
Their horror at the death and destruction that is to be visited on Iraqis in the process is matched by their dismay at the prospect of the country coming under long-term American tutelage, and being used to advance the Bush administration’s much-feared agenda for the region. But there are indications that a number of Arab governments are coming to terms with the idea, and trying to calm public anger at Washington’s plans.

In Egypt, where anti-war protests at the US Embassy in Cairo were suppressed by riot police, the leading semi-official daily Al-Ahram appears to reflect that approach. The newspaper features on its front-page the news that Bush telephoned his Egyptian opposite number to explain his reasons for initiating military action against Iraq, and assure him that he had ordered American troops to avoid hurting Iraqi civilians, and that the US has no designs on “Iraq’s territorial integrity or sovereignty.”

In reply, President Hosni Mubarak “affirmed the need to work toward a cease-fire as quickly as possible, and avoid expanding military operations in order to safeguard the lives of the Iraqi people.” Mubarak also stressed the importance of the US upholding Iraq’s territorial unity and the free will of its people, and “preserving the cohesion and mechanisms of the international order.”

Sharing Al-Ahram’s front-page is an interview conducted by editor in chief Ibrahim Nafie with US Vice-President Dick Cheney, who is quoted in a banner headline as saying: “The military operation will be over very quickly, and we don’t want to remain in Iraq longer than necessary.”

Among Cheney’s other pronouncements highlighted by Al-Ahram are:

But the attitude being shown by Cairo and most other Arab capitals in bitterly attacked by Abdelbari Atwan, publisher/editor of pan-Arab Al-Quds al-Arabi, who writes that it is “painful” to watch Arab security forces beat up anti-war protesters, and Arab leaders “make excuses” for the invasion by blaming the Iraqi leadership for not having “handed the country to the invaders on a plate.”
“Baghdad is burning, and the Arab brethren who possess power and armies are watching the fires on TV,” he writes. “They flick from one channel to the other in search of a more gruesome scene, while reassuring themselves that the war will be swift, and will be over in a few days, after which they can exchange kisses with the American liberators and roll out the red carpets for their new Israeli allies and future partners.”
Atwan says while no one is naive enough to think the mightiest power on earth cannot crush Iraq, the American occupation will ultimately end “in the same way that all other occupations do, and perhaps more bloodily.” He notes the early setback suffered by the US when it failed to kill Saddam Hussein in its opening missile salvo, and the resilience his regime appears to be showing after the first two days of attacks, and also of “psychological warfare” intended to destabilize it. That included Washington’s claims that Saddam had been killed, or that Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz had fled Baghdad, both of which were quickly disproved. Atwan points to parallels with Afghanistan, where, 20 months after “Rumsfeld’s war” began, US forces are still incapable of securing Hamid Karzai in Kabul or finding Osama bin Laden. “How many months, one wonders, will he (Rumsfeld) need to find the Iraqi president, or secure Iraq’s new Karzai.” Atwan foresees resistance emerging to US forces in Iraq once the war is over, far more serious than any which the Baath Party may be capable of mounting.
“The unseating of the Iraqi regime will not be a harbinger of stability, but the prelude to a new period of anarchy and extremism, providing a solid base for Muslim jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda,” he says.

“Invading and possibly dismembering Iraq will be much easier than rebuilding it, controlling it and restoring peace to it.”
An article in the ruling Iraqi Baath Party daily Al-Thawra appeals to the international community to take a stand against “the defiance of its will by the war criminals George W. Bush and Tony Blair.”

Sami Mahdi writes that it’s not enough for other countries to express “sorrow or regret” at the aggression. They should condemn it outright and demand that it cease, if not for Iraq’s sake then for the sake of international legality and morality. “Accordingly, we say that Iraq’s cause is not its cause alone,” but that of the pan-Arab nation and the entire world, whose peoples took to the streets in their millions to try to prevent the assault. “All states and governments concerned about security, stability, justice and balance in the world should therefore take a frank and serious stand against this insolent and criminal aggression, and decisive action to halt it,” he says.

“As for we Iraqis, this is our country, the country of our fathers and forefathers. We will defend it as our sacred national and human duty. This is our choice because it is the most honorable choice. We believe in it and are convinced of it. We will confront the mercenary aggressors on every hand span of our chaste soil,” Mahdi writes.

Subhi Hadidi writes in an opinion piece for Al-Quds al-Arabi that “military victory will be the easiest element of America’s imperial adventure in Iraq.” He predicts that it is when the military phase is over that its problems will begin, as it faces up to “other realities” that are less palatable to it than war, and has to tackle them one by one. “Tackling them will be made that much harder by the way America fully turned its back on the international community, as represented by the UN and some of its closest European allies ­ and treated them with considerable arrogance and contempt,” he writes.

“We know from the experience of all wars, especially American wars, that winning the war in no way means winning the peace. More than a cease-fire or end to hostilities, ‘the peace’ in the broad sense means nothing less than the process of employing the results of the war to the victor’s advantage ­ on the geopolitical and economic levels initially, and on other direct and indirect levels subsequently. In Iraq’s case, the peace America seeks in Iraq is multifaceted in theory. But in practice it concerns three specific things: Iraqi oil, military colonization, and the political transformation that have come to be dubbed as ‘regime change.’” The US, Hadidi explains, wants control of Iraq’s oil not just for its own sake (some estimates maintain that Iraq’s reserves are the world’s largest) but as a strategic asset.
It seeks to establish a permanent military presence there because its bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are becoming a liability to their ruling dynasties. They fuel anti-Americanism, which in turn spawns new Osama bin Ladens who pose a direct threat to both regimes. To Washington’s mind, the “military colonization” of Iraq can “ease the burden” on the Gulf states while “providing Israel with long-distance protection and practically placing the entire region within its grip.”

As for political change, Bush’s neo-conservative aides and advisors envisage turning Iraq into “a model state that adopts American values (the reactionary variant) and spreads the virus of democracy to the four corners of the Middle East.” Hadidi sees an early test looming for the US over two of these key things ­ oil and the promise of democracy ­ in Iraqi Kurdistan, where a crisis is brewing that could lure the American invaders into their “first quagmire.” He says that the Iraqi Kurds ­ a more formidable fighting force than Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance was before the Afghan War ­ are allocated a proportion of the proceeds from Iraq’s UN-controlled oil revenues, as a result of which they have managed to sustain their autonomous entity in northern Iraq. They are not prepared to relinquish the gains they have made there, and would probably fight both to retain their enclave and “get their share of the Iraqi cake when the time comes to divide it.”

Moreover, the Iraqi Kurds’ entire modern history having been a litany of betrayal by Western powers, they are not prepared to risk “being sold out by the Bush family once again,” as they were in 1991 when Bush senior exhorted them to rebel against Saddam and then deserted them. But the Kurds’ dreams are nightmares for key US ally Turkey, and Ankara won’t relinquish its acquired right to make military thrusts into Iraq. The Kurds would resist that fiercely. Thus, we have the makings of a “second front” opening up in Iraq, pitting the Iraqi Kurds against the Turks. Hadidi suggests that even if the Americans succeed in averting an immediate clash between the two sides over Kirkuk, control of the city and its huge oil reserves will be an ongoing source of conflict between them.
He writes that Washington has put the Kurds on notice not to move their forces out of their enclave or impede forthcoming joint US-Turkish operations in northern Iraq. Kurdish leaders were also reported to have agreed to place their fighters “at the disposal” of the Americans.
“This means the Kurds will have to acquiesce to Turkish military incursions into their land, something which all Kurds of whatever ideological hue would vehemently oppose,” Hadidi observes.

“Once again, the easy bit is overcoming Iraqi forces in Mosul and Kirkuk, perhaps without a fight. The tougher part is imposing the peace there, in the mini-Kurdistan, not to mention in all of Iraq.”

Raghida Dergham, New York bureau chief of the Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, expects the aggressive regional agenda of the hawks in Washington to overshadow their “nation-building” endeavors in Iraq. She anticipates a protracted occupation during which the US sets out to remake the political identity, infrastructure, and social fabric” of Iraq ­ or its component parts if it is dismembered as a result of the invasion ­ and apportion the geopolitical and economic spoils of its war. Its power to do so will be absolute, she believes.

Dergham says Iraq might be better off in US hands than under a combination of Saddam’s tyranny and devastating UN sanctions, and Washington could “in theory” promote democratization there. But in practice, Washington’s conduct is likely to be conditioned by the regional aims and objectives of the hawks and fundamentalists who conceived the war and are guiding Bush’s steps.
Among their principal objectives is to make Syria their next “target,” in an attempt to neutralize Israel’s last remaining Arab state adversary. They envisage Israel “dealing with” Syria militarily, while the US isolates it and subjects it to pressure, campaigns and accusations related to possessing chemical weapons and supporting “terrorists” ­ including Hizbullah, which brings Lebanon into the firing line, too. Bush could also be expected to use occupied Iraq as part of their strategy against “axis of evil” member Iran, which may in turn find itself on the receiving end of “preventive” military strikes against its nuclear facilities.

Meanwhile, “it will be impermissible even to mention” Israel’s nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals, Dergham forecasts. The “extremists” in the US administration view the arsenals as an asset, and the most that Israel can expect from the administration is some mild pressure if it gets too “reckless” vis-à-vis the Palestinians or openly defies the US “road map” for peace.