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American policy-makers are in real trouble. They do not know
how to convince the Muslim world of what they believe to be their
concept of the current war against terrorism. And they will continue
to remain confused unless they recognize that they have to change
their policies, particularly in relation to the Palestine-Israel
issue.
This was the stark message that came out of a discussion on
'Talking With the Islamic World: Is the Message Getting Through?' at
the Georgetown University on Tuesday.
Whichever way the speakers or the questioners turned, this was
the proposition that kept cropping up. Even Christopher Ross, one of
the US government's top Middle East specialists and currently senior
adviser to the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public
affairs (the highfalutin title adopted for the new public outreach
effort), admitted that during a recent tour of the region, the
uniformity of views he got was quite remarkable.
He was told that if he wanted to find out how the American
image could be improved, he would not be able to do anything unless he
could change American policy, especially on the question of Palestine.
He said the refrain he heard was that the US was practising double
standards.
The overriding impression from what was said at the seminar,
which was arranged by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy as the
first of a three-part series, was that American credibility, despite
whatever support the Bush administration may be getting from assorted
leaders in Muslim countries, is low.
One questioner stood up to ask why, if the US wanted peace, it
did not publicly, simply and directly declare that it accepted a
Palestine state within the pre-1967 borders and that it stood for an
end to occupation of land captured since 1967. That is stated policy,
Mr Ross said: how we get to that point is the point. The Bush
administration, he said, had gone beyond previous governments in
outlining a vision for the future and in recognizing the need for a
Palestinian state. There was a failure of leadership in the region,
"and we cannot help that".
But where is the harm in spelling out in clear terms what the
questioner suggested? In this context, one of the panelists pointed
out that a couple of months ago, Secretary of State Colin Powell had
presented the US view of the region by underlining the need for the
creation of an independent Palestine state and an end to occupation.
But then pro-Israel groups had moved into top gear, and a deliberate
effort was made by Israel to undercut the Powell statement.
The Israeli occupation, and the cost it is extracting in terms
of people killed and the subjugation of Palestinians to a status of
virtual serfdom, is so dominant that other problems are being pushed
into the background. Mr Ross told the seminar that what did not come
out in his discussions with his interlocutors in the Middle East was a
keenness to discuss Afghanistan or attitudes towards Islam, and there
was general acceptance of the fact that America's current campaign was
not seen as directed against Islam as a religion. This, if Mr Ross
probes further, may turn out to be a merely regional reaction,
confined, moreover, to a certain class of enlightened and educated
Arabs.
If Mr Ross went to Pakistan, he might encounter different
nuances. He might find that while there's not much passion for the
Palestinian cause, there's great indignation against the US support
for Israel, and that at the heart of this indignation is the common
perception of the US campaign against Afghanistan as drifting, as
Akbar S. Ahmad, who holds the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at
American University and was one of the panelists at Tuesday's
discussion, pointed out, into a situation of the US vs the Muslim
world. Dr Akbar Ahmad also, pertinently, drew everyone's attention to
the fact that Arabs constitute only about 20 per cent of the world's
Muslim population.
The "axis of evil" phrase coined by President George Bush or
his speechwriters also inevitably raised its head in the discussion.
Raghida Dergham, Senior Diplomatic Correspondent of the London-based
Arabic Al Hayat, was forthright in saying that as long as Israel was
allowed to keep its weapons of mass destruction, no one in the Arab
world was going to accept the US charge against Iraq that the country
needed to be punished because it was acquiring similar weapons.
Nor, she said, would the accusation hold water that Saddam
Hussein was a brutal dictator as long as Washington continued to
support Ariel Sharon. She referred to UN resolutions on Iraq, and said
these nowhere mentioned a regime change in Baghdad, although the
removal of Saddam Hussein now appeared to be the overriding concern of
the US administration.
It was a good and an open discussion, carried out in a spirit
of inquiry, and was indicative of one of the strengths of American
polity, its readiness to discuss and debate, but whether it will prove
of more than academic interest in the present atmosphere of bashing
"rogue" states and groups must remain a moot point. Americans ask why
do the Arabs hate us, Dr James Zogby of the Arab American Institute
said, but they should remember that the Arabs are also asking the same
question: Why do the Americans seem to hate us so much?
And if all this was not enough, the Central Intelligence Agency
has reportedly widened its definition of groups that may be possible
targets to include groups that display anti-American sentiments.
In a report to Congress last week, CIA Director George Tenet
named these targets as the Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hamas and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), a left organization that has not attacked
targets inside the US or Americans abroad. However, Mr Tenet says, and
this is where the definition gets broader and broader, FARC "poses a
serious threat to US interests in Latin America because it associates
us with the government it is fighting against". In effect, what the
new policy means is that you do not have to actually attack America to
be in line for US attrition: you can attack Israel, which represents
US interests in the Middle East, and you can be liable to be punished
for that.
The PFLP, named in the new policy, was founded in 1967 by
George Habash, and this fact should serve to remind everyone again
that the Palestinian struggle is a secular, and not a religious,
movement, and one dedicated to resisting occupation. This aspect is
hardly ever highlighted in the US Media.
The death occurred last December after a brave struggle against
brain cancer of a much admired Kashmiri-American poet, Agha Shahid
Ali, 52, who commanded a devoted following among many Americans and
who continues to be remembered in tributes in the US media.
Agha Shahid Ali was the son of Agha Ashraf Ali, former
vice-chancellor of Srinagar University, and a nephew of Agha Shaukat
Ali, a Pakistan information ministry veteran who now lives in the US.
Shahid was born in Delhi, grew up in Kashmir, and studied in the US,
later adopting the teaching of poetry as his vocation. At the time of
his death he was a professor on the faculty of the University of Utah;
he had previously taught at Princeton and the University of
Massachusetts-Amherst. He called himself bicultural and a "multiple
exile", and some of the conflicts associated with this state are
reflected in his poetry. He was described by one interviewer as
someone who found himself on the "banks of the Indus, the Ganges and
the Hudson".
The Washington Post's Book World carried a moving write-up on
Shahid last Sunday by Edward Hirsah in which the poet's work was
described as "by turns stately, anguished, dislocated, extravagant,
high-spirited and heartbreaking".
Hirsah points out that Shahid was a great proponent of the
ghazal, wrote ghazals in English complete with 'qafia' and 'radeef',
translated Faiz, and instigated and edited a book entitled 'Ravishing
Disunities: Real Ghazals' in English, published in 2000, "which is a
gift to American poetry". The ghazal form was popularized in the West
by Goethe, and Lorca viewed it as a testament to the Muslim element in
his native Andalusia. Shahid's own ghazals are "both playful and
grief-stricken, animated by the feeling of love and dedicated to the
idea of the beloved. He found equal power and feeling in the Arabic
form of the qasida, which was used so evocatively by his beloved Lorca".
Here are a few lines from Ghazal, which forms part of Shahid's
anthology, The Country Without a Post Office (1997):
At an exhibition of miniatures, such delicate calligraphy
Kashmiri paisleys tied into the golden hair of Arabic
Where there were homes in Deir Yassein, you'll see dense forest
That village was razed. There's no sign of Arabic.
They ask me to tell them what Shahid means
Listen: It means "The Beloved" in Persian, "witness" in Arabic.
Dynamics of Ties with US
By Talat Masood
Pakistan's relationship with America, which is central to its foreign
policy goals, has undergone a dramatic change since its involvement as
a frontline state in the war on terrorism. The anti-terror campaign,
combined with the new American global agenda and Pakistan's own
internal and external compulsions, have provided the two nations a
solid framework for cooperation.
President Musharraf's visit to the US did help in further
consolidating this new-found relationship in symbolic as well as
substantive terms. Apart from enhancing General Musharraf's domestic
and international standing, it has helped regain some of Pakistan's
lost prestige and bring immediate gains as well as improve long-term
prospects for US-Pakistan relationship.
The economic package providing for debt retirement equivalent
to over a billion dollars, economic and military assistance and trade
concessions may be insufficient to offset the full economic costs of
the Afghan war in terms of a drop in GDP and a fall in exports and
investment. But the earlier suspension of nuclear and
democracy-related sanctions, along with the new economic incentives,
indicates a clear desire on the part of the US of cooperating with
Pakistan in its efforts to promote economic and political stability in
Pakistan.
Equally significant is the long-term security relationship that
the two countries are embarking upon. For this they have agreed to
revive the defence consultative group with an expanded role for it.
Pakistan is now described as a "strategic partner", in sharp contrast
to the pariah and "failed state" categorization of yesteryear. True,
for the time being it would not mean the release of F-16s or any major
weapons systems for sale. But eventually it could lead to that
provided Pakistan's policies continue to evolve in a direction that
does not run counter to important US interests and also if its economy
is robust enough to afford such purchases.
Good relations with the US are an important factor in
countervailing Indian hegemony. American presence in Central and South
Asia can be a stabilizing force in the region and could serve
Pakistan's interests at least in the short and medium terms as it
needs quite a years of peace to address its major domestic problems
and to concentrate on development. By accepting a relatively benign
American dominant role in the region, Pakistan expects to benefit in
the form of a cheek on Indian pressure, cooperation in certain defence
fields, lifting of sanctions, economic assistance, freer access for
Pakistani exports and better prospects of investment.
Today, the United States is in an extraordinary position of
power and influence and has become an indispensable player in efforts
to solve the regional problems be they in Afghanistan, Central Asia or
between India and Pakistan.
India is somewhat uneasy about the American presence in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. It perceives it as a threat to its own
hegemonic designs because it will inhibit the promotion of its own
distinctive interests in the region. Apart from the fact that it wants
America to keep pressure on Islamabad to stop support for the
Mujahideen in Kashmir, it wants no other regional role for Washington.
But the question is: will the US want to counter the spread of Indian
power? No doubt, in the past the US worked with secondary powers such
as Ukraine and some Eastern European countries to contain the Russian
power, but then the objective conditions in the two regions are very
different as the US is developing a close political and strategic
relationship with India.
Furthermore, even if it adopts a balance of power approach, it
would still want to have good relations with both India and Pakistan
though for a different set of reasons, which are not mutually
exclusive.
With limited investment of resources Washington has already
been able to leverage its position in the region. It has a military
presence in both Central and as South Asia and is well positioned to
minimize or counter potential hegemonic tendencies of the major
regional players if it chooses to do so. Besides, it can pursue its
national interests being so close now to the strategic oil and gas
reserves of Central Asia. Probably already sensing these moves by the
US, India has developed its own counter-strategy by expanding its
military and nuclear power and getting closer to the Russians as a
strategic ally to offset the probably US dominance in the region.
Pakistan too could muster additional strength by seeking
extra-regional support, say from China.
Although Beijing currently is in no mood to be distracted from
its unflinching commitment to internal economic and social development
and wants to steer clear of Indo-Pakistan rivalry. Ironically, its
foreign policy in some ways appears to reflect an awareness of
America's growing presence in South and Central Asia. It wants to
develop good relations with the two South Asian rivals to maximize its
own influence even if it means overlooking India's aspirations to
emerge as a major rival and a countervailing force in the context of
Asia.
Pakistan's apprehension in the past that the US in its
romanticized liason with India may allow the region to evolve on its
own, meaning thereby that India would be left free to dominate it,
seems an unlikely prospect in the present circumstances. Undoubtedly,
India's democracy and its secular political system and ambience are
congruent with western norms and values. Then there is the recognition
of the fact that India is on its way to becoming a major Asian power
and in the context of the China factor it is supposed to be the only
equalizer. All this leads to the decoupling of India and Pakistan to
some extent in US-policy making.
Washington, however, realizes that the risk inherent in this
approach is that once India acquires an elevated power base and an
unchallenged regional status it may pursue policies which may even be
incompatible with America's long term interests. In any case,
Washington perceives its foreign relations not as a zero-sum game in
the Pak-India context, as our gains are not necessarily India's losses
and vice versa.
In this web of conflicting and sometimes overlapping
requirements, US policy of South Asia is likely to be heavily
influenced both by extra-regional considerations and the intrinsic
strength and stability of the regional actors. Success of economic
reforms, development of democratic institutions and the emergence of a
vibrant civil society in Pakistan thus acquire even greater
significance in the light of these considerations.
There are other factors which could influence US-Pakistan
relations. For instance, the public here would be very critical of the
US if it were to use force against Iraq or Iran in its unilateral
drive to punish these states. Undoubtedly, Washington is in a mood of
being interventionist and unilateralist applying double standards
where it suits its purpose, but hopefully it will not continue it be
so for fear of losing the support of its allies and polarizing the
world.
We should, however, expect that America would continue
aggressively to contain and confront militant Islam from wherever it
emanates. The scars of 9/11 are too fresh in the American psyche to
make a clear distinction between terrorism and freedom struggle or to
address the root causes of conflicts.
Ultimately, durable relations among nations are based on shared
values and political principles. If Pakistan can return to democracy
on a sound institutional basis and is able to combat extremism within
its body politic, it will command greater acceptability and respect in
the US policy-making circles.
America is today defining its worldview more in practical and
less in moral terms as complex global trends are shaping the world. We
must make a sober assessment of these developments. The United States
enjoys a pre-eminent position in today's unipolar world. Its military
power is overwhelming and its economic strength unmatched.
We have to realize that that US policy in South Asia possesses
competing and contradictory objectives and it is important to evaluate
these in order to make a more informed judgment.
The United States and for that matter the other members of the
western world and also China and Japan have a substantial interest in
helping Pakistan to overcome its current economic, political and
social difficulties. They are interested in a "transformed" Pakistan
so that it ceases to be a threat as a militant society and would help
itself in the fields of education, economy and the development of a
sound democratic system. Washington would like a reduction of tensions
between India and Pakistan even if it cannot help in finding a
solution to the Kashmir dispute, because they realize that the
country's domestic life is badly distorted by over militarization.
Even if we cannot move forward for a settlement of the Kashmir
problem, it may be important for Pakistan, for reasons of
self-interest and current compulsions, to lesson tensions with India
to free up resources for more productive purposes. The current US role
of pacifying the two South Asian rivals can have a stabilizing effect
on the region. The best that we can expect of the US is that it will
protect us from Indian hegemony and provide enough space for us to
grapple with our acute internal political and socio-economic problems
and challenges.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant-General of the Pakistan
army.
Luring Foreign Investors
By Sultan Ahmed
The large number of foreign delegates to the regional meeting of the
International Chamber of Commerce in Karachi for two days came to have
a good idea of the investment climate in Pakistan and the country's
economic prospects in the medium term.
Government officials led by commerce minister Razak Dawood and
finance minister Shaukat Aziz explained the policies of the
government, their readiness to help the investors all the way, and the
government's expectations from them. Minister for Petroleum Usman
Ameenuddin spoke of the possible need for importing oil for over eight
million dollars by the year 2010-11 instead of 3 billion dollars as at
present. That means there is plenty of scope for investing in the oil
and gas sectors which are giving good dividends to the investors. And
the Minister for Privatization Altaf Saleem sketched out the
government's mega privatization programme which is to be given a big
boost in the coming months and years.
Internationally Pakistan now presents a far better economic
picture than before the September 11 terrorist attack in the US with
its political fallout around the world. The debt burden has been
considerably lightened, and instead of rising by 19 per cent as it did
in 1990 to 1999 it increased by only 0.4 per cent in the last two
years, says the finance minister. And the deal with the Paris Club has
reduced the debt liabilities by 2.7 billion dollars.
Outflow of funds from the country has eased a great deal, while
the inflow has increased. The foreign exchange reserves now exceed
five billion dollars, inclusive of the privately held reserves in
banks, and the exchange rate of the rupee has stabilized around 60 to
a dollar instead of racing towards 70 to a dollar. The rate of
inflation growth is also low compared to the double-digit inflation of
the 1990s, due to both external and internal factors.
Of course, there are setbacks in the area of revenue
collection, budget deficit and fall in exports due to the global
recession. But those deficits are manageable due to sizable external
assistance, lower cost of debt servicing and the swaps being
negotiated to exchange debt repayments for funding the social sector.
In spite of such obvious developments not much of foreign
investment may come in the immediate future. The reasons are many. And
they made the secretary-general of the ICC Maria Cattaui say
investors' confidence in Pakistan remains weak which should be
addressed. She also warned the conference of the high social cost
incurred in implementing the economic reforms programme.
The finance minister gave details of reforms in all the sectors
relevant to foreign investment or overall investment. He said
President Musharraf was setting up a cabinet committee to suggest
modalities for eliminating irritants and red tape, and the
opportunities for corruption created by such procedures.
The federal law minister Shahida Jameel spoke of the measures
the government was taking to protect copyright and intellectual
property rights which has been the long standing demand of foreign
companies. After hearing such ministerial commitments and assurances
one of the delegates said it would be interesting to explore large
scale investment prospects in Pakistan after the promised reforms are
carried out, and many of the irritants and uncertainties were removed.
The uncertainties are not all economic or fiscal. To begin with
violence breaks out in Afghanistan frequently and the US is forced to
bomb the country from time to time. And that has its fallout in
Pakistan. The tension with India which has massed its forces on our
borders has not eased. India clearly wants to hurt Pakistan
economically and negate its recent economic gains as much as possible.
Then there is the law and order problem in Pakistan highlighted now by
the kidnapping of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. To
add to that, there is the political uncertainty.
The delegates to the ICC meeting were told that Gen. Musharraf
would be around guiding the country after the October elections as
well. But the foreign investors are not sure about the workability of
the new political set-up and whether the new government would stick to
the reforms and assurances of the military rulers. The investors want
to ensure safety and a reasonable return on their investment in a
developing country with all its hazards.
The infrastructure is inadequate for large scale foreign
investment, except in the petroleum sector, where the interest is
pretty good and rewarding. There is shortage of power and water.
Additional investment has to be made to produce one's own power. Roads
are a major problem. And poor roads discourage investors going into
the distant countryside for investment and exposing themselves to
criminals and kidnappers.
Taxation continues to be a major problem for foreign investors.
While the domestic investors are able to get around the heavy taxation
through devious means, foreign investors are reluctant to adopt such
tactics. And that includes Pakistani executives of foreign companies
as well.
The Central Board of Revenue continues to be viewed by
investors as a dragon. Taxation officers tell executives of the
multinational companies that they are rich enough to pay the large
revenues demanded of them. And that outrages these companies. The CBR
is to be reformed or thoroughly overhauled following the
recommendations of the Taxation Reforms Committee headed by Shahid
Husain, former vice-president of the World Bank, but the reform
process is too slow and resistance from the CBR too strong.
The Labour laws are still pretty primitive or crude and the
reform attempts are too slow. Hence companies are taking in new
employees very slowly and too cautiously. Employers have been
clamouring for the right to hire and fire for long. As the employees
federations resisted that, the employers have been resorting to
devious means to do both and hurting the interests of the employees.
The government ought to move fast in this area and the employees have
to become more realistic and give employment expansion as much
importance as preservation of existing jobs on existing terms.
The legal system of the country has to become good enough to
decide commercial disputes quick whether they be between the companies
and the government or between the companies themselves instead of
taking a very long time. The judges too should not play a partisan
role in disputes between foreign companies and Pakistanis. Instead
they should come to fair decisions quick and get them enforced.
The government is reported to be processing several legal
measures in this area. But what matters is not only the law but also
its execution for which the government and the judiciary have to take
special steps.
Foreign investors also find it tough to get the rich Pakistani
partners. Now they find too many of the possible partners are large
defaulters of bank loans. Pakistani partners tend to think in terms of
short term gains instead of long term partnerships. Most Pakistani
investors are accustomed to managing their own business under family
management and are not accustomed to corporate management. That
approach has to give way to modern management styles.
When it came to the taxes which are too many Shaukat Aziz said
the solution lay in reducing the federal taxes to three - income tax,
sales tax and customs revenues in a country which has about 102 taxes,
federal provincial and local. But the government is too slow to move
in that direction, while the province are dragging their feet in
reducing the number of their taxes which earlier was 27.
Governor Mohammadmian Soomro is delighted by the foreign food
outlets which are opening in the country and expanding. There are
franchises of about 10 American, British and even Mexican companies.
He is happy Pakistanis are flocking to such food outlets, and he even
gave a special award for Pizza Hut, Clifton, for record sales around
the world.
But what the country needs is large scale manufacturing units
which provide large scale employment, help expand exports and provide
for import substitution. We need introduction of new technology. We
need a revolution in our manufacturing methods to face the challenges
of globalization and conform to the demands of the World Trade
Organization.
Will Tears Ever Stop?
By John Gerassi
I can't help crying. As soon as I see a person on TV telling the
heart-rendering story of the tragic fate of their loved-one in the
World Trade Centre disaster, I can't control my tears. But then I
wonder why didn't I cry when our troops wiped out some 5,000 poor
people in Panama's El Chorillo neighbourhood on the excuse of looking
for Noriega. Our leaders knew he was hiding elsewhere but we destroyed
El Chorillo because the folks living there were nationalists who
wanted the US out of Panama completely.
Worse still, why didn't I cry when we killed two million
Vietnamese, mostly innocent peasants, in a war which its main
architect, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, knew we could not win?
When I went to give blood the other day, I spotted a Cambodian doing
the same, three up in the line, and that reminded me: Why didn't I cry
when we helped Pol Pot butcher another million by giving him arms and
money, because he was opposed to "our enemy" (who eventually stopped
the killing fields)?
To stay up but not cry that evening, I decided to go to a
movie. I chose Lumumba, at the Film Forum, and again I realized that I
hadn't cried when our government arranged for the murder of the
Congo's only decent leader, to be replaced by General Mobutu, a
greedy, vicious, murdering dictator. Nor did I cry when the CIA
arranged for the overthrow of Indonesia's Soekarno, who had fought the
Japanese World War II invaders and established a free independent
country, and then replaced him by another general, Suharto, who had
collaborated with the Japanese and who proceeded to execute at least
half a million "Marxists" (in a country where, if folks had ever heard
of Marx, it was at best Groucho)?
I watched TV again last night and cried again at the picture of
that wonderful now-missing father playing with his two-month old
child. Yet when I remembered the slaughter of thousands of
Salvadorans, so graphically described in the Times by Ray Bonner, or
the rape and murder of those American nuns and lay sisters there, all
perpetrated by CIA trained and paid agents, I never shed a tear.
I even cried when I heard how brave had been Barbara Olson,
wife of the solicitor-general, whose political views I detested. But I
didn't cry when the US invaded that wonderful tiny Caribbean nation of
Grenada and killed innocent citizens who hoped to get a better life by
building a tourist airfield, which my government called proof of a
Russian base, but then finished building once the island was secure in
the US camp again.
Why didn't I cry when Ariel Sharon, now Israel's prime
minister, planned, then ordered, the massacre of two thousand poor
Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, the same
Sharon who, with such other Irgun and Stern Gang terrorists become
prime ministers as Begin and Shamir, killed the wives and children of
British officers by blowing up the King David Hotel where they were
billeted?
I guess one cries only for one's own. But is that a reason to
demand vengeance on anyone who might disagree with us? That's what
Americans seem to want. Certainly our government does, and so too most
of our media. Do we really believe that we have a right to exploit the
poor folk of the world for our benefit, because we claim we are free
and they are not?
We are certainly entitled to go after those who killed so many
of our innocent brothers and sisters. And we'll win, of course.
Against Osama bin Laden. Against Taliban. Against Iraq. Against
whoever and whatever. In the process we'll kill a few innocent
children again. Children who have no clothes for the winter. No houses
to shelter them. And no schools to learn why they are guilty, at two
or four or six years old. Maybe Evangelists Farwell and Robertson will
claim their death is good because they weren't Christians, and maybe
some State Department spokesperson will tell the world that they were
so poor that they're now better off.
And then what? Will we now be able to run the world the way we
want to? With all the new legislation establishing massive
surveillance of you and me, our CEOs will certainly be pleased that
the folks demonstrating against globalization will now be cowed for
ever. No more riots in Seattle, Quebec or Genoa. Peace at last.
Until next time. Who will it be then? A child grown-up who
survived our massacre of his innocent parents in El Chorillo? A
Nicaraguan girl who learned that her doctor mother and father were
murdered by a bunch of gangsters we called democratic contras who read
in the CIA handbook that the best way to destroy the only government
which was trying to give the country's poor a better lot was to kill
its teachers, health personnel and government farm workers? Or maybe
it will be a bitter Chilean who is convinced that his whole family was
wiped out on order of Nixon's Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who
could never tell the difference between a communist and a democratic
socialist or even a nationalist.
When will we Americans learn that as long as we keep trying to
run the world for the sake of the bottom line, we will suffer
someone's revenge? No war will ever stop terrorism as long as we use
terror to have our way. So I stopped crying because I stopped watching
TV. I went for a walk. Just four houses from mine. There, a crowd had
congregated to lay flowers and lit candles in front of our local
firehouse. It was closed. It had been closed since long because the
firemen, a wonderful bunch of friendly guys who always greeted
neighbourhood folks with smiles and good cheer, had rushed so fast to
save the victims of the first tower that they perished with them when
it collapsed. And I cried again.
So I said to myself when I wrote this, don't send it; some of
your students, colleagues, neighbours will hate you, maybe even harm
you. But then I put on the TV again, and there was Secretary of State
Powell telling me that it will be okay to go to war against these
children, these poor folks, these US-haters, because we are civilized
and they are not. So I decided to risk it. Maybe, reading this, one
more person will ask: Why are so many people in the world ready to die
to give us a taste of what we give them?
The writer is Professor of Political Science, Queen's College and the
Graduate Centre, CUNY, US. |