The fear of isolation has led Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to meet with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Damascus last week, where a tripartite “summit” was held. The fourth party to such a summit, absent from the famous “picture” yet present at the strategic meetings of the so-called “axis of resistance and defiance”, are the leaders of the armed Palestinian factions that assume Damascus as their political headquarters and Lebanon as their military front. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad headed to the Syrian capital carrying various messages directed at the West, especially the United States and France, at the East which is pressuring him, specifically China and Russia, and at the Middle East in both its Arab and Israeli aspects. The main heading of such a message is that the Islamic Republic of Iran holds the keys of war through Lebanon, not just through Hezbollah but also through armed Palestinian factions, and that the pledges and reassurances put forth by any other party are of no use. The other message, directed by Ahmadinejad at the Syrian leadership, is that raising the war agenda is an Iranian decision par excellence at this juncture, especially in these times of Western and Eastern courting of Syria, and in these times of isolation besieging Iran, even appearing in the form of inquiries by the likes of Hugo Chavez about escalatory support relations with Iran for the sake of relations of interests that serve him and serve Venezuela. However, one of the most important things the Iranian President wanted to achieve in Damascus was to openly force Syria into the ranks of countries upon which falls the responsibility of war and resistance from their borders with Israel, de facto overturning, even if temporarily, Syria’s constant and declared assurance that negotiation – and not resistance – is its strategic choice. Ahmadinejad also made sure in Damascus to warn against merely thinking of complying with the attempts to gain Syria’s affections coming from the US through diplomacy, the ambassador and promises, as well as those coming from Europe with investments, rehabilitation and breaking an isolation which not long ago was terrifying for Damascus. Indeed, Damascus is nearly alone the main country which, if it complied with desires for it to break its engagement with Iran, would leave Iran in a state of deep isolation. Faced with all of this, the Syrian leadership stands before challenges and highly accurate calculations as it walks on tightropes with both the West and Iran in its bilateral relations with all parties and in highly sensitive areas, most prominently Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. And here lie the reasons and the potential results, in terms of profit, loss and perhaps risks. The Iranian-Syrian relationship in and towards Iraq is unclear. In fact, it holds strikingly obscure contradictions and interpenetrations with the US-Syrian relationship in Iraq. Indeed, Iraq remains the regional priority for the Islamic Republic of Iran, directly after its utmost priority, which is the survival of the regime. Some may think that Lebanon is the most important scene of Iranian-Syrian cooperation or communication. Lebanon is of course important in this relationship, but Iraq today is nearly more important, placing this relationship under mutual surveillance in this phase.

There is talk about the de facto relationship of understanding and cooperation between the US and Iran over Iraq recently suffering a relapse, the tepid atmosphere reaching the point of Washington taking the decision of returning to the policy-making table, specifically between the cadres of Commander of US Central Command General David Petraeus. There is also talk about an increase in US-Syrian cooperation in Iraq. Some say that Damascus wants to exercise influence towards Iraq by leading a unified Baath Party, but it is not clear whether this is really taking place, and to what extent, as well as whether it is taking place within agreed-upon US-Syrian cooperation. It is a message from Damascus to Washington that includes the various capabilities of Syrian influence in Iraq. It is clear that there is US-Iranian divergence in Iraq, whereas there is US-Syrian convergence there. What is obscure is whether this is taking place by an Iranian-Syrian understanding falling under role distribution, or whether this indicates the gradual and relative success of the European-American strategy based on splitting Syria from Iran. Breaking the engagement with a complete split is not an option for Damascus, yet what is taking place might be a lessening of the degree of engagement. Perhaps the Iranian leadership saw this coming and sent its President to Damascus, where he would voice the message of matters being run from Tehran and would purposely say, during meetings of resistance and defense against Israel, that Iraq is an important part of this axis and of this circle. And because Iraq is in the view of the current regime in Tehran its “backyard”, and has become, after the Iraq war, the achievement and the gift which cannot be relinquished, Tehran is getting ready for any signs, indications or even rumors of US-Syrian cooperation or of a Syrian role perhaps resulting from inter-Arab reconciliation. Thus the equation is of the utmost accuracy for the Syrian leadership, as it walks the tightrope in Iraq in its strategic relationship with Iran and in the balance of its Arab reconciliations. Indeed, what preoccupies the regime in Tehran is not limited to the near-complete isolation that would befall it in case Damascus splits away from it, but it is also preoccupied by the kind of trade-offs that are taking place in the US-Syrian relationship and in inter-Arab reconciliations, specifically that between Saudi Arabia and Syria. And perhaps one of the things the Iranian leadership had in mind when it sent Ahmadinejad to Damascus was to anticipate the trade-offs and to undermine some of the bases of the reconciliations.

Regarding the Palestinian factions, and regardless of whether inviting them to meet in Damascus came though a decision or a suggestion from Damascus or Tehran, the result is the same and the message is clear: namely that, first of all, the regime in Iran considers thwarting US President Barack Obama’s efforts to activate the peace process in its Palestinian and Syrian aspects to be a cornerstone in the interest of the Tehran regime. Indeed, any success in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue is a failure for the Iranian agenda based on hijacking the “cause” from Arab leaders in order to incite Arab and Muslim peoples against them, and for the defiance of the regime in Iran to become a banner and a symbol of nationalism and pride. The issue does not regard Palestine alone, as Tehran in fact objects to making peace between Syria and Israel even if it leads to ending Israeli occupation of the Golan. Second, Iran has sought to become an alternative agent for Palestinian factions including those loyal to Syria, this in order to weaken Syria’s assets in trade-offs with the United States and to strengthen Iran’s in Lebanon. This is why the true leader in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, made sure to receive the leaders of Hamas and of Palestinian factions directly after the Damascus meeting, which included Palestinian military leaderships allied with Damascus and working in Lebanon. To assert, the intention here is not to say that the leadership of Hamas abroad has decided to split away from Damascus, but that it plays its political and financial cards at the same time, moving in turn on a tightrope in both relationships. The Syrian leadership has proven that it has perfected its diplomatic skill and can play its cards with dexterity, yet it has in the past committed mistakes due to excessive confidence which led it away from making the right calculations. It is extremely cautious, accurate and skillful when it comes to its relations with Iran, to the ways in which it manipulates its Palestinian cards, and to the means of forging a new role for itself in Iraq, but it is in danger of repeating what it did in Lebanon, perhaps because it has not yet adapted to its new relationship to it.

The new reality of the official Lebanese-Syrian relationship, based on the principle of two independent states of equal sovereignty, has suffered a blow from the attempt to nip in the bud the notion of the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and the codified relationship between Syrian and Lebanese state institutions which Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit to Damascus less than two months ago had resulted in. The message represents a blow to the Lebanese offices of Prime Minister and President of the Republic, as it signifies: we are above you. This in short is a direct interference on the part of Syria and Iran into Lebanese internal affairs, even if the meeting took place in the presence of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, because Hezbollah represents part of the government, not the government or the state as a whole. Perhaps Damascus did not purposely void of its meaning the notion of consolidating the relationship between the two countries, yet there is a feeling among public opinion that it from the start was not serious about strengthening such a qualitatively new institutional relationship, that it has changed its mind for reasons that concern it, or that it has adopted the principle of “take and demand more” and quickly returned to its old habits when Hariri’s visit achieved what it wanted. Its reactions to what Hariri told Italian newspaper “Corriere della Sera” did not come in protest of the significance of what he said as much as it came in anticipation and containment of putting to practice the notion of two independent states, and in an eagerness to revive the practices of subordination by which Syria controlled Lebanon in the past. And that is in the interest of neither Syria nor Lebanon, nor does it profit the Syrian leadership during this important transitional phase.

There is no need for it to lose its European and American investments in order to position itself and assume its current role in the Middle East, through Turkey or through Iran, or independently from either of them. Furthermore, ruining regional relations that have been repaired by directing a blow at the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state and government is not a sound long-term investment for Syria, for Lebanon or for Arab interests. There is no need for Damascus to appear as if contributing to hindering stability in Lebanon, or to providing Israel with ammunition so that it can rush to attack Lebanon and perhaps Syria as well. Skill at playing cards is one thing and taking risks through misinterpreting international factors is another. This applies to all players in the “axis of defiance”, especially since Israel is nearly an honorary member in such an axis, as it benefits from obstinacy and waits for mistakes in order to jump to wars that serve its purposes.

Syria’s reservations over the support of the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers for indirect negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel are not reservations over indirect negotiations or over the principle of negotiation. They could be reservations for reasons related to Syrian-Israeli negotiations, or they could have a direct relation to the Damascus meeting and its results in terms of decisions, suggestions or views. Yet at the end of the day Damascus will not sound the drums of war or lead one against Israel. Indeed, it perfectly understands that Iran will not lead a war against Israel as a direct participant, and it knows that the Arabs will not take a group decision to wage war against Israel. The Syrian leadership will therefore not offer its borders as a front for wars and resistance, and that is because it understands its own interests and the interests of its country.