Decision-makers in the United States are divided over the issue of the fate of “deteriorating” US-Chinese relations and over whether what is taking place between the two giants really is deterioration or merely a storm in a teacup. Iran holds an important position in balancing the relationship between the United States and China, but it alone is not enough to throw the balance off one way or the other. Indeed, as in Iran and Sudan, and also in Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a mixture of strategic competition and cooperation between the two countries. The atmosphere of tension during this period is caused by disagreements over Taiwan and Google, in addition to accusations of Chinese “piracy” over the internet of devices belonging to US companies. Yet there are those within the US political-military institution who point to the close cooperation between the United States and China in “the alliance against piracy” in maritime routes essential for the transport of oil from the Gulf and other regions, and who say that there is “no tension” there at all, and that Chinese policy is “pragmatic” and focuses on “common interests”, most prominently freedom of navigation and guarding the main routes of oil. What happens to this relationship certainly reflects on Iran’s alliance and its consequences in terms of its nuclear ambitions and regional relations. The fact that the United States has been spreading anti-missile defense systems in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) does not represent a qualitative shift in its relationship with these countries but rather sends a message of deterrence and reassurance to Iran and Israel respectively. In spite of this, there is talk of a “transformation” in US President Barack Obama’s tactics and strategy after a difficult year for his presidency. Some of it is concerned with the Gulf region, the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East, and most of it is focused on speaking the language of US strategic interests. It is not clear who will prove right: those who say that it is too early to judge “Obamism” because it has not yet matured and because it is still in the process of buying some stability in international relations… or those who say that “Obamism” has failed and that Barack Obama will not be able to secure a second term if he does not cease his policy of relaxation and embracement. Those who speak of a transformation in the US President’s tactical and strategic policy say that it is either an attempt to save the presidency or the features of Obama’s “growth” in the White House and his realizing the necessity of speaking the language of the US’s higher interests. This means maintaining the position of superpower, protecting oil sites and routes, and thinking strategically in a language of geopolitical realism. 

Iraq, for example, has begun to return to the forefront, not from the perspective of implementing an exit strategy, but rather from that of the necessity of reexamining Iraq from the standpoint of its strategic and oil value in considerations necessary for US interests. Henry Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post this week, warning of the “consequences” of neglecting Iraq and ignoring its central position in the strategic balance with Iran. Others have begun to speak in terms of the need for Obama to stop considering the “exit strategy” from Iraq to be an achievement, and to replace this with a strategy of protecting direct US interests, meaning the oil companies and others, and higher national interests, in the sense of realizing the tremendous importance of Iraq with regard to China positioning itself as a superpower or the United States continuing to monopolize this position. The political-military institution does not necessarily agree that the Barack Obama Administration has ignored Iraq, and it considers that the new president has not overturned the main features of US policy. Rather, he has moved forward with what politics had reached towards the end of George W. Bush’s presidency. There are also those who are of the opinion that there is nothing amazingly new in the various issues, and that things are in fact not necessarily bad. In Yemen, for example, these circles consider that the defeat inflicted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has increased the resolve of Al-Qaeda leaders to use Yemen as a gathering point and base of operations in order to get revenge from the KSA and from Gulf countries as a whole. Moreover, they consider that Yemen’s neighbors will be the ones to bear the burden of saving Yemen from the fangs of Al-Qaeda and from slipping into chaos, this through the following: insisting that the Yemeni government should initiate cease-fire with the Houthis and reach an understanding with the Southerners; and providing funds in order to be able to place Yemen on the track to stability.

In terms of international contribution in Yemen, on the other hand, these circles consider that the “maritime alliance” which takes Manama as its base, and in which American, European, Russian, Chinese and also Pakistani ships participate, takes priority. Common interests, represented by the freedom and protection of the navigation of ships carrying oil, have forged partnerships that will not be affected by disputes, no matter how short-lived or fierce. This alliance was established more than a year ago, and it is a maritime alliance in which no Arab countries participate but a few and in small numbers. As for Russia, China, Europe and the United States, they are in the same “trench” when it comes to protecting maritime routes. Political-military circles do not expect a US-Chinese confrontation over Iran, despite the rising tone of disagreements because of Taiwan, Google, internet piracy and the expected visit of the spiritual and political leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, to the United States. They rather expect a kind of “building on” recent Iranian stances expressed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over enriching uranium outside of Iran, and also that about the release of Americans held in Iran. This would lead to delaying putting forth a draft resolution to reinforce sanctions against Tehran, and thus to avoiding any diplomatic confrontation with China or between the great powers, the five permanent members at the Security Council, who favor unanimity within their ranks regarding Iran’s nuclear alliance.

All of this indicates that the rising tone of tension and hyperbole in predicting military confrontations in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon is in fact excessive and might even be baseless at this juncture. There are no realistic indications of Iran’s desire for military escalation, through Hezbollah in Lebanon or through others, because Tehran is skilled at interpreting the relationship between the US and China and realizes that the shared interests are too strong to be threatened by Iran refusing to yield to international demands that have been met with unanimity. Similarly, Israel in turn understands the language of interests and realizes that international unanimity has not taken a direction that would allow it to strike against Iran or get implicated in Lebanon. It is thus unlikely for it to adopt the provocation of a military confrontation. Part of these anti-missile defense systems of the Patriot type located in some GCC countries are aimed at deterring Israel from attacking Iran and at deterring Iran from taking revenge through operations against GCC countries or against oil facilities. Part of the reassurance is aimed at both Iran and Israel, in a message signifying that there is solidarity between the countries of the region and with the United States over the fact that no one wants Iran to provoke Israel and no one wants Israel to attack Iran. Indeed, these Patriot systems are defensive, not offensive, and they have been present in the Gulf region since the invasion of Kuwait. Therefore, what is new about them is the clamor that has accompanied them, knowing that military cooperation between the United States and the GCC countries has led to spending more than a trillion dollars. In addition, neither Russia nor China has signaled the alarm regarding these anti-missile systems, and there are in fact indications that there is understanding and agreement over them.

In Afghanistan too there is agreement and understanding, whereby Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperate well. China also participates, but to a lesser extent. GCC countries have also entered the partnership on the issue of Afghanistan, as they consider that their contribution benefits them on both the short and the long term, directly and as party to international partnerships. The President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai has asked Saudi Monarch King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz to play a direct role in helping to achieve Afghan reconciliation, i.e. including with the Taliban. In such a proposition lies an attempt to draw the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into bearing responsibility it has no need for. It is part of an international partnership that involves shared responsibility, and it has no need to bear individual responsibility, whether for the failure of a national reconciliation or for its success through a rehabilitation of the Taliban it might be blamed for.

Indeed, everyone knows that this is the phase of partnerships despite the verbal assaults – whether they are regional or taking place between giants like China and the United States. And everyone is positioning themselves accordingly.